**Purism: logicality as the basis of morality**

**Primus**

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*Abstract*

*This article introduces a posthumanist moral paradigm, based on a priori definitions of beings and (im)morality. A novel approach was implemented, involving a theoretical dissection of human beings. Beings – aspects which are unconditionally sought and which originate from the same mind – are differentiated from their human bodies and other supporting materials – the remaining conditional aspects, which may be important (needed) for the realization of beings’ desires, but are not themselves desired (wanted). Assuming societal technological progression whereby human bodies and their surrounding infrastructures continue to evolve and integrate, the distinction between beings and their supporting materials will become ever more relevant.*

Keywords: A priori; Beings; Logicality; Desire; Morality; Moral-Rationalism; Posthumanism; Purism.

**Introduction**

The search for a fundamental definition of a ‘being’ or ‘self’ continues. In this article I introduce an a priori paradigm of beings and morality which I have termed ‘Purism,’[[1]](#footnote-1) a posthumanist branch of Moral Rationalism. This paradigm refutes that the self should be defined by any aspects relating to the satisfaction of need. Aspects which satisfy need are the conditional actions and structures that humans are essentially forced to possess, in order to survive and have their true desires – their unconditionally sought actions and structures – realized. I thus present an a priori view of beings as clusters of unconditional desires: wants – as distinctly contrasted from the structures and actions which satisfy their needs – originating the same mind. This delineation between beings (final forms) and the material from which beings are composed (the means used to achieve forms) provides an answer to Hume’s (1740) ‘is–ought’ problem.

This article consists of two parts. I firstly define beings through logically (I argue) contrasting them with their material surroundings. I secondly present a logically-derived moral framework for this being-material dichotomy. This discussion includes how both fundamental and conditional rights and responsibilities can be deduced from this framework, and how these rights should apply to the material aspects of human beings in contemporary society.

**Part One**

**Defining Beings**

This paradigm necessarily divides all entities into one of two categories: 1. beings, and 2. materials. Despite this conceptual ‘duality,’ this paradigm metaphysically subscribes to materialistic monism – the notion that all entities are reducible to a single material (for further details of this monism see Author, 2019). I mention this to be clear that I am not arguing for a metaphysical distinction within the being-material dichotomy, as per mind-body Cartesian dualism. Rather, the distinction between being and material is a conceptual categorization, made solely for societal moral purposes.

I define a being here as *states, attributed to a single mind, which are sought for an arbitrary or nil purpose*. By ‘state,’ I simply mean any structure or action, conceptual or real. In less formal terms: a being is a collection of states whose existence is *wanted*, as differentiated from states which are either *needed* (for other states to exist) or unsought (neither wanted nor needed).[[2]](#footnote-2) All aspects of beings therefore – by their definition of being sought for arbitrary, rather than logical/functional, purposes – exist as ‘unconditional’ states.[[3]](#footnote-3)

The being-material dichotomy presented in this paradigm does not equate to a mind-body dichotomy. Rather, this paradigm classifies a mind as either a material or part of a being, depending, in each instance, on whether or not it desires itself. While many contemporary beings (including this author) would consider their mind – the structure creating, and potentially changing, their abstract desires – as a part of themselves, a being does not need a mind to be recognized accordingly.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Furthermore, a being is neither required to be ‘alive,’ nor possess ‘agency’ or intelligence, to be classified as a being according to this framework. A desire need not be a sensation or an experience; a desire at its most fundamental level is an expression of intent relating to an unconditional outcome. James Griffin views that at the core of personhood is “human dignity,” comprised of ‘autonomy’ and ‘liberty’: “our capacity to reflect on, to choose, and to pursue what we ourselves decide is a good life” (Griffin, 2001, p.319). I consider Griffin’s (2001) view of ‘agency,’ as inadequate as a definition of personhood. There is no logical reason[[5]](#footnote-5) why the desire of a person who *wants* to exist forevermore in the form of a static state, without agency (e.g. as a marble statue), should not be entitled to the same material-support (resource) as a being who seeks to continually change their form (e.g. a living human being). I assert that it is not the notion of agency that is fundamental in providing the rights of personhood, but rather *desires* – including the desire to possess agency (or not).

The above example of a being depicted as a marble statue is simplified for demonstration purposes. Realistically, most human beings (beings existing using human bodies) would consist of a vast and complex network of desires sought for arbitrary or nil purpose – each a cluster of wants originating from the same mind. I argue that this definition of beings is accurate even though the contemporary human bodies of beings are unable to exactly define the aspects which comprise their beings. However, the contemporary practical limitations which prevent human bodies from objectively defining their own beings (and/or other beings) should not prevent the conceptual understanding that beings theoretically can be defined exclusively by their arbitrary desires.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Materials are negatively defined within this paradigm as entities which are not beings; every state is categorized as a material, by default, unless *sought for arbitrary or nil purpose*. This framework therefore groups together the contemporary entities which actively serve beings on most occasions (e.g. the functional anatomy of human bodies and humans’ technological infrastructure, barring illness or malfunction) with entities that either passively, or do not at all, serve beings, including those entities which hinder the lives of beings (e.g. inanimate objects, viruses, weather phenomena).

On the basis that human beings need many other entities beyond their respective bodies to survive (e.g. the nutrients they consume, the atmosphere they breathe, the ground they walk on), and on the basis that these aspects are rapidly changing and/or evolving (e.g. terra-firma has been designed to propel us forward – escalators; autonomous vehicles drive us around), I argue that it would be arbitrary to distinguish human bodies within an enduring theory of beings and morality. The reason that everything other than beings – that which usually *does* serve beings and that which *could* serve beings – has been categorized together into the one group – ‘material’ – is because these aspects are not sought as an end in themselves; rather, if they are sought, they exist so as a conditional means of achieving one’s ends: the aspects that beings desire. As will be discussed in part two, all materials have a responsibility to change (improve), whether immediately or eventually.

