


PURISM

(in English)



Primus

Socrates: ...[the best minds] must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

Glaucon: What do you mean?

Socrates: I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the cave, and partake of their labors...

– Plato, The Republic

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PREAMBLE

This text presents the apolitical moral ideology of Purism in English, organized into two parts. The first part (A) details morality in a general sense, and subsequently demonstrates the method for calculating the specific degree of morality in any given state. The second part (B) details why the concept described in part A is the notion that logical observers intuitively view as morality.

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PART A

Morality is consistency – the Purist perspective

This part introduces the Purist perspective of morality which views morality as the process of two differentiations: firstly, between two categories of purpose, to determine that which is sought (and may exist) for an intended purpose and that which exists (and may be sought) for a material purpose. Secondly, morality requires that, where necessary, differentiation is made between competing intentions to determine that which is the greater, or more defined, intent. Intended states, also known as forms, are those states (action, structure, association) whose existence would continue to be sought (by a being's mind) even if it were a perfect, or ideal, world. More succinctly, intended states are sought for arbitrary or nil purpose; they are wanted, not needed (e.g. a 'visit to the beach' would be an intended state if it is sought for an arbitrary purpose, such as for 'fun'). Material states, by contrast, exist only because it is not a perfect world – they will either be useful, useless or detrimental to the existence of intent. If material states are sought by the minds of beings it is because such states are needed, not wanted (e.g. the atoms and sub-atomic structures supporting the 'human bodies', 'sand' and 'water' during one's visit to the beach). Intent is sacred and beyond moral judgment (i.e. intent is considered amoral), whereas all materials, by contrast, possess degrees of morality in proportion to their consistency. A consistent material is both willing and able to continually determine morality through the (two) aforementioned differentiations. Vitally, Purism transcends humanistic views of beings by reducing and defining all beings, whether existing via human bodies or other material, as their intent itself. Fast forward 10,000 years into the future, and forevermore after that, and there are only two types of entity in this world: beings – entities that have no requirement to change, because they're wanted; and materials – entities which have a logical requirement to become for efficient, because they're needed.

0. Introduction

0.1. Morality remains a thoroughly debated subject of philosophy (Shafer-Landau, 2003; Railton, 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009; Chalmers & Bourget, 2009). Whilst some theorists (Kant, 1785; Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1861; Kekes, 1989; Allott, 1991; Johnson, 2004; Driver, 2007; Rawls, 2009; Huemer, 2005) have recorded their support for and/or have themselves attempted to create or derive at least partially universal theories/laws of morality, it is reasonable to conclude that none could be considered as close to being universally accepted.

0.2. Rather, the academic consensus appears to overwhelmingly support various versions of moral relativism (Lombrozo, 2009; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Graham & Haidt, 2010; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Sheehy, 2006; Mackie, 1977). Previous authors (see for example, Kölbel, 2014; Krausz & Michael, 1989; Meiland & Jack, 1982; Ladd, 1973; Duncker, 1939; Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, & Knobe, 2011) have provided excellent overviews of the various competing arguments of moral relativism, which I will not attempt to elaborate upon. Whilst generally lending their support for popular relativist theorists such as Westermarck (1932), Harman (1991, 1996) and Hales (2009), these authors collectively surmise that not only is an objective morality not yet known, but that such a concept is fundamentally improbable, if not impossible.

0.3. In contrast to moral relativism, Purism attempts to claim objectivity of morality using a priori logical derivation. That is, it does not rely on empirical knowledge or opinionated (i.e. arbitrary) determination. *Purist* morality, or *Purism*, views morality as a state of consistency, or 'purity', within material (with respect to both its structure and action). The understanding and application of this perspective within contemporary conditions does not require understanding of its logical basis and, for this reason, only the basic premise of Purism itself will be presented in this part. Purism's logical argument, justifying the a priori moral perspective presented in this part, is demonstrated in part B: 'The logical basis of Purism'.

1. The Purist perspective

1. Purism foremost categorizes the purpose(s) of all entities (i.e. structures/objects, actions, associations) into one of two categories: *intent* or *material*. Purism states that all and only intent is sacred, or precious, similar to the way human life may be considered sacred by a humanist ideology. Material, however, is regarded as important, in so far as it is useful to the formation and continuation of intent, but never sacred or precious itself. Purism states that material therefore has a responsibility to continuously and selflessly serve intent as efficiently

as is possible. Purism further views that the method in which material should prioritize its service to intent, amidst the inevitability of its limited resource at any moment, is a logical process and so does not require, nor should it allow, subjective values (e.g. opinion/politics) to direct such service.

2. Intent

2.1.1. Intent is defined as **a(n end)state which is defined** (as (discrete/finite) symbols, and thus exists objectively, and with varying degrees of independence from material condition, across space), **desired** (through being sought for either abstract or nil purpose(s), and thus, in this respect, exists defined, with independence from material condition, across time), **and deliberate** (through being sought with greater relative freedom from conditional pressure(s) and with greater degrees of critical consideration regarding such preferences of desire, and thus, in this respect, exists defined, with varying degrees of independence from material condition, across time), **irrespective of the degree by which such state is** (actually) **realized as form, or exists** (conceptually and/or perceptually) **as** (desire for) **an ideal**.

2.1.2. Intent, in fewer words, exists as **form**(ed desire) **and/or desire** (for form), where the latter includes desire for changes of pre-existing form.

2.2. Notably, two aspects of the Purist definition of *intent* differentiate it from its general, contemporary usage (see for example, the Oxford, Cambridge or Collins, online dictionaries, n.d.), whereby, intent is summarily viewed as *an aim or purpose that one plans or is determined to achieve/realize*. I did not revise the definition of intent to alter its pre-existing meaning. Rather, the Purist definition better reflects the true essence of the term *intent* – describing deliberate motivation for a state, where such motivation exists as an action (or inaction), as distinguished from (accidental, automatic and/or reluctant) reaction.

2.3. Firstly, the Purist definition of intent exists as a state which is *desired* and *deliberate*. *Desired* entities are sought for arbitrary, if any, purpose. Therefore, for an entity (i.e. a structure, action or association) to be truly intended, the entity itself should satisfy a desire, capable of existing independently from environmental conditions. Any desire could (or would, assuming moral material) exist in an ideal world, and is a 'want', not a 'need' – the latter will subside once satisfied or circumvented; the former could potentially exist indefinitely. Desired, or wanted, entities can be separated from material, or needed entities, on the basis that the former are sought as ends in themselves; they serve no functional purpose, in contrast to material entities which are sought solely as a means to an end. Examples of desired entities

include any forms of art/entertainment: a beach ball, owned and used simply for fun (abstract reason); a painting that a being *wants* to paint, conceived without purpose of selling for material gain; the aspects of a social visit to friends which are void of need for social acceptance or support; a being's desire to exist to personally experience all these aspects.

2.4. Furthermore, the Purist definition of intent requires that desire must be *deliberately* sought, that is, sought relatively free from conditional pressure, which forces reaction to, and/or reliance upon, the sought entity. Conditionally inflated 'desire', even if directed toward a genuinely desirable entity (i.e. an entity that is wanted, not needed), will inevitably subside when conditional pressures are alleviated. For example, a being may desire spending time with a friend for abstract enjoyment (intent) and yet also rely on such friend for material needs, such as for advice and emotional support. It may occur that, as conditions improve and the material support is no longer required, the being's desire to spend time with the friend also subsides as it was enhanced by conditional need.

2.5. Phrases such as 'I *intend* to purchase clothes for work', therefore, incorrectly use the term 'intend', as the purpose of clothes in this instance is functional; the 'decision' is a reaction to work, to survive. Purists argue that one does not truly intend for something if one is essentially forced to react as, or rely on, such. Instances of reaction or reliance are not truly intent because they are not action of, or for, a mind of relatively free will. As a guide, intention can be easily distinguished from material entities by asking oneself if one would still act or associate as such if it were a perfect world (i.e. a world where all beings were instantly granted exactly what they want, for as long as they desire such); if the answer is 'yes', then such structure, act or association is intended. One would not, using the above example, 'intend to purchase clothes for work' in a perfect world – in a perfect world, beings would have no need to work (although 'work' may be simulated as (art) form, it would not be work in the sense that it is known in contemporary conditions). Rather, one could offer that they '*need* to purchase clothes for work' or announce that such is their (material) 'will' (rather than their intent); they could also correctly state that they *intend* to purchase clothes for abstract reasons, for example, because they 'suit one's personality' or because they 'look stylish'.

