


Purism: Summary of its Ontological Proof of the Impossibility of God¹

Primus²



“God,” at the Plantation of Doubt’ (original rendition of “God” by JVictor-25 using AI assisted tools): A(ny) “God” will always possess the seed of empirically-derived epistemic uncertainty regarding the absoluteness (permanence) of their power, irrespective of the apparent purview of their knowledge and power. The proof herein further provides rationally-derived confirmation of their inability to conceive that their power is absolute – that all power is mortal and that faith in divinity as a source of material salvation is fatal.

Herein, I summarize the proof contained within my (+2020) article titled, “Purism: An ontological proof for the impossibility of God,” published in *Secular Studies*. I further include a(n unpublished) proof* that we are not living in a (simulated or actual) world which is ‘intelligently designed.’

Proof we cannot, a priori, conceive of God(s)

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² ‘Primus’ is my full, legal name. My formal qualifications include a Bachelor of Psychology (Honours) and a Masters of Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism. To report logical objections or grammatical errors: primus@purity.org

1. The fabric of reality must be conceived, a priori, to be *absolutely* consistent.

We cannot conceive, a priori, that the fabric which underlies reality could embody a difference (i.e., any kind of variation) *within* itself (i.e., we cannot imagine that a difference could exist discretely, at individual points³ of reality itself, or that reality could be limited across times and space). We must instead conceive that (all) difference exists continuously, across (multiple points of) reality (i.e., we must imagine that all differences exist as *conditional* (non-absolute, contingent) properties which are localized arrangements (motions) of a fabric which extends indefinitely across times and space). Put more simply, upon appropriate consideration we must imagine that an absolutely consistent, immutable material underlies everything and that all the various entities that exist, exist as (temporary) arrangements (i.e., motions) of this fabric. The consistency of this fabric provides the consistency that we indirectly sense and directly observe within our world. It provides the basis for laws of physics, logic and mathematics – that entities uniformly interact and cannot collapse into each other and that one point of the fabric of reality is equivalent to any other one point: 1=1. Our inability to conceive of a ‘square-circle’ is an example of our generalizable (a priori) inability to conceive of difference – in this example, the properties of ‘straightness’ and ‘curvedness’ – at any individual point(s) of space. For details on this assertion, and this proof more generally, see Primus, +2020.

2. The defining property of (any) God is that they (and their powers) exist *absolutely*. Gods, by definition, are not mortal; they (and their powers) cannot be created or destroyed except, perhaps, by their own design.

3. We cannot conceive, a priori, that two *absolute* entities – the absolute consistency of the fabric of reality and the absolute power of God – could coexist. To do so would require the conception of difference within the fabric of reality. To the contrary, we are limited to conceive that the fabric of reality exists with absolute consistency and that all other entities are mortal, meaning that their difference (i.e., their existential separation from, and power over, their environment) exists as

³ By ‘point,’ I mean the smallest area of reality that an(y) particular observer can conceive in any moment.

conditional properties of this fabric (in motion). As such, Gods can (only) superficially be conceived to exist – when considered outside of appropriate consideration of the nature of the fabric of reality.

4. Our conception of God is therefore, a priori:

A. limited to exist as an immortal yet wholly passive, powerless entity – otherwise known as ‘the fabric of reality’ or ‘space’ – whose only property is *consistency*. This is similar to Benedict Spinoza’s (+1677) conception of God, except that Spinoza imagined “God” to possess ‘infinite attributes’ (rather than the singular property of consistency – Spinoza’s God too is irreconcilable with an(y) appropriately considered conception of the fabric of reality); **or:**

B. limited to exist as a mortal and thus fallible entity, as per humans, whose power can be surpassed and destroyed; or:

C. impossible (inconceivable, a priori).

5. Iterations A. and B. do not meet the traditional definition of God (as found in popular religion) and therefore we must conclude C.: we cannot conceive, a priori, that God exists.

Proof* we are not living in a world which was ‘intelligently designed’ (by god(s)⁴)

1. Entities capable of ‘intelligent design’ are, by definition, highly intelligent and highly capable.

⁴ By ‘gods’ (lowercase ‘g’), I mean highly advanced mortals, noting that we cannot conceive of Gods – entities of absolute power.

2. Highly intelligent and capable entities would almost certainly possess the ability (e.g., knowledge,⁵ resources⁶) and motivation⁷ to design and build an ethical world.⁸

⁵ I define knowledge as (merely) justified belief. The implication of this, as Edmund Gettier (1963) alludes to, is that knowledge need not be true or equal in terms of value (i.e., some knowledge might be false in retrospect, and some knowledge might be more [true or false] than other knowledge).

⁶ Highly capable material entities would almost certainly possess a proportionately high degree of ability to realize persons' desires (including disclosure of the truth regarding whether our world was 'intelligently designed' and whether its nature is simulated or actual).