At this juncture, I will clarify that beings are always theoretically distinguishable from their materials. Whilst any state (i.e. structure or action) can be sought for multiple purposes at any moment, logically, each part of each purpose assigned to any state cannot be both arbitrary and logical at the same moment. In other words, the terms ‘arbitrary’ and ‘logical’ are antonyms of each other and are thus mutually exclusive in any space at the same time. For example, a being may be appreciating the ambience of candlelight – an arbitrarily sought purpose and thus an end in itself – whilst its material body uses the same candlelight to write a work-related letter – a material purpose, serving a means to other ends, in which specific outcomes must be achieved through logical application of thought and action. The candlelight is a singular entity which is simultaneously sought for two purposes, both of which are sought in their own right and can thus exist in isolation from each other.

Whilst the delineation of people into separate components based on their purpose may seem both conceptually and practically awkward at first, it is morally vital, now and into the future.

In the contemporary era it is important to draw a clear conceptual line between a person’s personal artistic expressions – that which should be protected from moral consequence under the auspice of freedom (e.g. free speech) – and expressions which should carry moral consequence (e.g. hate crime). This distinction forms the basis of the argument in part two, whereby beings are considered to be entirely protected from moral consequence, and the states (structures and actions) of all materials are viewed to possess moral value.

Notably, the definition of beings as a cluster of arbitrary desires does not render human bodies as unimportant or unrelated to the beings they serve. Rather than simply viewing Purist beings as more-narrow versions of human beings, it is more accurate to view that Purism ‘splits’ human beings into two components – the being and material – based on the purpose of such components. Furthermore, this ‘splitting’ of human beings into being and material need not necessarily occur at the same moment in time – as it did in the candlelight example above – if the priority of a human being is clear (e.g. if the purpose of a human being is explicitly designated) in specific moments. In such instances, a human being may be considered to be acting overall in a capacity as a material or as a being, based on the primary purpose towards which they strive (or should strive) towards in any moment. A person who is on duty as a police officer would be primarily considered to be a material because their primary purpose at that moment is to serve the public. This is despite the officer also possessing desires (personhood) at the same moment; they may, for example, desire their appearance, their possessions and various activities that they plan to enjoy when not on duty. When the officer is off duty and doing something they enjoy, they would primarily be considered to be a being. This is despite their person concurrently being composed of multiple materials (e.g. their body’s functional anatomy). Although off duty, their material would continue to serve, in a secondary, reserve capacity, despite primarily existing as a being; the officer’s knowledge and skills make them useful such that they may be directed to assist in case of emergencies.

Consequently,even in this era – where beings and their human materials are bound together into a single body, which can neither be readily theoretically nor practically distinguished in any moment – it is still vital to make a distinction between people primarily working (serving as material resource) for society in any moment, and those which are not serving as a resource (existing simply as beings). Each, I will argue, possesses a different set of social/moral responsibilities.

Beyond this, the aforementioned distinction will become increasingly relevant into the intermediate future, a posthuman era – an era where the traditional human body has blurred with technological enhancements and automated technologies (most posthumanists adopt variations of this view, but see, for example, Heylighen, 2002, 2015; Kurzweil, 2006; Chu, 2014; Last, 2014, 2015; Heylighen & Lenartowicz, 2017). In such a future, when beings presumably take many varied forms beyond the human body, it will be vital that beings (entities which are desired) are clearly identified from consumable materials (entities which are not desired), such that they are not themselves consumed or discarded.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The distinction between beings and materials in a moral context, I argue, is a logical distinction, not an arbitrary one. The notion of morality – what ‘should’ or ‘ought’ to occur (or not occur) – in its most fundamental and reduced essence, necessarily invokes a prescription for an entity to either change or not change in order to exist within specific parameters. The aspects of a person, object or society which are considered immoral must change to become moral; the aspects which are considered moral must remain unchanged. Similarly, the proposed being-material distinction recognizes that materials – and only materials – must remain within strict parameters to fulfil their functions; the aspects of materials that are relied upon in any moment must not change (e.g. a heart must keep beating; atoms must not suddenly collapse in on themselves; a good government must keep governing). All materials must continually – whether immediately or later – change; they must improve or be improved. By contrast, beings – whose states are not needed to serve any higher purpose – are ideally able to assume any form. They need not change (or exist); they, which need not change nor remain unchanged, have no moral duty.

Accordingly, the aforementioned distinction between beings and materials recognizes a fundamental difference between the purposes of entities: that some entities – the things we *need* – are expected to not only exist, but to act, adapt, and improve, in accordance with specific parameters dictated by contemporary conditions. Whereas other entities – the things we *want* – need not change, nor assume specific parameters, nor even exist; these things possess no responsibility to exist because they need serve no higher purpose. These a priori distinctions inform the proposed moral framework of part two and I argue that this distinction is universally relevant, now and into the future. Beings are exclusively the latter category; they are ends themselves, and thus possess no higher responsibilities. Because of this, beings can ideally express themselves however they want. When a human being is acting in a private capacity (for a purpose of want), they can *ideally* assume any set of characteristics; this notion aligns with the well-worn concept of ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’.[[8]](#footnote-8) By *ideally*, I recognize that there may *need* to be temporary and localized limits imposed by materials, which prevent the realization of beings’ desires from impacting others’ ends. Vitally, however, and unlike Levinasian ethics (Levinas, 1998), the recognition that a desire cannot be fully realized in any moment is not an indication that the desire itself is “too different” to be ethical in such moment; rather, it is an indication that contemporary materials are too inadequate to be considered moral (this concept will be further elaborated in part two).

Materials, I will argue, are intuitively viewed by logical observers[[9]](#footnote-9) to possess responsibilities, to both their respective beings and to society in general. When a human being is at work, acting in a material capacity (for a purpose of need), they must be productive, efficient, and conform to specific regulations. We intuitively expect that materials must act in the service of beings (e.g. if a being wants to spike a beach ball, its body should comply; a human heart should keep pumping; a government should act in the interests of its people).[[10]](#footnote-10)

This offered paradigm requires that logical observers should always consider any being (each sought as an ends) to be more valuable than any material (each sought as a means). The reason, I offer – and noting that the extended argument is beyond the scope of this article – is that the states of beings, being unconditional by their definition, are inherently more *defined* across time and space. I assert that logical observers implicitly recognize that states which have greater definition in time and space – sought with a greater degree of desire (in space), over a greater duration (in time) – should be prioritized (i.e. be provided resource and the opportunity to be preserved) beyond states of lesser definition: states which are temporarily sought as a means to more-defined states.