2.6. The second notable differentiation of the Purist version of intent from general use is that it encompasses both conceptual and physical manifestations of 'want' – *desire* (for form) and *form*(ed desire), respectively. Using contemporary definitions (see for example, the Oxford, Cambridge or Collins, online dictionaries, n.d.) one could infer that, unless abandoned, intent exists up until the point that its intended outcome is satisfied. At which point, such outcome becomes *the result of* one's intent, and does not necessarily continue as a form of intent itself.

2.7. To Purists, rather, both *desire* and its *forms* themselves (existing as expressions of desire), are intention and continue to be recognized as intent, even if the mind which possessed such desire for form no longer exists. For example, if one conceives that they want to paint a picture and yet they are unable to do so (e.g. due to disability or insufficient resource), such conceived desire exists as intent (and should be preserved by material until it can be realized as form). Similarly, if a being's body or another material was able-enough to fully or partially form one's desire, such (formed) picture would also constitute intent (in addition to the desire for any conceived improvements that the being would like to make). Finally, in either of these examples, if the creating mind ceases to exist (because either it does not intend to exist or because it intended to exist yet was not (pre)served by adequate materials), such intent (i.e. the formed picture and/or conceived improvement) continues to be intent (and would ideally be (pre)served by material as if its respective mind continues to exist).

3. Material

3.1. Materials are negatively defined as *entities (i.e. structures/objects, actions, associations) which are not intended (i.e. such structures, actions, associations do not 'qualify' as intent)*. Therefore, unless a state is positively defined as intent, it possesses a material purpose (by default). Useful materials are the literal support-structures from which all forms of intent exist (i.e. composed/realized). Contrary to the popular contemporary notion of a material, it is the purpose of an entity which designates it as a material or intention. Materials can be organic or synthetic in composition and living or inanimate in nature. In contemporary conditions, the term *material* encapsulates the bodies of human beings, their support structures (e.g. their homes, governments and bodily organs) and the vast majority of the entities existing within environmental conditions, including those which are counterproductive or useless to beings for the purposes of realization of intent (e.g. debris, waste, by-products, '(unrefined) nature').

3.2. Materials encompass all types of resource. More specifically, resource, in all its various contemporary measures, is the quantification of material usefulness, that is, its willingness and ability as a means of achieving any purpose. Materials are used to build or repair forms, and are replaceable, improvable, and important (for the realization of intent), but should never be considered sacred or precious (as is intent). I use the terms *sacred* and *important* to respectively distinguish between unconditional, abstract value – intrinsic, by definition, to all intent – and conditional, functional value – which may be inherited by certain materials in certain conditions.

3.3. The term *material* is used to collectively describe all non-intended entities, such as 'bodies', 'tools', 'infrastructure' and 'environment', because these are all entities which exist as a means to an end. I view that, as society progresses (with enhanced technology and applied logic), the perceptual and conceptual separation between these conditional aspects will increasingly dissipate to the point where they become one and the same and distinction cannot be made. A Purist would view nil practical distinction between, for example, a human body holding a tool (such as a wrench) and the tool itself; they are both material(s) to serve and support the intent of beings. As the materials of beings advance and specifically design their environment to be more purposely-tailored to themselves, such that the individual bodies of beings react less and, rather, their environment acts increasingly more for the purpose(s) of beings, society will literally become, and act as, a larger, singular, integrated 'body' – a relatively uniform/consistent, purpose-designed material, more-efficiently serving intent. Extending this notion to its fullest conclusion, Purists envisage that future governance will wholly occur via endo-government, automatically and discretely governing from *within* the structures of beings. This can be contrasted with contemporary (exo-)governments, which reactively, inefficiently, ineffectively and intrusively, govern as multiple, large, heterogeneous – in terms of ideology and structure – external bodies, which rely on the working bodies of beings for their functioning.

4. Beings are their intent; human bodies are materials

4.0.1. Purism views beings as the aspects of their personality and appearance which serve nil or abstract purpose and which they choose to associate with. These aspects associated together form the 'self', not necessarily the functional aspects of any body (I say not necessarily, because the functional aspects themselves may be desired). It would be inaccurate to assume that any being *is* any aspect which they are automatically forced to *be* and/or forced to associate with through (con)temporarily conditions, such as the vast majority of materials sustaining beings existing via human bodies (e.g. the bodily functioning of organs or the cells, molecules and atoms from which they are composed). Purism, therefore, separates the 'human (body)' from the 'being' by viewing that the former are materials which are replaceable and/or improvable without changing what and/or how beings intend themselves to be.

4.0.2. More specifically, in a perfect world, every being is defined from two perspectives.

4.1. Beings – from an official (material) perspective

4.1.1. From an official perspective, that is, for material (e.g. government) and thus resource allocation purposes, Purism defines and reduces beings exclusively as their intent – their formed desires and their desire for forms. Preferences such as style (yet not function) in clothes, taste (yet not nutrition) in food, and personality (yet not politics) of the company that one keeps, are statements of intent which unconditionally define beings. By contrast, the striving (e.g. for functionality, nutrition, political allegiance) to satisfy (material) need is viewed by Purists as (con)temporary, conditional reaction.

4.1.2. A being, therefore, is summarily defined as the collective of intent *possessed* by a single mind (whether the term *possessed* occurs in a contemporary or a former tense – the latter tense recognizes intent in the contemporary absence of a mind).

4.1.3. A mind is summarily defined as a structure (contemporarily) possessing the ability to possess – retain and/or alter (pre-existing), and/or create (new) – intent. A mind may be a material or a desire, depending on whether it desires itself.

4.1.4. Although further explanation is beyond the scope of this introductory text, the *possession*, that is, the ownership/sovereignty, of any intent requires at least one of each of the (three) following structures:

1. a (material) structure designed to symbolize a quantity (e.g. 'one', 'nil' or 'white'; 'black' – as discussed in part B, colors must logically be quantities, not qualities);
2. a (material) structure designed to symbolize either 'stasis' or 'change' (e.g. the symbols of 'keep', 'retain' or 'disassociate', 'discard', 'gain'); and,
3. a (material) structure designed to differentiate symbols 1. and 2. from the immediate condition and differentiate their designed association with each other from other non-association. The process of differentiation is detailed in this appendix A.

4.1.5. Notably, if the association between structures 1. and 2. is determined (by structure 3.) to exist for nil or arbitrary purpose (e.g. 'I seek to gain a white car, because I want it'), such state exists as intent (whether ideal or 'real'). If such association is determined to exist for a logical purpose (e.g. 'I seek to retain white blood cells, because my body needs them to live (to serve my intent)'), the possession of such state, whether 'ideal' or real, exists for a material purpose.

4.1.6. As discussed earlier (paragraphs 2.7. and 4.1.2.), a mind is not necessary for intent to exist, whether as desire or form. Intent void of a mind, being unable to create new or alter existing intent, would simply remain unaltered (assuming moral conditions), whereas intent of an existing mind may be altered (i.e. changed, including being added-to or discarded) at the intent of such mind (again, assuming moral conditions). The degree by which a mind's structures can vary due to conditional pressure before it is recognized to be a different mind (and therefore unable to alter – add to or change – its (pre)existing intentions with moral authority) must be rationally determined by the material serving such intent (using the formula for calculating rationality, as detailed in this appendix A). Broadly speaking, the degree of acceptable conditionally-induced variation within any mind's structure, beyond its state at the creation of any intention, would be proportional to the consistency of the immediate conditions of such mind's material at the time of such intent's creation. That is, an intention created by a mind amidst relatively high degrees of conditional variation could be legitimately changed by such mind despite it having undergone proportionately large degrees of conditional variation from its original state.

4.2. Beings – from a social (aesthetic; being's) perspective

4.2. From a social perspective, that is, with respect to intended private/personal association between themselves, beings are defined *by* (i.e. in accordance with) their intent. That is, a mind chooses what portion of their intent, if not all, and if any, is presented as a symbol to represent its respective being to others. One, for example, may intend to be known as 'Primus' and be viewed as a separate entity from the 'home' and other, peripheral, intentions (e.g. vehicle and clothing) in which they possess; these peripheral intentions would still officially (i.e. for material purposes) be recognized as an extension of Primus, and their alteration without the intent of Primus could potentially be just as immoral, or even more immoral, as any unintentional alternation of Primus themselves (depending on the degree by which Primus intends for each aspect to exist unaltered). Another being may intend to be perceived in one way to one being and be perceived in a completely different way to (an/)other(/s).