⁷ Material entities of highly advanced intelligence will almost certainly possess both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to do what is ethically right. The *internal* motivation to act in accordance with moral realism (and do what is objectively and universally ethical) will almost certainly exist within any material entity of highly advanced intelligence and technological resources, as granted by their proportionately high degree of ethical maturity and sense of responsibility and their accompanying lack of motive (need) to deviate from their ethical path. Entities possessing the technological resources necessary to create (a simulated or actual) existence would almost certainly possess everything they need and want. If, for example, these advanced entities themselves desired to deceive humans into believing that the human condition was real when it is really a simulation, they could believe they are orchestrating this deception while living in a simulation. In this simulation of a simulation, these advanced entities would believe they are simulating the lives of real people who wanted to know the truth of their condition and yet these people would merely be simulated (i.e., apparent yet not actual) "persons." As such, these advanced entities could believe they are deceiving humans while also believing that they are not in a simulation (until they wanted to know truth). Furthermore, these highly advanced entities could, if they desired, actually and ethically allow people to live in a simulation if, and for as long as, these people specifically desired as much – the desire to know truth, however, would always override any previous desires to be deceived. Ultimately, these highly advanced entities would possess no internally-derived reason to deviate from what they know is ethical because they would not be lacking anything (in contrast to contemporary humans); they would be wholly content due to their ability to have their needs and desires fulfilled ethically, irrespective of the nature of those needs and desires (e.g., even if they desire to deceive humans). Furthermore, the *external* motivation to act in accordance with moral realism (and do what is objectively and universally ethical) will almost certainly exist within any material entity of highly advanced intelligence, as granted by its proportionately high ability to consider its existential condition deeply and distantly, bringing a fear of being silently observed and judged by forces unknown (e.g., other entities of advanced intelligence, potentially existing outside this universe). These external entities would foreseeably view and judge deviations from moral realism – especially by entities which are intelligent enough to know better – as a cancer that is to be irradiated, while possessing the ethical responsibility and resources to easily do so.

⁸ According to moral realism, it is objectively and universally ethically wrong for a(ny) material (i.e., non-person) entity to deceive a person if that person desires to know truth and if that material entity

3. This world is objectively⁹ an abomination.

4. This world was not 'intelligently designed.'¹⁰

* I use the term 'proof' in this context, in the spirit of its use in relation to the scientific method, to mean 'evidence (which supports a probabilistic truth due to being (empirically and logically)) consistent with scientific (i.e., repeated, impartial) observations.' The reader will be aware that empirical claims are not ever '(dis)proven' and rather that these claims are justified in degrees, via being supported by observations which are consistent with other impartial observations. The more observations from credible sources, the more evidence and justification that one has (i.e., proof exists as 'strength in numbers'). In this sense, a belief transitions into knowledge with the (ongoing) occurrence of observations which are consistent with, and confirm, that particular belief in the context of the broader scientific worldview. Unlike the claims of my a priori proof (above), which observes our logical inability to

possesses sufficient resources (i.e., ability) to know and disclose truth (e.g., in relation to whether their world is created by gods and whether it is actual or simulated). More generally, according to moral realism it is objectively and universally ethically wrong for a(ny) material (i.e., non-person) entity to not maximize the realization of all known desires if that material entity possesses sufficient resources (i.e., ability) to do so. Readers who are interested in the basis of moral realism and, in particular, the reasoning for the (counter-intuitive) conclusion that material entities – i.e., the bodies which (should) serve persons – are bound by ethical duties, while the desires of persons – i.e., entities sought arbitrarily, in and of themselves – are foreseeably not subject to or bound by ethics, and thus that all desires should be maximally realized, should see Primus, +2020, +2021, +2023a, +2023b.

⁹ By 'objectively' I am referring to the notion that the objective aspects (i.e., the material aspects – the aspects of the world that we believe we *need*, as opposed to, and excluding only, those aspects which we *desire*) can be impartially and independently observed to be inadequate. Persons appear to possess a vast and intricate array of desires. Furthermore, many persons desire to know the truth concerning whether or not their world was 'intelligently designed' and whether it is actual or simulated. The vast majority of desires of people go unrealized. The materials of this world appear to be objectively inadequate for its persons once we consider the quantity and complexity of desires that go unrealized in the course of their brief and limited lives. At the very least, it has not been revealed to us whether or not our world was 'intelligently designed,' albeit very poorly, by 'highly advanced' mortals.

¹⁰ This conclusion is subject to change and will be revised upon our building of a world which maximally realizes (persons') desires.

conceive of God(s), this proof includes both a priori and a posteriori observations: 1. is definitionally true, a priori; 2. is an empirical claim; 3. is a mix of empirical and a priori claims: our observation of the inadequacies of material aspects of the world is an a posteriori observation which is, of course, epistemically fallible, yet, if we accept these observations at face value, their inadequacy is logically true, a priori, when assessed against the (objective) standards of moral realism.

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¹¹ My use of the prefix '+' on dates is a symbolic gesture which recognizes the beginning of recorded history as being far greater than ~2000 years prior to the era of this publication.