In contrast to the desires of beings, material states are, by their definition, considered to possess degrees of *conditional* value. At any moment, a material possesses a degree of importance to beings, in proportion to the degree, and for the duration, that it serves the intent of beings. A material in one condition (e.g. the use of ‘fins’ while scuba diving) may not be useful, that is, valuable, in another (e.g. the use of fins while running). This conditional value will now be explored further as the notion of morality.

**Part Two**

**Purist Morality**

In this next part I translate the unconditional value (preciousness) of desire and the conditional value (importance) of materials into a moral paradigm. The states of beings are viewed to be amoral – they are neither right nor wrong. Rather, I argue that ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ – the “ought,” as opposed to the “is,” (Hume, 1740) – exists only within material conditions, and in all material conditions.

**The amorality of beings**

It may initially seem counterintuitive to consider that any state of any being is necessarily amoral – neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ – especially in relation to intent for violence towards or oppression of other beings. The summary justification to this concern is that the states of beings themselves, by their definition, do not necessarily affect others, and if they do, their effects are subjective[[11]](#footnote-11); what may be enjoyable for one being may be frustrating or even nightmarish for another. And where there is incongruence between desires (e.g. being A wants to do X to being B, but being B either explicitly does not want X, or X is incongruent with the desires of B), it is the materials realizing the desires of beings in any moment which are morally accountable, not the desires themselves. More specifically, the occurrence of immorality, such as the violation of beings against their intent, is always due to a failure of material(s) to limit or vary the realization of desire prior to the point in which it interferes with the realization of other beings’ desire; the desires themselves are not ‘wrong’, but rather spatially incompatible in that moment of time. For example, assume a being, B, views being A walking with their white coat, and, for whatever arbitrary reason (e.g. for enjoyment, or because they subjectively find the coat to be ‘distasteful’), intends to cover A’s coat in red paint. If B is able to splash A’s actual coat contrary to A’s intent, it is the materials which both allowed and enacted this – namely, the human body of B, its sub-materials (the muscles and central nervous system), and technically even the passive nature of the materials within the red paint itself – which are morally wrong. The argument for viewing that inanimate objects possess values of (im)morality will be discussed subsequently.

Assuming a condition whereby desires are realized within limits which do not contradict the desires of others – and this may mean that some desires are never fully realized (e.g. limited to remain in their respective minds) – the onus is on others to argue why any desire in such condition (isolation) should be considered ‘immoral’ or ‘unethical’. As touched upon earlier, I view that it would be arbitrary for someone to assert that any desire – a state which, by its definition, neither necessarily nor objectively affects others – should be universally prohibited or altered. Whilst it is tempting to blame the source of the B’s act in the example above – being B’s intent to splash A with red paint – there is nothing inherently right or wrong about B’s intent itself. In conditions where materials actively prevent the realization of intent that would violate the peace of others, there is no logical reason why B should not be able to possess the intent to splash paint on another. Such intent is a part of the identity of being B themselves, just as A’s white coat forms part (or all) of the identity of A. B’s intent, as per any intent, is harmless in its own right and can be peacefully expressed (through being logically limited or varied) in various forms: from thoughts/fantasies within the mind of B, to a play/movie/re-enactment, to a simulation occurrence where B splashes a replica which they believe is the form of A. Furthermore, there is always the chance that A (or another being) may want to be splashed with paint in future occasions.

The notion that beings (desires) should be considered amoral – void of (im)moral value – is reinforced by the nature of what I will assert does constitute (im)moral value: I will subsequently argue that logical observers intuitively sense that morality directly relates to the probable efficiency of a material achieving a logically prioritized end (i.e. a moral material is one which pursues logical ends via logical means). If this is true, beings do not qualify to possess a moral value by their definition; they are specifically sought for an arbitrary purpose (or nil purpose), not a logical purpose. The absence or arbitrariness of the purpose for which they are sought ensures that their states are neither right nor wrong, that is, neither efficient nor inefficient at achieving an end. Rather, beings are ends themselves – even if their states are sought as means to other ends (e.g. if a playwright desires to put on a Broadway show, but the show is also sought as a means of entertaining his audience, both the show and the entertainment of his audience are ends in themselves).[[12]](#footnote-12)

On this basis, the value of any being can only be evaluated subjectively by other beings, *if* evaluated by other beings at all. Desire which appears repugnant to one being may be welcomed by another. A being’s desire to wear a white coat for arbitrary purpose is neither right or wrong, moral nor immoral; it *may* however be perceived and judged by the subjective standards of other beings (e.g. ‘ugly’ or ‘attractive’).

Let us now consider if the action sought by being B in the above example – to splash being A with red paint – were sought by B for a *material* purpose, rather than being desired as an end in itself. As such, the same act would not, by definition, be sought by B for arbitrary or nil purpose (e.g. enjoyment), but rather, the act would occur either as an (unsought) accident, or as a perceived means of rendering the world in the image of how the actor (B) believes it *should* function. Let us assume that it is not an accident and that person B believes that they *need* to splash being A with paint (as a perceived means to some other end). For example, if B were an activist in the contemporary era, protesting against the use of animal fur in A’s white-fur suit, the thought and/or action of splashing A with paint would each serve a material purpose and B would be acting in a material capacity (or specifically, the components of B which embody these purposes could be considered to be materials). In the spirit of Levinasian ethics – where merely existing has an ethical value – both the act and the plan to act for such a purpose can be considered to possess a moral value because each necessarily and objectively affects others.[[13]](#footnote-13) As per the house painting example earlier, there are only a finite number of materials at any moment, and a fewer number which are capable of actively working to realize the desires of beings; when someone possesses beliefs and/or actions of one nature, they are reducing their capacity to concurrently believe and/or act in another capacity. Accordingly, because material thoughts and actions are a finite resource – a means of realizing desire – the nature of each material thought and action matters (or should matter) to each member of society, not just those directly involved (persons A and B). Society benefits when material thoughts and actions are appropriate and it suffers when they are inappropriate. I will explore the concept of ‘(in)appropriate’ further, yet for now the reader can recognize the objective and necessary affect that each (finite) material action or thought has on society: each either will or will not maximize the realization of all beings’ desires. If a material thought and/or action of covering another in paint is inappropriate (wrong) – and I will discuss wrong now – then no one benefits: society misses out on the benefits of a ‘right’ action, a person (A) gets covered in paint against their will, and the person completing the act (B) gets no personal gain (assuming they were attempting to do the right thing) – they did not *want* to complete the act after all.