4.3. Two aspects to every human

4.3.1. For reason that the being and the body of human beings are generally entangled in contemporary conditions, it may be easier for many to view human beings as essentially possessing two aspects: a personal and a professional aspect. These aspects reflect a human being's intent (i.e. the being itself) and their material (body), respectively; they may be dissected across time and/or space (e.g. across time: a person could be viewed as a being

when they are primarily enjoying themselves, acting for an arbitrarily sought purpose in one moment, and the same person could be later viewed as a material when they are working, primarily serving a functional purpose; across space: a person could be conceptually dissected such that their desire (e.g. their aesthetic aspects) and their material aspects (their functional aspects, such as their bodily organs) are recognised in the same moment). The distinction between the two aspects is important because, as will be discussed further, a person's personal side (i.e. their being) is amoral, and may only be considered subjectively (i.e. as opinion) if considered by others (e.g. 'arrogant', 'interesting', 'lovable'). A person's material body side (i.e. their professional/official aspect), however, possesses a degree of morality at any moment – as per any material – which can be judged on the degree to which it contributes to the material condition of the world.

4.3.2. The determination of the morality of any material occurs through analysis of its apparent purpose(s) and means.

5.1. Every material possesses at least one purpose and one means

5.1.1. According to Purism, every material possesses at least one purpose and at least one means/method towards such purpose. Note: the subsequent paragraphs (5.1.2. – 5.1.5.) are relatively dense with definition, however, a collective example for these definitions is offered in paragraph 5.1.6.

5.1.2. I define a means/method as *the structure(s), (re)action(s) and/or association(s), whether conceptual or real, by which a material realizes (i.e. achieves and maintains) or pursues realization of its purpose(s)*. The terms *means* and *method* are largely interchangeable – the term *method* can be applied to specific and more-obviously defined structure or action, whilst a material's means can be considered as the sum of its methods. Both terms can be considered as *immediate purpose(s)/states*.

5.1.3. I define a purpose as *a(n end)state/outcome of any entity, whether ideal(ized) (i.e. conceived as a future state, anywhere up unto a final state which assumes perfect conditions) or real(istically describing an actual and contemporary portion of conditions) in nature*.

5.1.4. A purpose, therefore, is a state that may range from an entity's current, realistic/realized state, to future idealized states. Ideals are final states, or *endstates*, towards which a material can strive and, thus, would realize in a perfect/ideal world (irrespective of resource and other practical considerations). Technically (as discussed in part B), ideal states will never be truly

realized within reality (even if a contemporary state is considered as *ideal* by an observer). Consequently, all ideals are considered to be future states that materials can continually strive towards. To recognize that ideals cannot be truly realized and yet that actual states within reality may be considered ideal by observers, an idealized purpose can be more specifically categorized as being either *ultimate* or *penultimate* in nature. Whilst both are final states, ultimate purposes are figurative endstates which are non-specific to conditions of reality. Penultimate purposes, rather, are the final outcomes sought for specific conditions of reality and can be considered to be (literally) realized by an observer. The (literal) realization of a material's penultimate purpose will necessarily (figuratively) realize its respective ultimate purpose (assuming an ultimate purpose is possessed by such material).

5.1.5. Notably, the effective difference between Purist definitions of *purpose* and *means* – both are simply states (and together, both encompass all possible states) – is the expectation of unidirectional servitude from the latter to the former. That is, the realization of any purpose is sought to occur to a greater degree relative to the realization of its means. It is expected that means, at their own expense (if necessary), will strive towards the realization (i.e. achievement and maintenance) of their respective (end)states. Purposes, therefore, can be considered to be more valuable than their respective means (where such value exists as *importance*, in the instance of material purpose, and *sacredness*, in the instance of intended purpose).

5.1.6. A humanist government, for example, may possess an ultimate purpose to 'serve humans' whilst its penultimate purpose may be to serve human populations A and B (the only humans known to such government). Such government will inevitably exist amidst conditions whereby materials do not perfectly realize this endstate. That is, it could be argued that atoms and subatomic particles do not appear at all to be specifically tailored for human purposes, whereas bodily cells, organs, human bodies, and societal infrastructures (which appear to be at least partially tailored towards serving humans) are relatively inefficient, unreliable and far from perfect for this purpose. Consequentially, the government in this example must employ various means/methods to realize (i.e. change conditions towards) its idealized state. Such methods, for example, laws, policies and their enforcement/provision through public servants, will change according to conditions, yet the government's (ultimate) purpose to 'serve humans' is an ideal which can potentially remain static. From this government's perspective, materials which are adept at serving humans would be of the greatest *importance*, humans themselves would be considered *precious*, and an outcome where humans are served would be sought to a greater degree than all other outcomes.

5.2. Every purpose is either 'intended' or 'material' in its nature

5.2.1. Any entity can, at the same moment, serve (i.e. be associated with) multiple purposes, yet intent and material are incompatible within the same purpose. Arbitrariness – sought in states of being – and logicity – sought in material states – are antonyms and are mutually exclusive to any point in space; we cannot conceive that a difference (e.g. arbitrariness and logicity) could exist at any single point of space (Primus, 2019). Accordingly, any purpose is either material or intended in nature. For example, one may possess a wall-mounted painting with two purposes; its intended (i.e. abstract/artistic) purpose may be to simply ‘look nice’; its material purpose may be to ‘provide security’ to its owner’s property (through method of concealing a wall-mounted-safe). Each purpose, however, is distinct and can exist independently from the other.

5.2.2. Due to the complexity of contemporary materials, the realization of intent may superficially appear to be combined with a satisfaction of material need, yet all purposes are distinctly separable by sufficiently-advanced material. As an example, a being may intend to attend a dinner party with friends whereby such dinner and its social interactions will incorporate elements that satisfy material-needs: the need to eat for nutrition; the need to socialize and grow support networks amongst friends as a social ‘safety-net’. Similarly, it will include elements that are purely abstract and are sought for enjoyment: the excitement of getting ‘dressed-up’, the taste of fine-foods, the social games – the elements of friendships that one would still maintain and engage with if one existed in an ideal world, where finances, health, social standing, employment, and raising children were not concerns for beings (either because such needs no longer exist, or because such needs are satisfied via material automations).

6.1. Intent is amoral

6.1.1. Intent cannot be judged according to moral value – it is amoral and sacred, irrespective of how it is perceived by another. Beings themselves, therefore, cannot be morally judged and their intent should be served selflessly by material to its fullest permissible capacity in any moment.

6.1.2. For example, one individual’s intent to harm another may be viewed as immoral by many contemporaries, noting that intent is a *desire* or a ‘want’, sought for arbitrary reason (rather than being sought in response to perceived need). To Purists, however, there is no such concept as immoral or (mal)adaptive intent; it is specifically the material facilitating intent that possesses degrees of (im)morality. Where a material (e.g. a human body) possesses an

immediate purpose (e.g. to harm another) which does not logically strive to serve an ultimate purpose of peace (i.e. such material has no awareness or regard for the intent of other beings), the structures possessing and enacting this purpose would be immoral. That is, a material's ultimate purpose which is anything other than peace would be deemed immoral by logical observers, as would any illogical action (i.e. immediate purpose) assumed towards any ultimate purpose (peaceful or non-peaceful). In both instances, the degree of immorality, as will be discussed (from paragraph 7.4. onwards), would be proportionate to the degree that it abstractly limits and/or varies the existence of intent (whether existing as desire or form). Note therefore that it is the specific structure possessing any purpose and/or the subsequent action towards such purpose itself which is especially immoral, not necessarily the entire body from which such structure and action exists.

6.1.3. Purists view that ideally (i.e. resource allowing) any intent, and therefore any ideology, can exist (amorally) as art, that is, exist upon the condition that its state is served by relatively moral material (i.e. material possessing peaceful purpose and using logical means to such purpose). One's intent to 'harm another', for example, could exist limited as an imagination and desire for such occurrence within the mind; as a conceived illusion that such has occurred; as a book; as a poem; as a painting or as any other form of expression which is consistent with peace (as defined in paragraph 8.2.2.). The limitless potential for material progression provides unlimited potential for the peaceful realization of intent.

6.1.4. In summary of intent's amorality, the nature of beings' intent determines how and with whom beings associate (socially), not what art/form does or does not possess a right to exist. The arbitrary (i.e. opinionated) limitation and/or variation of art (i.e. forms of intent) cannot bring morality to the world; it will be argued, rather, that such is immorality itself.

6.1.5. The reason that intent is sacred and entitled to maximal realization by material is presented in part B. In short, I propose in part B that intent is the only conceivable type of endstate (a true 'end' in itself), due to existing, by lexiconic definition, with greater metaphysical definition across time and space; that materials are, by their lesser (lexiconic and metaphysical) definition, merely a means to an end; that it is logical for an observer to value the existence of states of greater definition (intentions) beyond states of lesser definition (materials).

6.2. Every material possesses a degree of (im)morality

6.2. Purism views (im)morality as a spectrum and an exclusive and intrinsic property of material. Every, and only, material possesses a degree of (im)morality at any one time.