And so I will reiterate what is perhaps the most counter-intuitive aspect of this proposed paradigm: irrespective of the nature of each desire, in every condition, it is the materials which realize (i.e. support and enact) or fail to realize (i.e. limit or vary) these desires that are morally accountable; desire itself is amoral.

**Material (im)morality**

I have discussed how materials (e.g. atoms, molecules, government, human bodies, and other needed infrastructures) are important – or should be recognized as important by logical observers – to the degree, and for the duration, that they each satisfy the needs of beings. Because material acts are sought as means to an end, all materials can be viewed to possess objective requirements that they must satisfy at any moment. These requirements relate to both the purpose that a material is trying to achieve, and the means that they use to achieve it. I argue that logical observers intuitively demand that materials must – i.e. they possess a responsibility to – employ *logical* means towards realizing a *logical* purpose. It is this requirement (duty) – for materials to act logically, to possess logicality – that is viewed intuitively by logical observers as the notion of ‘morality’: what *should* occur in any given condition.

There is no universal definition of ‘logic’, and indeed many various types (Ayer, 1946; Maddy, 2012; Putnam, 1972, Dauben, 1990; Carnielli & Coniglio, 2016, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*). Whilst some have argued that each type (e.g. modal, mathematical, philosophical) is broadly connected by the notion of *consistency*, this concept too is not readily agreed upon (Schick, 1966; Coons, 1987). The elusiveness of universal or widely accepted definitions of logic or consistency, however, is largely inconsequential to this paradigm. By use of the term logicality in this paradigm, I am not attempting to stake a claim in the formal schools of logic, nor redefine the general use of the term. Rather, I use the term in this paradigm, for lack of a more appropriate word, to describe the essence of objectivity. In my use of the term I am evoking the spirit of a natural, default state that exists when arbitrariness and subjectivity is absent. Thus, in the spirit of Coons (1987) and Schick’s (1966) indirect definition of ‘consistency,’ I negatively define logicality – the property of being logical – via defining what it is not: it is not arbitrariness. For the purposes of this paradigm, and in the absence of a more appropriate term, I define logicality as *the absence of arbitrary difference (i.e. variance and/or limitation) within a condition*.

I will now very briefly examine what a logical material purpose and means requires, noting that they are characterized by an absence of arbitrariness.

*Logical purpose*

In terms of purpose – the most distal state (i.e. endstate) towards which a material strives – I argue that a logical material (e.g. government or human body) strives to realize conditions where the states of beings are not *arbitrarily* limited or varied. Notably, in striving for this ideal, the realization of beings’ wants may need to be conditionally (locally[[14]](#footnote-14) and temporarily) limited or varied for *logical* reasons. These logical reasons may be purpose-related (e.g. if the wants of being A conflict with the wants of being B, it is logical that the realization of A’s wants should be limited prior to the point that they interfere with B) or they may be means-related (e.g. if there is insufficient resource to realize the wants of all beings at any moment, it is logical that the realization of the wants of beings must be limited).

By contrast, I argue that a material (e.g. government or human body) is immoral to the degree that it *arbitrarily* limits or varies the lives of beings. An immoral government, for example, may strive to universally and permanently prevent their citizens from wearing brightly-colored clothing, for arbitrary reason (e.g. because they ‘say so’ or because of a ‘sacred’ text). This is not to be conflated with conditions where a moral government needs to conditionally (locally and temporarily) prevent some of its citizens (e.g. military personnel) from wearing brightly-colored clothing as a *logical* means of achieving its purposes (e.g. due to the need to be camouflaged).

In addition to not striving to arbitrarily limit or vary the lives of beings, I argue that a material pursuing a logical purpose will logically prioritize its service to beings (in conditions where prioritization is needed). If prioritization between or within beings is required to occur (e.g. due to a shortage of resource or where beings’ desires are incompatible), a logical material will prioritize resource to the greater strength of desire. The strength by which a state is desired or wanted is a product of the intensity and the duration of a desire. Whilst a full defense of this claim is beyond the scope of this article, all other factors being equal, I offer that it would be illogical for a material (e.g. government) to give a person (being) something they do not want, especially when there is another person who does want what is being offered. This same principle is extended when multiple people want the same entity: all other factors being equal, it would be logical to give the entity person who has wanted, and likely will continue to want, the entity for the greatest intensity, for the longest duration of time.

*Logical means*

In terms of means – the immediate and intermediate states assumed to achieve a purpose – I argue that a logical material will continually assume states (structure and/or action) which *will probably most efficiently achieve its purpose*. A material state which will probably most efficiently achieve a purpose is necessarily void of arbitrary variance or limitation within its means – any such arbitrariness would produce inefficiency. Therefore, even a government or human body which has a logical purpose (i.e. they strive to logically prioritize realization of the desires of beings without arbitrary limitation or variation) would be acting with a degree of immorality to the extent that their actions towards this purpose would probably be arbitrary, and thus a waste of resource.

Whilst the natures of future beings are difficult to predict, I assert that we can predict the path of societal material as it undergoes logical, structural (technological) progression to be rendered more efficient at achieving its need-based purposes. I argue that to improve at performing their purposes in accordance with the expectation of logical observers, the logical path of materials is to perpetually become more adaptive (i.e. active[[15]](#footnote-15) and variable) in function, smaller in size, more plentiful in quantity, and more simplified, stable and homogenous in structure (i.e. composed of fewer levels of sub-materials[[16]](#footnote-16) and becoming ever more independent[[17]](#footnote-17) from, but interoperable with, each other, in terms of their structural design).[[18]](#footnote-18) This ‘evolution’ would essentially eventually render materials as a singular-like material – a ‘sea of cells’.[[19]](#footnote-19),[[20]](#footnote-20) This ‘sea’ of materials would gradually replace the relatively large, few, structurally heterogeneous, and relatively passive, contemporary material structures (e.g. human bodies and their infrastructure), which, I assert, are comparatively inadept at serving the needs of beings.[[21]](#footnote-21)

**Provisional and absolute morality**

Notably, the above examples – of government policy not arbitrarily limiting citizens, of government and human bodies not wasting resources – each describe ‘provisional morality’ or simply just ‘morality’: the states that active (autonomous) materials (e.g. human and government bodies) should immediately assume within any given condition. Put more simply – and in general alignment with the contemporary use of the term ‘morality’ – ‘(provisional) morality’ describes a disposition which can and should be adopted by a material entity possessing agency in any moment.