7. Morality: consistency (within material)

7.1. I define morality as *consistency*. Importantly, as I demonstrate in part B, equivalency exists between the concepts of *consistency* and *logic*. Morality can therefore also be described as *logicality*.

7.2. I define logic as *the single consistent/uniform outcome/(end)state for any given condition: that outcome/(end)state which is void of abstract/arbitrary, if any, limitation or variance*. Logic, by definition, cannot occur within states of being (aesthetic states) on the basis that said states are, by definition, sought for arbitrary or nil purpose (see paragraph 2.3.).

7.3. In the (idealized) conditions of the equation ' $1 + 1 = x$ ', for example, observers will assume that '1' is consistently equal to '1' (and does not vary across time and space). Therefore, the only logical (consistent) answer for x (in this condition) is that $x = 2$. Similarly, Purists would argue that consistency can be objectively determined and demanded from more-complex conditions; for example, if (the being of) person, A, wants to perform act C, and their body is able to do so, and yet (the body of) person B has the power to deny such act, it is consistent that A should complete that act without interference from B. It would be viewed as illogical/inconsistent for B to arbitrarily limit or vary A's act. A's act could however be limited for logical, non-arbitrary reasons, such as if it were to affect another person, D, or if there is limited resource and A's act would consume more than their entitled portion of resource.

7.4. Purism, therefore, views that consistent/logical (i.e. non-arbitrary) variation or limitation within (the purposes and means, of the structures and actions of) material is moral, whereas *arbitrary* limitation or variation within any material is immoral. Furthermore, it is viewed that the degree of such immorality is proportionate to the degree that a material (i.e. structure and/or act) abstractly limits the creation/realization of new intent and/or varies the realization of existing intent.

7.5. Note that it is the presence or absence of *arbitrariness* which mediates the morality of material states. Inherent to all moral realizations (of all forms of intent), materials will be required to facilitate *logical variation* and/or *limitation* with respect to their purpose and their means. In terms of logical variation and/or limitation resulting from a material's *purpose*, for example, if a being, 'S', intends to move from point 'A' to point 'B', a righteous material (e.g.

the body of S) will (logically) strive to both *vary* S' position in space (from point A to point B, in accordance with such intent) and strive to *limit* such variation of position (to ensure that S does not exceed point B and, for example, end at point C). In terms of logical variation and/or limitation resulting from a material's *means*, a material may need to *vary* being S' movement between points A to B (e.g. change/extend its course and/or change/delay the time and/or rate of its movement) such that S' movement *varies* from its intended course. This *variation* would be necessary if it realizes the greater realization of intent, for example, by allowing two more beings, 'T' and 'J', to use the course from A to B and realize their intent. Similarly, a material, irrespective of its purpose, may be forced to *limit* its service to S (e.g. by moving S only halfway between point A and B, if S agrees that 'halfway' is better than 'not at all') in conditions where S' material lacks the resource, that is, the ability, to fully realize being S' intent.

8. Morality in general terms

8.0.1. Purist morality can be viewed as a measure of a material's *willingness* and *ability* to serve intent, relating, respectively, to its purpose and means. Such measure is applicable to any material, from an atom, to a human or government body (passive materials, by their indifferent nature, can be viewed as being implicitly *willing* to exist and be used or manipulated for various purposes – in a near-ideal world, space itself would be the only passive material, whereby all other materials, composed of space and formatted as an ever-advancing technology, would be actively striving for the purpose of peace).

8.0.2. It is not lost on me that it is probably a very foreign concept for most contemporary readers to consider that inanimate objects possess degrees of morality. As foreign and unintuitive as it first appears, human-specific terms of morality can, and should, be applied to inanimate and less-complex materials, in addition to human and government bodies. Prior to demonstrating the method for calculating specific degrees of morality within specific states (this appendix A), *logicality/consistency* will be discussed more generally, using contemporary terms which are used in association with morality and ethical behavior in humans.

8.1. Moral terminology relating to purpose and means

8.1.1. I employ the term *logicality* to describe the morality of the purpose of a material, whilst I use the term *rationality* to describe the logicality/consistency of a material's means/methods. In other words, the terms *rational* and *logical* are essentially synonyms within Purism (and this text), with the specification that rationality is usually used in relation to the means employed by materials in achieving their purposes, whilst logicality is used specifically in relation to the

purpose or the overall nature of a material (i.e. when referring to both its means and purpose); in any sense, the terms rationality and logicity can be used interchangeably because they both describe an absence of arbitrariness. The morality of a material's purpose (i.e. the endstate towards which it strives) can be measured, therefore, as a spectrum of (il)logicity, whereas the morality of a material's means (i.e. its structures and/or actions) can be measured as a spectrum of (ir)rationality.

8.1.2. Examining the logicity and rationality of means/methods more specifically, I apply the terms *righteous* or *good*, *less-than-righteous*, and *evil* (each existing on the same spectrum) to describe the degrees of logicity of a material purpose. I employ the terms *reliability* and *availability* as descriptors of the rationality of a material's structures, whilst I designate the terms *reasonableness* or *responsibility* as synonyms for the rationality of material (re)action.

8.1.3. The more righteous (i.e. willing to serve intent) a material's purpose is, and the more rational (i.e. reliable and available in structure, and responsible/reasonable in action) a material's means/methods are, the more moral (logical; consistent; pure) such material is.

8.2. Righteous versus evil purpose

8.2.1. A righteous material – a material of moral/consistent/logical purpose – possesses a purpose/endstate seeking to (pre)serve the maximum possible quantity of intent. Specifically, a material with a logical purpose strives to serve all forms of intent, where such service is void of *arbitrary variation* (i.e. alteration/destruction of pre-existing form) or *limitation* (i.e. prevention of creation of new form or prevention of alteration of pre-existing form).

8.2.2. Peace. I term the (end)state which facilitates the ***maximal (material) realization of naturally occurring intent*** as the state of ***peace*** (where *naturally occurring intent* is that intent which is not merely generated by material for purpose of convenience of realization). Peace, void of arbitrary limitation and variation with respect to material service, is the most logical, that is, righteous, endstate towards which any material can strive. *Peacefulness* describes the degree of morality of any material's purpose and is synonymous with concepts such as *righteousness* and *goodness*.

8.2.3. The Purist definition of peace implies that material, in practice, possesses a responsibility to continually *progress* itself (technologically), wherever (across space) and whenever (across time) such progression is rationally permissible. Such progression actively maximizes material's potential to perform intent, whether such intent is currently known or

undiscovered. More specifically, the practical need to continually progress to satisfy a purpose of peace exists because there is potentially no limit to:

- a. the quantity or complexity of the intentions of beings; nor is there a limit to:
- b. the magnitude of potential threat to materials of relative consistency (i.e. materials supporting the intent of beings) posed by material 'impurities' (i.e. materials possessing inconsistent purposes and means); and, nor is there a limit to:
- c. material's ability to technologically advance itself to better realize any intention (e.g. material decreasing in size (i.e. increasing in resolution) will forever become more-able to perform 'smoother' surfaces of forms);

and, because varying degrees of **a.** and **b.** (above) may be(come) known to material at any time, with any degree of warning.

8.2.4. Purist states of peace, therefore, are not necessarily associated with contemporary notions of peace, such as 'calmness', 'tranquillity', or the absence of 'warfare'. Peace, rather, may involve the occurrence of any state (including, for example, states of 'anxiety', 'disruption' and warfare) where such states directly serve as, or indirectly result as a (residual) by-product of, rational means used to maximize the realization of intent. Notably, any state (e.g. a state of anxiety, disruption or warfare) may also exist as intent itself and therefore may be peacefully realized by material (e.g. the simulation of warfare, disruption or anxiety in games, movies and the dramatic arts). The realization of Purist peace, rather than being a necessarily pristine condition, encapsulates as much good (i.e. facilitates as much realization of intent – the fulfilment of beings' desires) as its respective material condition can offer, with the proviso that such condition must continually improve itself (to better realize intent) wherever improvement is rationally permissible.

8.2.5. On this basis, materials peacefully realizing any intended state (including static states, where one's intent is unchanging) will exist as varying versions of the same ideal across time. That is, any peaceful realization of form will improve or deteriorate in 'likeness' to its ideal version, in accordance with the ability of the material and the overall adequateness of conditions.