Beyond this, however, this paradigm recognizes that there is also an impetus for materials to make less-immediate improvements to the world, to gradually render its materials to be increasingly more ‘technically moral’. For example, there has been much debate as to what the human actor should do in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s (1976) ‘Trolley Problem’ – a trolley is hurtling out of control towards some people and a human bystander has the option of intervening or not intervening. Either act - intervening or not – possesses a value of (provisional) (im)morality, as does the process of consideration.[[22]](#footnote-22) However, much less discussion – nil, by my account – has focused on the moral requirement for humans to (eventually) improve the nature of the trolley itself, such that the immoral impact of either decision is reduced in future instances. Recognition of a moral onus to change a state – whether immediately or in the future – begins with recognition that the state itself is not ideal. In the paradigm I present, all materials – whether government or human bodies, conventional trollies, or automated trolleys, or the passive red paint described earlier – will always be ‘technically immoral’ (less than absolutely moral) to the degree that they are inefficient (less-than-ideal) at achieving their purposes.

So whilst it may have seemed counter-intuitive to earlier categorize the passive materials within the red paint of being B (which allows it to splash being A) as ‘immoral’, these materials are more accurately considered to be ‘technically immoral’. The use of this term acknowledges that the paint could not have acted with any greater degree of morality in the moment – it is a passive entity after all – however the state of such material is inadequate and thus non-ideal – it is an immoral condition which must be improved eventually (i.e. when it is logical to do so). It is logical that the materials within the red paint of being B (and indeed other passive materials) can, and should, eventually be improved such that they are active in nature. In a far distant future they would hence possess the ability to recognize, and logically prioritize, the intent of beings A and B, thus potentially preventing B from splashing A with paint in the earlier example (or limiting the action at the last safe moment, to maximize the net realization of intent).

The recognition of a moral value for *all* materials – an operational moral value for those with agency and a technical moral value for those which are inanimate – relates back to the fundamental differentiation between the purposes of beings and materials: the former need not change – each is ideal as they are; the latter need to continually change (improve), to better serve the former.[[23]](#footnote-23)

An implication of the aforementioned precious–important duality is the requirement for beings and materials to exist and operate in concerted, yet parallel, realms. Materials must be structured such that the nature of beings’ intent – especially including their culture, ideology and political views – is unable to interfere with the logicality (impartiality/apoliticality) of their operation. Conversely, materials – with the exception of a respective beings’ mind – must not be able to change or interfere with the nature of a beings’ intent.[[24]](#footnote-24)

**Clarification of fundamental rights and responsibilities**

A key application of this framework may be its contribution to the discussion of which rights and responsibilities are fundamental, that is, parsimonious and unconditional.[[25]](#footnote-25) The Purist paradigm, attributing rights to both human and non-human beings, allows for an objectively deduced framework of fundamental right(s) due to its objective definition of beings.[[26]](#footnote-26) With this paradigm I attempt to challenge the relatively conditional (i.e. localized and/or temporary, rather than universally applicable) nature of purportedly fundamental human rights in contemporary literature (see, for example, Nussbaum, 2011, Liao, 2015; Rawls, 2009; Griffin, 2008; Tasioulas, 2012).

The previously proposed moral responsibility for material to act logically – that is, to most efficiently prioritize states of greatest definition across time and space, or more specifically, to assume states which will probably most efficiently realize the maximum quantity of beings’ desire – can be alternatively viewed as a fundamental and unconditional right of beings. In other words, beings can be viewed to possess the right to have *the maximum[[27]](#footnote-27) quantity of their desire realized, where such realization is performed by materials and is only limited or varied for logical reasons*. I succinctly describe this as the right to ‘peace’.

Peace is by no means a ‘perfect’ state; it may be far from ideal. It also may not involve the maximum possible realization of any desire in any particular moment when the realization of desire is considered across time and space; a state of peace may require that, due to deficient materials, the maximum quantity of beings’ desire would probably be realized through the recording and preservation of some or all beings’ desires for subsequent realization in more adequate conditions. Whilst less than ideal, the term peace describes the state that is as ‘good as can be’ in any moment with consideration for the probable nature of all known intent and materials, and noting that such state will inevitably incorporate the progression (e.g. technological advancement) of materials to ensure that future states of peace are ‘more ideal’.[[28]](#footnote-28)

Peace can be considered a fundamental right of beings because it is wholly encapsulated by the definition of beings themselves (i.e. beings, by definition, exist exclusively as states of desire, and peace, by definition, merely provides for the maximum realization of beings across time and space).

Consistent with the framework of part two, beings, existing as endstates by their definition, possess no morally derived responsibilities (obligations); they *need* not assume any particular states as a means of achieving other endstates. Beings, of course, may create, and thus potentially violate, their own socially-created ‘responsibilities,’ expectations, and agreements (e.g. the expectation and ‘responsibility’ for one to be ‘a good friend’ to another), however such violation would possess no moral value (i.e. it is neither right nor wrong).

From the fundamental, unconditional right of beings – peace – conditional (i.e. localized and temporary) material rights and responsibilities can be derived. The material whose direction *will probably most efficiently achieve peace (realize the maximum quantity of desire)* in any condition possesses the right to direct the allocation of all resource in such condition. This right is granted on the basis that it has the highest moral authority. This right would, for example, provide governments with the moral authority to exert power over their citizens and direct them how to act. As a condition of this right, such material (usually a government) possesses the responsibility to prioritize the use of materials within its condition based on whichever use of their properties would probably most efficientlyachieve peace. Ideally this would occur through a case-by-case analysis of the properties of each of its ‘sub-materials’ at every moment: in future eras, for example, an electrician might be prioritized (e.g. given the ‘right of way’ at a traffic intersection) beyond a musician, and vice versa, depending on which outcome would *probably most efficiently achieve peace* (i.e. maximize the realization of beings’ desire).