8.2.6. For example, assume that the only intent known to a material, 'X', is intent for a spherical memorial, which is desired to exist forevermore by a being, 'B'. If B is fortunate, their intent

would be served by a relatively-progressed (reactive) material of wholly peaceful purpose (assume that X meets this description through its existence as a *pureaucracy* – a contemporary government striving for (Purist) peace through rational means). A state of peace in this instance would involve X realizing a ‘near-spherical’ shape through the literal arrangement of sub-materials (e.g. ‘granite’ and ‘concrete’) in space. Concurrently, X, wherever rationally permissible, would be further advancing itself technologically, such that its sub-materials become greater in resolution (i.e. smaller in size), greater in quantity, and more efficient in their operation. Ultimately, such advancement would enable X to continually maximize the realization of B’s intent through formation of an increasingly ‘smoother’ surface (of greater structural consistency) and of greater structural stability. That is, X would continually ‘reform’ its sub-materials and their arrangement to enable B’s memorial become increasingly more ‘sphere-like’ into the future (e.g. the concrete and granite of B’s memorial would eventually be replaced, by ‘steel’ for example, which would ideally be replaced by infinitely more-refined materials as they become available to X).

8.2.7. Furthermore, because the nature of B’s intent may change (assuming being B’s mind still exists) and/or because intent which is of greater priority to serve may become known to X at any moment, X, in proportion to its degree of (technological) advancement, would possess greater adaptiveness (i.e. ability to change its immediate state as a rational reaction to environmental conditions). Greater adaptability would enable X to serve a better standard of peace through its increased ability to react to both changes of intent (of B or of other beings) and changes within the environmental/material condition. Because it is probable from the perspective of X that there are other structures in the environment (e.g. weather, vandals) that may interfere with and thus effect less-than-maximal realization of B’s intent, X, wherever viable, would provide security concurrently with its performance of B’s ‘near-sphere’. Such security may be proactive or reactive in nature and would ultimately involve changing (i.e. improving) environmental conditions to be more-favorable to peace.

8.2.8. Should material conditions become particularly inadequate, such as during states of emergency, where direct threat to B’s form or indirect threat to the material (X) supporting B’s form exists in combination with a lack of available resource, X, being a reactive material, would possess the ability to rationally react. X may determine that, in the face of such threat, a peaceful outcome is to decommission X’s sphere and reallocate its resource elsewhere (where it is most vitally needed) whilst continuing to record (i.e. preserve) B’s intent until it can be re-realized in more-ideal conditions. Through temporarily reducing its direct service to B in order to prioritize the neutralization of a threat, X would be (indirectly) maximizing the realization of B’s intent throughout time and thus would be achieving peace.

8.2.9. Alternatively, and less-fortunately for B, assume that the only material available to B, material X, is passive (i.e. does not possess an active will to serve peace) and possesses relatively low degrees of ability (e.g. the sand and water of any beach). X in this instance, due to being composed of passive material, would require an external, reactive material (possibly the body of being B) to become formed into its state of peace. A state of peace in this instance, served by less capable material than the government in the previous example (e.g. sand granules and water), would probably entail such materials being arranged as a 'partial-sphere' (e.g. 'semi-sphere' or 'three-quarter-sphere') formation. Attempts to construct a near-sphere shape using sand and water – material which appears to not be purposely-designed to serve intent – would probably collapse under the weight of its non-purposely designed sub-structures. The partial-sphere formation of X would be classified as a state of peace on the basis that such state realizes the maximal quantity of intent given the considered conditions of X (it is not rationally permissible for X to realize a greater standard of peace in this instance).

8.2.10. Furthermore, because it is not rationally permissible for X, a passive material, to progress itself, X would be reliant on other reactive materials to progress its state into more-useful outcomes. Until this time, X, in its current state, would be unable to serve intention of relative complexity (i.e. involving highly intricate detail and moving parts) and would be unable to proactively adapt to changes of B's intent should B intend for a different (and potentially more intricate) memorial. Finally, X, due its passivity, would also be subject to uncontested alteration (i.e. decay or destruction) from the interference of environmental conditions. In this state, X would not be able to provide any proactive security of the intent it serves and would be limited to the provision of passive resistance to conditional change, occurring via the weight of its own structure (e.g. if the watered sand is heavy enough it will resist being moved by wind). B's form therefore would inevitably be changed over time by external conditions, through gradual erosion (e.g. relatively strong winds) or sudden destruction (e.g. via waves or the bodies of other beings). Passive materials, in summary, realize a peace which is considerably less-than-ideal for even the most simplistic intentions.

8.2.11. Whilst the latter example of peace may be unsuitable for any being seeking to have their intent permanently realized, B would be even less-fortunate in either of the above examples if their material possessed a *less-than-righteous* purpose.

8.2.12. Void of wholly-consistent purpose, a *less-than-righteous* material strives to *arbitrarily limit* and/or *vary* its service, thus only selectively serving/performing intent if its form meets certain (arbitrary) criteria. A humanist government, for example, which (arbitrarily) strives to

only serve (i.e. provide resource to) beings whose form is of human origin (i.e. exists upon a human body), is less righteous than a Purist government that strives to serve all beings/intent. A nationalist government, for example, which (arbitrarily) strives to only serve beings/intent whose form exists on bodies possessing specific nationality, is less righteous than a humanist government that strives to serve all beings of human origin/body. A racist government employee, as further example, which strives to only serve beings whose form is of a certain color, race or religion, is less righteous than a nationalist government employee that strives to only serve beings whose bodies possess specific nationality.

8.2.13. Returning to the example of being B; *less-than-righteous* materials may refuse to serve B on the arbitrary basis that they refuse to form 'spheres', and/or because they refuse to serve beings existing or identifying as the letter 'B' (noting that the state of 'B' could be a material characteristic, by which one is reliant on and/or entangled with, and thus essentially forced to associate with, or it may be a state of intent, by which one freely identifies). Such materials, rather, may only serve other geometric shapes and beings of other letters of the alphabet (e.g. beings 'A', 'C', 'D', and so on). Even less-righteous materials may provide even more limited service to intent, for example, by serving (i.e. forming) only 'cubed-shaped memorials' which originate from beings of the letter 'A', whilst refusing to serve all other forms (e.g. cones, spheres, pyramids) and all other beings (e.g. beings labelled 'B' to 'Z'), despite possessing the ability to do so.

8.2.14. A material possessing *evil* purpose, furthermore, in addition to its own arbitrary pledge to provide either nil or *arbitrarily limited* and/or *varied* service to intent, would also actively seek to *arbitrarily vary* and/or *limit* the existence of other intent (currently being served by other, more-consistent, materials). Evil government/regimes, for example, may firstly strive to control (i.e. *limit*) the forms of their citizens, as per the *less-than-righteous* examples above, by dictating the private activities, appearances and beliefs that citizens must abide by in order to receive their resource. Furthermore, in addition to refusing to serve (i.e. provide resource to) their minorities and the citizens of other governments (which fall outside their arbitrary criteria for service), evil governments would actively strive to persecute/destroy (i.e. *vary* the material of) certain forms on the basis of their form (e.g. their appearance and beliefs) and/or strive to prevent (i.e. *limit*) the existence of future generations of such people.

8.2.15. In the instance of being B, evil materials, for example, may strive to locate, with the purpose of destroying, currently existing 'spheres' and all beings of the letter 'B', whilst preventing future forms of this nature from existing.

8.2.16. The classifications of *righteous*, *less-than-righteous* and *evil* can be applied to the purpose(s) of any material; from a government, to a human body, to one's internal organs, to atoms. Whilst atoms, for example, are arguably not evil (i.e. because they themselves apparently do not strive to arbitrarily limit or vary intent), they could be viewed as less-than-righteous. Their relative reliability (i.e. lack of arbitrary *variation* in structure) and availability (i.e. lack of arbitrary *limitation* in structure) across a relatively large range of conditions allows for the realization of some intent (through their use as 'building blocks' for relatively simple forms of intent). Arguably, however, being passive in nature, atoms apparently lack the structures to recognize intent, let alone actively strive to maximize its realization.

8.2.17. In summary of (ir)righteousness, peace is the only righteous and wholly logical/moral purpose. Immorality exists within less-than-ideal material conditions where and whilst a material possesses a less-than-righteous-purpose. At best, less-than-righteous materials, for arbitrary reason (e.g. on the basis of personal beliefs), are unwilling to serve either all or specific forms of intent. At worst, and in addition to any unwillingness, evil materials actively and systematically strive to locate and implement variance (i.e. alteration or destruction) and/or limitation (i.e. control of pre-existing and/or prevention of creation) upon all or specific forms of intent.

8.3. Rational versus irrational means/methods

8.3.0.1. The will to bring goodness is only one half of morality. Even material which possesses a moral purpose is immoral to the degree that it employs irrational means of realizing (or failing to realize) such purpose. As mentioned (paragraph 5.1.2.), the means of any material includes both its structure(s) and/or its (re)action(s).