In less-ideal instances (e.g. contemporary society, or during the collapse of future society), the properties of materials may need to be prioritized using a generic system, conveyed passively through prescriptive laws (e.g. legislation). Such laws provide a passive and crude degree of ‘order’ so that valuable bodies (e.g. human, government) do not arbitrarily limit or vary each other (e.g. via collisions with each other) in the absence of active prioritization by government. Such systems are a temporary measure, conferring provisional morality, as they do not directly compare and prioritize the properties of every individual material in relation to their ability and willingness to realize a higher purpose (e.g. peace). For example, a traffic light system of the contemporary era prioritizes (i.e. provides right of way to) all vehicles traveling in the same direction for set amounts of time, rather than considering the individual properties of the vehicles’ passengers and how such properties could contribute to society if actively prioritized. At certain points of time, therefore, an electrician may have to give way to a musician at an intersection (or vice versa), even though it may have been in the common interest for the other to have the right of way. The use of emergency sirens and the ability for emergency vehicles to override contemporary traffic light systems demonstrates partial recognition by contemporary governments of the need for the active prioritization of materials.

Accordingly, the generic system of order discussed above includes the allocation of human bodies as a possession of their respective beings. By default, each human body is passively (automatically) legally assigned to serve the needs of their respective being. This arrangement would *probably most efficiently achieve peace* in the absence of the ability for government to specifically micromanage each body. In the same way that traffic lights generically maintain order between materials (vehicles) in general, until a priority material (e.g. ambulance) needs to have right of way, human bodies generically serve their respective beings until they are specifically prioritized by government to serve a higher societal need (e.g. conscripted in time of war or natural disaster, summoned for jury duty, directed to assist police).[[29]](#footnote-29)

A notable consequence of the view that beings are exclusively precious is the recognition that not all aspects of human beings are precious. This includes any aspects of the human body which are needed but not wanted.

In addition, and in accordance with the intuition of many (for example Kelly, 2014; Schwartz, 2014; Riddle, 2014; Oriel, 2014; Jürgens, 2014; Davis, 2014; Cordeiro, 2003), there are aspects beyond human beings which are considered precious; Purist framework grants rights to the intent of animals which is sought for abstract or nil purpose. That is, this framework recognizes the preciousness of the wants of animals, where applicable, as differentiated from their instinctual strivings (to satisfy need).[[30]](#footnote-30)

The Purist definition of beings also allows for an a priori provision of rights to yet-unencountered beings: extra-terrestrial and/or those existing with a synthetic body, such as “Artificial Intelligence” (Dvorsky, 2014; Cordeiro, 2003). Finally, this framework recognizes that static forms of beings (e.g. a building with historic or personal value) may be considered just as precious or more precious as living beings, depending on the strength by which such desires are sought.

**Delineation of freedom of expression from (im)moral expression**

The aforementioned paradigm has contemporary application for the delineation of freedom of expression from morally laden expression; human beings – part being, part material – should be classified and treated as either a being or a material depending on the primary role that they are fulfilling in any moment. When a person is acting in a capacity as a material – that is, performing any act that they believe *needs* to be performed, such as providing healthcare or security – their actions should be logical and void of arbitrariness. On all other occasions, when not acting in a material role, a person should be free to express themselves how they want unless their actions need to be conditionally (i.e. temporarily and locally) limited or varied for logical reasons (e.g. if one lacks the resource to realize their desires or if an act would interfere with the realization of the desires of others). Because desires themselves are considered amoral within this paradigm, people should always be able to believe whatever they desire (want), but not necessarily whatever they believe they need to believe; a person’s beliefs about what needs to occur, in relation to self or society, are subject to moral scrutiny. Material beliefs and actions are not protected under the auspice of freedom of expression and illogical manifestations must be addressed for the betterment of society.

For example, according to this paradigm a person should be able to dress-up in a Nazi uniform for enjoyment (desired) purposes (e.g. in a play or as role-playing/re-enactment of history); in this sense the uniform would be referred to as a costume. Note that there may need to be some conditional (temporal and spatial) regulation of when and where such dress-up occurs to maintain peace (e.g. under this paradigm, actors would be permitted to dress-up as Nazis in movies and plays for entertainment purposes, though other private uses of these costumes might need to be limited into the immediate future if children’s minds are not developed enough to know the difference between an artistic expression of a Nazi and a material expression of Nazism); this would need to be determined and regulated by the highest material (usually a government). The point here is that *ideally* it is acceptable to express oneself in this way (or any way) so long as one desires it. Notably, whilst we will each personally consider many aesthetic expressions to be reprehensible, we must remain cognizant that these are our subjective opinions and that the desire to express oneself, and indeed any desired expression itself, causes no harm. Accordingly, the act should not be universally prohibited or condemned, but rather, as per all beings’ expressions, regulated to occur in appropriate times and spaces. By contrast, *material* expressions of Nazism – e.g. a person dressed in a Nazi uniform because they believe that dressing as a Nazi is *needed* (to change the world in some way) – would be either moral (i.e. mandated to occur) or immoral (i.e. prohibited across all time and space) depending on whether the ends that they strive for and the means that they employ are logical (void of arbitrariness). An actor who dresses up as a Nazi within a documentary specifically designed to educate on the horrors of WWII is probably using the uniform for a good purpose (peace) and in a method that may logically achieve peace; again, this would need to be determined and regulated by the highest material, depending on contemporary societal needs. However, someone wearing the uniform because they believe that they need to bring Nazism to the material world would neither possess the right to dress up as a Nazi, nor the right ‘believe in’ National Socialism as a sought material end; as discussed, materials are prohibited from possessing a political purpose. This prohibition would be unconditional (i.e. it will never be acceptable, in any time or space). The end sought by the person in this example is immoral because it arbitrarily prescribes the unconditional exclusion of beings that are not within a specific racial profile (by ‘unconditional’, I mean that such exclusion is not a temporary measure to achieve a higher purpose).