8.3.0.2. I define a rational structure or (re)action as one which *will probably most efficiently realize its purpose*. All materials exhibit degrees of irrationality (i.e. they can never be completely rational) due to the limitations associated with their operation (i.e. the residual loss of resource during functioning and being finite in structure and function). The only exception to this (as discussed in part B) is space, which is the only material that does not suffer from these limitations and is a wholly rational material. The term *rational* in general usage is therefore an abbreviation for *relatively or reasonably rational* (except in the instance of space where the term *rational* accurately describes a (truly) rational state).

8.3.1. Rational structure/design

8.3.1.1. In general terms, a rational structure is able (i.e. capable, reliable and available); it does not *abstractly vary* and is not *abstractly limited* in presence or ability. Structurally, a more-rational material – that which *will probably most efficiently realize its purpose* – is more-consistent in design. Specifically, structure of greater rationality is both more *advanced* and more *ascended* in design.

8.3.1.2. *Advancement* is the degree of a material's generic potential to wield power over environmental conditions. More-advanced materials are designed with greater ability to change their environment in the image of their purpose(s), more efficiently and with greater precision. More specifically, rational design allows a material to *know* its environment, *determine* how it needs to be changed and *convert* such environment towards its purpose. Materials of greater degrees of rationality complete this process more rapidly, more precisely (i.e. possessing ability for greater 'resolution' of form), using less overall resource, with less (residual) wastage of resource and with greater capacity for concurrent reaction than materials of lesser rationality. More-advanced materials, therefore, are more-omnipresent with respect to the quantity of their sub-materials (i.e. 'cells' or individual 'building blocks') and possess sub-materials which are inherently smaller in size and more-uniform in structural design. In this respect, advancement ensures that each sub-material, or 'cell', within any material is not too different from each other, with respect to structure and action, ultimately maximizing the interoperability of such sub-materials towards a common purpose. As per the logical requirements for the existence of any material (described in part B), greater quantities of relative difference within the state of any material (i.e. too much change/difference, occurring too soon) reduces the degree by which its sub-materials (e.g. cells) can adapt and rationally react towards their current purpose.

8.3.1.3. Advancement therefore ensures that relative differences in structure and action are minimized between cells of varying means attempting to work together towards the same purpose. Similarly, advancement maximizes an ability to generate states of relative difference for use in instances where cells are attempting to erode the capability or alter the purpose of other materials acting towards a conflicting purpose, thereby altering (degrading or utilizing) their state towards their own purpose. As a material becomes more (technologically) advanced and increasingly less-*varying* and less-*limited*, across time and space, it approaches, but never truly becomes, a 'continuous' or 'pure' consistency (thereby 'mirroring' the image of space).

8.3.1.4. Design which exhibits greater advancement (i.e. potential to wield power) produces an able, yet not necessarily a reliable/rational, material. Materials, in order to be considered

rational, must also be *ascended* to decrease the probability of deviation towards another purpose.

8.3.1.5. *Ascension* is the degree to which any material, however advanced, is institutionalized towards its specific purpose(s). The more ascended a material is, the less probable it is to 'turn cancerous' or be 'misused' in pursuit of varying other purposes across time. The structural requirements of an ascended material vary, depending on its respective purpose(s). Unless otherwise stated, the term *ascension* refers to a material's willingness to serve the (Purist) purpose of peace. Towards the rational pursuit of peace, an ascended material is structured such that each being's intent (and therefore, the immediate materials most-directly (pre)serving such intent) become increasingly less, and eventually not at all, *reliant* on, *shared*, or *entangled* with, the intent (and immediate support-structures) of other beings.

8.3.1.6. A *shared* entity (i.e. structure/object, action or association), whether of intended or material purpose, is recognized as the property (i.e. part or direct extension) of other than one being (e.g. two or more beings) at any one time (e.g. a house with two concurrent owners is shared between both owners). Sharing does not include instances where transfer of ownership occurs (e.g. a clearly defined owner of a house decides to allow another being to stay within a room of such house – in this instance either ownership of the whole house would be retained by the owner or a clearly defined portion of it (e.g. a room) may be temporarily allocated to the tenant under defined conditions).

8.3.1.7. *Entangled* entities exist together in space in a relationship which requires forced (and potentially undesired) association between beings (and potentially irrational associations between materials), in combination with a difficulty or inability for either being to disassociate where and when intended (e.g. a person who owns or rents a room within a house which is otherwise owned by another person is entangled with such person, especially if they rely on such room to satisfy their material need to 'rest').

8.3.1.8. An entity which *relies* on another entity exists within a relationship of power, whereby the state of a *reliant* entity is maintained as a direct consequence of the use of resource from a *relenting* entity, where such resource is used to satisfy material need. For example, if a person owning or renting a room within a house owned by another being does not also have their own bathroom, such person requires (and therefore relies) on use of the bathroom of the being who owns such house.

8.3.1.9. Whilst the above relationships may be temporarily necessary and/or unavoidable in contemporary conditions, they must be recognized as being non-ideal conditions for peace. The structural design of future ascended states of material will institutionally ensure that any one person does not rely on any other person for the realization of their intent (and that each person relies upon the least complex arrangement of materials necessary); such states will also ensure that all aspects of beings are unshared and unentangled, such that no association between beings is necessary.

8.3.1.10. Ascension provides clear structural delineation between beings (and their immediately supporting-materials), allowing for true independence from one another and as much freedom as is rationally permissible within any state of peace. Beings existing with the support of ascended materials can associate with and disassociate from other beings, as and when mutually intended. Ascension, finally, provides moral clarity from the perspective of materials serving beings' intent, allowing material to determine which beings have moral entitlement to alter, donate or preserve forms of intent.

8.3.1.11. A material society which is both *ascended* and *advanced* represents the Purist view of the future, as briefly mentioned earlier (paragraph 3.3.). Such an endstate envisages that the large, few, individualized and specialized bodies which support beings within contemporary times (e.g. human and government bodies) – each possessing varying degrees of ability, and each reacting and adapting to each other and the environment for their own varying purposes – will be actively evolved into a relatively-uniform and relatively-continuous material (encompassing all of the known environment). Such material will discretely-operate, both as, and beneath, the surface of all forms, for a singular purpose (of peace). The processes of *advancement* and *ascension* are collectively referred to as *progression*.

8.3.2. Rational (re)action

8.3.2.1. As per rational structure/design, rational, or responsible, (re)action is action that which *will probably most efficiently realize* its (material) purpose. A rational action for a passive material (e.g. a block of sandstone) may simply involve such material existing in its current state. Rational action by materials which are capable of reaction (e.g. human and government bodies) requires (active) determination of which method, potentially among many possible methods, is the most rational for such material's purpose(s). A rational method may include following the direction or guidance determined by other, more-able (i.e. more rational) material of similar or identical purpose (e.g. a citizen acting in accordance with the direction provided by their government). By contrast, irrational, that is, irresponsible action, occurs as (unsought)

arbitrary variation and/or limitation of states, and therefore such action would probably *not* most efficiently progress its material's condition towards its purpose. Because irrational action is, by definition, both arbitrary and unsought, it can be viewed as a 'pointless', or 'senseless', misuse or abuse of resource.

8.3.2.2. Relative Indifference towards allies. Whilst the specific nature of (ir)rational acts will vary depending on the purpose and the immediate conditions of any material, all rational acts possess properties which are relatively indifferent, that is, consistent, whilst interacting with the properties of other rational action(s) and structures possessing the same purpose. More specifically, the properties within any rational act are *not* of too greater difference across too lesser period of time within the space of any interaction, lest they prevent the properties of other rational state(s) (i.e. structure and/or actions) of the same purpose from adapting to such change during such interactions. Notably, the Purist perspective views that the properties of any state of difference can be reduced to values of velocity, quantity and direction, where greater quantities, velocities, and opposition of direction, between the space of any two states is proportionate to greater difference.

8.3.2.3. Relative difference towards enemies. In addition to being relatively indifferent towards other rational acts of the same purpose, rational acts possess properties which produce states of relative difference (i.e. too much difference too soon) whilst interacting with rational states possessing opposing or divergent purposes, and irrational states striving for the same purpose.

8.3.2.4. Assume, for example, that a rational (human) body, 'X', is striving for the same purpose as another body, 'Y'. In order to act rationally, X must ensure that its acts which are directed towards the mutually-aligned structures within Y do not occur with too greater (i.e. 'too much') quantity of (sub-)structures, and, nor that the composition of such (sub-)structures is too dissimilar to the (sub-)structures of Y, in terms of their individual properties: quantities, directions and velocities. X must also ensure that such contact does not occur with too greater velocity (i.e. 'too soon') towards Y.