I concede that distinguishing between the two types of expression may be difficult in contemporary practice. In lieu of citizens and government being able to read minds to determine the materiality or formality of the purpose of an expression, a contemporary government might require citizens to declare if their expressions are for material or artistic purposes (e.g. film makers, social media users and political and religious costume wearers might place a small symbol on their art/work to indicate the nature of their purpose, similar to the way in which films and media are currently rated for audiences’ ages). [[31]](#footnote-31)

**Conclusion**

This article has introduced the posthumanist, a priori moral philosophy of Purism. I have argued that beings are collections of states which are sought for arbitrary or nil purpose: desire for forms and formed desires. Being unconditional in nature, they can exist indefinitely across time, irrespective of contemporary conditions. Existing as ends themselves, beings can be considered to be universally and unconditionally precious; they possess nil responsibility to assume any particular form or perform any particular function, and are thus also considered amoral – whatever form they take is neither right nor wrong. Materials, by contrast, encompass all entities which are not beings; this includes both entities which are sought by beings for a logical purpose – useful, important materials – and entities which are unsought by beings – materials which are useless or counterproductive to the purposes of beings; the latter have been grouped with the former because they both have a moral onus to change or be changed into the former category. All materials – each potentially being important to beings, but never precious – are to be used, technologically advanced and expended if necessary, for the service of beings. A method for discerning freedom of expression – whereby the full realization of any state of being may need to be spatially and temporally regulated, but never unconditionally condemned – from (im)moral material expressions – which are either mandated or prohibited – was briefly discussed.

This article has served as an introduction to the Purist paradigm. There are key implications for society – particularly in terms of economic[[32]](#footnote-32) and political reform[[33]](#footnote-33) – which are beyond its scope and which should serve as the basis for further discussion.

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1. The term ‘Purism’ is chosen to describe a moral paradigm which is arguably ‘untainted’ by “ideologies, worldviews and cultural assumptions” (Ramos, p.86). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Notably, even if a being does not yet possess a realized version of their desires, or no longer possesses a realized version for reasons beyond their control (e.g. they cannot afford the resource to possess their desires, or they did possess them but they were stolen or damaged), their desire or ‘want’ is still considered to be a part of their being or ‘self’. This want, even if yet unrealized, can be considered to define beings – it is a part of who they are – on the basis that, given a more-ideal set of conditions, such desire would (and perhaps will) be realized. In other words, a being’s less-than-ideal state is owing to material inadequacy, not personal identity. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The term ‘unconditional’ denotes the *potential* for such states to be sought indefinitely, existing independently from external material conditions; it does not indicate that such states *necessarily will* be sought indefinitely. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The only inherent difference between a being with and without a mind is that the former may possess an ability to change its desires. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. I expand on what I mean by ‘logical reason’ in part two. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Future technology will foreseeably solve this practical problem, through enabling beings to be precisely defined based on detailed analysis of their material (e.g. neural) structures. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. In part two I briefly outline a deeper future in which the materials of beings continue to be rendered such that they are more inconspicuous (e.g. concealed within the forms of beings in some instances and operating below their perceptual threshold in others) and more autonomous in their duty. I suggest that at this point, not only will the notion of a person and the definition of a being presented herein essentially align, it may be the only way in which a person *can* be defined. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See Davis (2016), Rawls (2009), or any of the multiple theories and organizations espousing ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Noting that I define logicality in part two, in essence, a logical observer is capable of recognizing that entities which are sought solely as a means to an end are less precious then said end, and that said entities must exhibit specific properties which would appear to probably efficiently serve the ends which are sought. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Therefore, when Ryan Davis, in his support of constitutivism, concludes that “we are rationally required to treat the liberty of persons as sacred” (Davis, 2016, p.28), the Purist would respond: ‘the liberty of beings, if they desire such, yes; their materials, no’. Until the human being is theoretically dissected into being and material, the conceptual issues with discerning ‘liberty’ from ‘anarchy’ will continue to plague moral theorists, politicians, and the general public alike. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. This serves as my definition of metaethics: those states which necessarily and objectively affect other states. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Kant’s (1785) oversight is his notion that human beings in their entirety should be treated as (precious) ends, rather than realizing that the aspects that they each respectively seek as an end is the extent of preciousness. In other words, it’s not that *human beings* *should* be treated as ends, their *beings* *are* ends. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. I use the term ‘moral’ rather than ‘ethical’ due to the unconditional, a priori nature of this paradigm: the ‘rules’ presented within thus do not change in accordance with conditional variables, such as cultural norms (MacIntyre, 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. By ‘locally’ I mean, restricted to a limited space, e.g. a government that limits one person from driving, rather than completely banning driving across society. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. By ‘active’ I mean automatic in terms of their service to beings and in their own technological advancement. I define an ‘active’ or autonomous material simply as a material which possesses properties which allow it to possess and pursue a purpose beyond its current state (e.g. a government, human, or animal body, or an autonomous vehicle or drone), as differentiated from passive objects. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For example, human bodies are relatively complex and unstable because they are composed of many ‘levels’ of sub-materials which appear not to have been purposely designed for human use (based on their relative inefficiency, unreliability and passiveness to human purposes); human organs are composed of cells, cells are composed of molecules, molecules are composed of atoms, atoms are composed of sub-atomic particles, and so on... [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. ‘Independence’ describes the need for materials to become increasingly less structurally reliant on, entangled, and shared with, each other; this is a logical requirement for increasing material ability to efficiently serve the (often divergent) intent of beings. I argue that materials can (and *should*) work together with interoperability – dependent on each other to achieve a purpose, without structural dependency on each other. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The natural design of human hearts, for example – categorized as materials, because they are needed (a means to a higher purpose) – logically should not remain as they currently are: singular to each human body, passive in nature, relatively complex (Hill, 2008) and unstable in structure. Contemporary human hearts cannot sense blood pressure and adjust their pumping accordingly. Despite being singular in function, they are comprised of many sub-materials (e.g. arteries, valves, cells) which are each prone to malfunction, and they have no self-reboot and/or backup-system should they suddenly stop pumping. Foreseeing a logical path of progression, for the duration that blood is needed to travel around human bodies, the future cardiovascular system of humans should be continually redesigned such that they are ever-more decentralized: there should be multiple hearts throughout the body (first there was one, then perhaps two, then five, then eventually ten, then 100 – each becoming smaller as more are added). It is logical that hearts will also become ever more active, actively sensing how much blood they should pump and where; they will be more efficient (i.e. pump more blood using less energy); they will be more-simply designed (i.e. composed of fewer layers of sub-materials), will be less prone to sudden stoppage, and will be able to restart themselves if they do suddenly stop pumping. Beyond this, we can anticipate that there will exist a time when hearts are unnecessary because blood cells themselves can be redesigned to be active and propel themselves around the body to where they are most needed (whilst in communication with each other and their respective brain). I argue that this same trend can be extended to all future public materials, such as defense forces, police, medical facilities, sanitation, and other public services: they will eventually not be comprised of the relatively few, large, varied, complex, unreliable, inefficient, externally-situated personnel and equipment, as they are today. Rather, it is logical that future public services will be delivered via a multitude of active, integrated, homogenous, internally-situated (i.e. endo) cells, whose functions need not be observed or activated by beings. I argue that such disposition is logically the most efficient means of satisfying the needs, and ultimately the desires, of beings. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Due to space restrictions, and perhaps the sheer simplicity and obviousness of the assertion itself, I won’t thoroughly defend here why I assert that it is logical that this, and only this, structural reform leads to greater efficiency. As an example of this self-evidence, it is logical that: multiple bodies can produce more work than a single body of the same nature; more bodies can operate in any one space if they are smaller; bodies, even if serving a collective purpose, should not be structurally entangled with, or dependent on, each other where possible, allowing them to change their formation and location in accordance with revised purposes. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Notably, this view of a very literal ‘singularization’ (homogenization) of material is different from, but not incompatible with, a distant evolution of Vinge (1993) and Kurzweil’s (2006) concept of “singularity”. Crucially, the unconditional–conditional distinction between being and material is key to the prediction of material progression; it would be absurd, for example, to assert that being themselves must become smaller and more homogenous. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. If this view of the future is accepted, the Purist definition of beings, based on unconditional aspects, may be the only method by which future beings *can* be defined if the continued progression of contemporary materials is extended to its logical conclusion. In such a future, unconditional states – states which do not have a requirement to become more efficient at achieving their ends (because they are ends themselves) – would be the only unique and relatively-static states (‘forms’) existing amidst (i.e. literally composed from) an effectively singular and uniform material: a ‘sea’ of integrated ‘cells’. As such, these forms would be the only distinguishable entities and the only method of defining beings. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Incidentally, the Purist answer to the Trolley problem and like-variants (see, for example, Bonnefon, Shariff & Rahwan’s, 2016, dilemma involving autonomous vehicles) requires consideration of the probable desires of all persons involved (i.e. which people want to live the most), in conjunction with the degree to which each person contributes to the societal realization of desires (i.e. consideration of how useful the materials of each person are to society), noting that the formulation of these variables into a moral solution is beyond the scope of this article. Alternatively, should such information be unavailable to the actor and the trolley, each person would be considered equal by default, and thus the outcome which would probably save the most lives *would probably most efficiently maximize the realization of desire*. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. An implicit consequence of the expectation for materials to maximize the realization of beings’ desires, through efficient service, is the requirement for all materials to gradually and eventually be advanced technologically; to ensure their continued existence (and the existence of the beings they serve), and to excel at their purpose (and excel at serving beings). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The need for parallelization of beings and material is already intuitively recognized by modern societies with the contemporary notion of the need for separation of ‘church’ and ‘State’. This concept, extended to its fullest conclusion, entails the need for separation of politics (i.e. opinion/subjectivity/culture) from the required apoliticality (logicality) of materials. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Those attempting to deduce fundamental human rights (for example, Cruft, et al., 2015) must first agree on a fundamental definition of what it is to be human. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. By ‘objective’ I mean that these definitions – of beings and their fundamental right(s) – are concretely and universally knowable into the infinite future, due to being unconditionally defined (in contrast to conditional concepts such as ‘human rights’ and 'humanity'); I do not mean that all observers will necessarily agree with these definitions. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Notably, the inclusion of the term ‘maximum’ overcomes Griffin’s (2008) ‘Redundancy Objection’ – that there should be no human right to ‘everything necessary for a good life,’ because a right to ‘everything’ would supposedly render the notion of rights redundant (Griffin, 2008; Liao, 2015) – through adopting the position that a right remains a right irrespective of whether or not, or the degree that it can be granted in any moment. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. It is a mistake to view fundamental rights through the lens of contemporary conditions. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Thus, the framework discussed is not a replacement for democratic government or its laws, and nor does it disregard the important relationship between beings and their respective bodies in this era. I argue, rather, that the logical prioritization of resource is the goal which democracies and their citizens are striving for as they become more ‘progressive’. If this is true, citizens in advanced democracies would be becoming increasingly less accepting of governments and their agencies limiting their lives for arbitrary reasons and/or inefficiently enacting their policies, whilst also expecting societal progression (e.g. medical advancement). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Whether or not these rights could be realistically granted in contemporary conditions is another matter, depending on material ability and availability. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. This will become especially important as technology improves media creators’ ability to make fictional entertainment emulate reality toward the point in which they cannot readily be distinguished. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. For example, in accordance with the Purist requirement for separation of beings and material – neither should be able to influence the nature of each other – there is a requirement for dual economies in future society: a currency for use between beings and a separate currency for use between materials. The former currency should be unregulated in a truly and wholly free market; the latter currency (of governments) should be limited to exchanges which logically prioritizes the needs of citizens in accordance with public peace. Thus, a person or company which is paid for expression that does not serve a material purpose (e.g. an entertainer, entertainment company) cannot use such currency (essentially ‘popularity’) to gain priority of material services (e.g. healthcare, public transport, education, basic nutrients and services of need), though they could use it to purchase services which primarily satisfy desires (e.g. entertainment, luxury cars and fine dining). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. For example, contemporary democracies allocate one equal vote per living human body, and this vote is usually cast for the provision of services catering to both wants and needs (or, more accurately, what voters *believe* they need). Purists, however, would argue that future governments should only measure the nature and strength of beings’ desires to determine the direction of government strategic policy at any moment (i.e. people should only be able to vote on issues of ‘want’). Governments should then autonomously prioritize the satisfaction of beings’ needs via the most logical means of achieving their citizens’ indicated desires. Such prioritization would be directed by scientific research and macro computation of societal variables, rather than individual voting, as individuals are not in the best position to calculate their macro needs. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)