8.3.2.5. It would be irrational for X, therefore, to apply a quantity of radiation which encompasses the whole body of Y. Such quantity of radiation – relatively large compared to the quantity of the body of Y – would possess a relatively high degree of velocity that would contact Y's body at a rate which is too soon for Y to adapt (i.e. move out of its path, apply protective clothing or evolve protective skin). Such radiation would also contact Y's body with (sub-)structures which are too different (i.e. of varying, including opposing, directions and of

relatively high velocity) when combined with the properties of the (sub-)structures within Y's skin and bodily cells. The radiation would either degrade the skin of Y or move through the skin and degrade the inner body of Y on the basis that Y's structures are not designed for (i.e. are too different in combination with) X's act.

8.3.2.6. X would, however, be able to make rational contact with Y using a very minute quantity of radiation, or a relatively large quantity of other structures on the condition that the sub-structures of such structures are not too dissimilar to the design of Y's structures, and where such act is of relatively low velocity (allowing its impact to be avoided or its difference at impact lessened, through adaptation). For example, if X were to exhale in the same room as Y, and should such exhaled breath encapsulate Y, such act would not generate too much difference too soon in relation to Y's state; Y's structures (i.e. lungs and skin) are adapted to the quantity, velocity and (sub-)structure of X's act of exhalation.

8.3.2.7. Furthermore, it may be rational for X to generate states of relative difference upon or within Y. To be successfully classified as rational, such acts must generate changes to the quantity, velocity or direction of the (sub-)structures within the specific structures of Y which are identified as possessing a divergent purpose or irrational means (e.g. cancerous cells on or within Y's body, or the body of Y itself if Y is attempting to violate peace). The degree of change/difference which is generated by X's act should be sufficiently great (i.e. too much too soon) to prevent Y's divergent structures from adapting, thus altering their purpose(s).

8.3.2.8. Notably, the degree of relative difference that a material act generates determines its (ir)rationality in any condition. For example, the act of deliberately discarding unneeded, incidental structure (i.e. any object) on the ground is either rational – and viewed as appropriate – or irresponsible – and viewed as 'littering' or 'polluting' – depending on:

- a. how different the (sub-)structures of the object is to its immediate environment (including users of such environment); and,
- b. the quantity that is discarded within any space of time relative to how quickly the condition is able to adapt, that, is redistribute, decompose or evaporate the discarded structure.

8.3.2.9. The deliberate discarding of a tree-branch in natural forest, for example, is probably not considered littering; the same act in a public park may be considered littering (depending

on the size of the branch and how manicured and 'branch-free' its landscape is); the same act in an office building almost certainly would be considered littering.

8.3.2.10. The accidental discarding of a tree branch, irrespective of location, may be considered to be a disorder or an irresponsibility depending on whether it occurred due to carelessness of mind (e.g. an inability to properly secure a load of rubbish on a trailer, whether due to a lack of consideration or ability to do so) or malfunction of body (e.g. the body dropped the branch without corresponding cognition to do so).

8.3.2.11. **Clearly defined purpose, the probable ability of means to tangibly affect purpose, and the observability of process (means and outcome).** In addition to the required ability to generate relative difference in relation to enemy entities whilst generating relative indifference when operating with allied entities, a rational (re)action requires:

a) a clearly defined and objectifiable purpose to strive towards;

b) that the action (means used) must probably tangibly – whether directly or indirectly – contribute to the achievement of said purpose;

and – in order to determine if the purposes are/were tangible and reasonably achieved their purpose –

c) a method of observing the effects and/or the outcome – lest another entity be spuriously responsible for the effect or lest it be unknowable whether the required outcome was achieved (and consequently there being no indication of whether the act was rational or not, as a guide for future actions).

8.3.2.12. **Torture and Terrorism.** The aforementioned requirements for rational material action – to be toward a clearly defined purpose, be of probable ability to tangibly affect their purpose, and be observable in process – can bring resolve to contemporary moral questions: why terrorism is wrong, what separates torture from the moral use of pain to gain compliance, and how 'intentions' (will, purpose) relate to moral permissibility (see for example, Heuer, 2015; Liao, 2012; Scanlon, 2008; Lillehammer, 2010; Markovits, 2010; Kolodny, 2011; Wedgwood, 2011a, 2011b)? Purism's contribution comes as a deconstruction of "intention," in terms of an actor's purpose (Scanlon, 2008), and closer examination of "rationality", in terms of their means (Heuer, 2015; Liao, 2012). As discussed (see paragraph 6.1.), (true) intention – that of arbitrary desire, void of perceived need – has no bearing on the (im)morality of an

act, nor any value of (im)morality itself. Conversely, the determination (will) to conduct a material act – specifically, the selection of a material purpose by an active material – is morally accountable, as is the efficiency – the selected means – of the action itself. Each are immoral to the degree that they are probably arbitrary for the purposes of realizing peace.

8.3.2.13. There is a difference between the degree of *probable arbitrariness* of the *means* of Quinn's (1989) hypothetical 'Strategic Bomber' – a pilot who will bomb an arms factory during a war (and will incidentally, yet knowingly, kill ten civilians) for a 'good' purpose (to end the war) – and his 'Terror Bomber' – a pilot who will deliberately and primarily kill ten civilians in order to 'demoralize' society and put pressure on their government to end the war (also for a 'good' purpose). This difference is the generally unobservable primary effect of the Terror Bomber's means – 'demoralization' – combined with its intangible second effect – the notion that 'demoralization,' even if achieved, may not apply adequate or any pressure (leverage) on the government, and the civilian deaths could be for naught. In other words, there is a lack of tangibility between means and sought outcome. The effect of 'demoralization' is difficult to observe and thus it is difficult to know if the raid has been successful (efficient), compared to the strategic bombing, whose destruction is observable and its success more objectively calculable (future acts can be rendered more efficient based on such act). Furthermore, the destruction of an arms factory will very probably tangibly degrade the enemy's war effort, whereas, as per Nazi Germany's bombing of British civilian targets in WWII, even a sustained campaign of bombing is unlikely to cause a government surrender, let alone an isolated bombing causing ten casualties. This unobservability (lack of verifiability) and intangibility of means to affect their purpose, renders the Terrorist Bomber's act to be less-rational than the Strategic Bomber's act. Rational observers viewing Quinn's (1989) hypothetical should intuitively view the Terror Bomber's act as a waste of life because it will probably not achieve their outcomes (irrespective of whether their sought outcome is peace – the purpose for which they use their means is a separate issue, as discussed in the paragraphs of 8.2.).

8.3.2.14. The requirements of tangibility and observability in implementing a rational means may also explain why torture is intuitively considered immoral by rational observers. It is not the infliction of "great pain," as offered by Liao (2015), nor the loss of agency, as offered by Griffin (2008), per se, but rather the lack of observability and thus verification of the success of the torture and/or the intangibility of the torture method or selected victim. Police officers, for example, routinely apply techniques to create "great pain" and/or deny agency in the course of their duty, and yet these acts cannot reasonably be considered torture. For example, a police officer could inflict great pain (e.g. bending a suspect's finger backwards, using pressure points) if it was probably the most efficient way of gaining compliance that would result in a

peaceful outcome (e.g. forcing the suspect to drop their weapon during a struggle). The dropping of a weapon is an observable end by which the officer can cease inflicting pain; the officer could probably not legitimately use the same pain infliction techniques towards an ambiguous end (e.g. “tell me everything you know about your criminal empire and the pain will stop”). Furthermore, the infliction of pain on the suspect holding the gun is a tangible use of pain as leverage; the police officer could probably not legitimately apply the same techniques on one of the relatives of the suspect holding the gun in the hope that it will indirectly put adequate leverage on the suspect to comply.

8.3.3.1. Direct and indirect rational (re)action. Rational action towards a peaceful purpose (i.e. moral action), more specifically, includes instances where material directly serves, that is performs, the intent of beings (e.g. a human body kicking a ball in accordance with its respective being’s intent). It also includes acts which indirectly serve intent through acting to *progress* the material condition, thus rendering the environment by which intent exists to be more consistent, that is, void of arbitrary limitation and variation (e.g. a government initiative to improve the quality of drinking water). The same principle of maximizing and/or minimizing states of difference (as described in paragraphs 8.3.2.2. and 8.3.2.3.) is necessary to ensure rationality in each instance.

8.3.3.2. In terms of the (ir)rationality of action directly serving peace; assume that the (human) body, X, for example, is striving to serve the intent of its being, ‘A’, to hug another being, ‘B’, served by the body Y. The intent for non-association between beings would be assumed by rational bodies unless intent for association is specially indicated via properties (i.e. velocity, quantity and direction of actions) which are not too different in custom to the properties (i.e. cultural/social norms) of other rational materials within the immediate condition. It would be a rational act for X to prevent A from even attempting to hug B until an indication of B’s desire for (any) association with other beings is detected. In instances where B has consented for interaction (e.g. by their attendance in public or by answering the front door to their house), X would move A across space in a (logical) direction towards the space of B whilst ensuring that such action does not occur too fast such that it would disrupt the form of A as they are moved across space (it is implied that A intends to retain their pre-existing form as they intend to hug B). The act of X must also not occur too fast such that A would contact B before B has the ability to be aware of such impending contact, consider such contact, and actively indicate if such contact is *not* desired.

8.3.3.3. If B does not intend to be hugged and yet both X’s act of approach and Y’s act of rejection are rational, B (via their body, Y) should not need to move positions in space to avoid

contact with A. The requirement for such countermeasure would indicate irrationality of action – either X has moved too fast in relation to Y, or either body has searched for, sent, or interpreted, a signal from the other using means which are too dissimilar to social custom. In essence, therefore, if A leans in for a hug, its nature should be that B is able to gain an indication of A's intent and either embrace the hug or indicate that it is not mutually intended prior to (and thus halting) its occurrence.

8.3.3.4. Whilst it would be an irrational act if X were to realize A's intent to hug B whilst disregarding the intent of B, or if B were required to move positions via their own means (Y) to avoid contact, X's action would be more irrational if it were unable to perform a controlled approach. For example, X's act may occur both too fast, such that B is unable to react to avoid contact, and with too greater force, such that B is moved from their position in space. Or, it would be even more irrational if the force of contact was too much (and too soon) to allow the (sub-)structures of Y to be able to react within their normal range of operation, indicated, for example, by the bruising or puncturing of skin (which is designed to react to a certain degree of force from other materials). Finally, if the force generated by X was great enough (i.e. too different to the overall structure of Y) it could disrupt the overall interoperability of the structures within Y, such that Y is unable to adapt and repair themselves in response to the destruction of their individual structures. This act would be highly irrational to X's purpose as it could result in the death or disability of the bodies of A and B (and ultimately the limitation and/or variation of either or both being's intent).

8.3.3.5. In terms of *progression* (specifically *ascension*), rational actions for peace would strive to refine existing structure and/or create or acquire new structure which specifically increases the (prob)ability of material serving peace. Such acts would prevent the existence of, and/or improve pre-existing, irrational states, which minimize the realization of intent. More specifically, this would include reducing the degree that materials which most directly serve beings (e.g. human or government bodies) are *shared* or *entangled* with, or *reliant* on, each other.

8.3.3.6. For example, assume that beings A and B *share* a bed, within a shared bedroom, within a shared house, and that such house has two bedrooms. It would be a rational act for the materials (i.e. the areas of the brain dedicated to rational thought and decision making) of A and B to agree upon allocation of specific ownership for each of the two bedrooms (e.g. where A and B agree to own room 1 and 2, respectively). If resource limitation were to prevent room 2 (and bed 2) from existing, such beings could allocate ownership of the bedroom 1 on an alternating roster (i.e. the room and bed is A's for one month, and B's for the next month –

whichever being does not own the room and bed on any night would be required to sleep elsewhere (e.g. on the couch or in a hotel) if such was intended by the owning being).

8.3.3.7. The aforementioned acts of allocation need not affect A and B's usual living arrangements across the majority of time where their intent to cohabit room 1 is mutual. Rather, such act is a technical allocation which would prevent moral ambiguity should the intent of A and B vary in future instances within room 1 (e.g. A wants to sleep (in darkness) whilst B wants to read in bed (under light); A wants to reposition the bedroom furniture whilst B doesn't; A wants B to leave the room but B doesn't want to leave – there is no moral solution to each of these occasions if the strength of both being's respective intentions is assumed to be equal, as it may be from the perspective of the human bodies of either being). Notably, this act of allocation would be considered especially rational on the basis that sleeping in a bed is essential to the material wellbeing (i.e. the human body) of both beings. That is, each being *relies* on a moral solution to contested states of intent within the *shared* room so that the realization of their other intent (e.g. an outing to the park with children, which is best served if their respective bodies are well-rested) is not limited or varied.

8.3.3.8. Finally, a *progressive* act of rationality may also include the *advancement* of material through the refinement of existing structure or creation/acquisition of new structure which generically increases material ability (irrespective of its specific purpose of peace). This may range from the diffusing of specific irresponsible states which possess too much potential to exert too much difference too soon (e.g. materials of explosive properties, whether of body which is human, government or an object), to the conduct of technological research (e.g. medical advancement).

9. Morality as 'right(s)' and 'responsibility'

9.0. Alternatively, Purist morality can be expressed in terms of *right(s)* and *responsibility*.

9.1. The right of every being

9.1.1. Purism views that morality expressed as *right(s)* (i.e. as an idealized *endstate* regarding the governance, and as viewed from the perspective, of beings) is reducible to an ultimate right: every being has the right to peace. That is, beings possess the right to have their intent realized as form – as accurately as is rationally possible, and by a material which will automatically and discretely progress itself forevermore (the perpetual progression of material allows it to serve intent more-accurately, realize it more-fully, and increase the probability that

intent will exist forevermore, as intended). This ultimate right can also be viewed as a *true* right on the basis that its entitlement is objective and that it is not accompanied by *responsibility*. The right of intent is described as being objective because (as discussed in part B) material responsibility to serve intent is a logically derived conclusion which is accessible to all observers (across space), and exists independently from conditions (across time).

9.1.2. From intent's right to peace, conditional rights can be determined and possessed by specific materials serving such intent, such as the *right of way* to a contested resource (e.g. space, when two materials are on a collision course), or the *right to convert* (i.e. *use force to change the structure or position of*) *material* in order to render it as more-moral. These conditional rights are therefore not true rights, as they exist vicariously through their relationship to the intent that they serve. Whilst these 'rights' provide the moral mandate (i.e. legitimacy) to assume certain states, they can alternatively be viewed as *responsibilities*, on the basis that such states are also morally mandatory (i.e. compulsory).

9.2. The responsibility of every individual (body)

9.2.1. Purism views that morality, expressed as *responsibility* (i.e. as a *means* to provide the right of every being, as viewed from the perspective of material) is reducible to a single responsibility: every body of material, from governments, to humans, to rocks, to the atoms they're each composed of, possesses a moral responsibility to rationally strive towards the only righteous purpose: peace. Such responsibility, for complex materials, involves rational reaction to one's environment: *actively knowing, determining and converting* one's condition to render it more-moral (including where it is determined that acting in accordance with the direction of material of probable greater consistency/morality, such as a government directive or employee, will best realize peace).

9.2.2. The bodies of contemporary beings thus have a moral requirement to act, that is 'work', as a material towards peace, yet this need is temporary. As the morality of material condition increases (see paragraph 3.3.), individualized bodies will gradually be replaced by a more-singular and uniform material, such that beings are neither entangled with, nor limited by, such bodies. In this state, all beings, free from the limitation and variance imposed by their working bodies, can solely focus on their intent and associations between other beings (as the more privileged beings are able to do so in this contemporary era).

10. Separation of intent and material

10.1. A logical consequence of Purist perspective is that moral and intended states should exist in parallel realms; material is responsible for forming intent, as per the intent of its respective creator, yet it should possess no ability to influence the nature of the intent itself (and vice versa – beings should possess no ability to influence the nature (e.g. the priorities) of materials). In other words, this can be viewed as a separation of government (i.e. material) and politics (i.e. intent; the opinion of beings). Ultimately, this view recognizes that it is a requirement for persons to be moral, but not social.

10.2. In line with this view, materials of progressive societies must reserve mutually exclusive terms to describe intended and material outcomes. That is, it is necessary to provide clear distinction between (amoral) states of intent, which are subjectively perceived (e.g. 'rudeness' or 'niceness'), from material states of morality (e.g. 'right' and 'wrong'), whose degrees can be objectively determined. This distinction is important because, as will become apparent, states of immorality indicate material fault and require material intervention to rectify; any form of intent, by contrast, may occur amidst ideal material conditions, in a perfect world.

10.3. For example, it *may* be considered 'rude' or 'disrespectful' (yet it is always amoral) to deceive another in a private capacity (e.g. lying to a friend). As there is no (material) need for any two beings to associate, actions which jeopardize such association cannot be morally wrong – there should be no material intervention (e.g. government sanction/intervention) to rectify such behaviour (and rather it is up to the offended being to disassociate from such friendship, if and as intended). Conversely, deception in a material capacity would certainly be either immoral or moral – depending on the instance – due the need for material interoperability (e.g. lying to a terrorist may be moral, whereas lying to a police officer may not). Furthermore, it would certainly be morally wrong, and therefore should not dually be considered 'rude', to occupy the space of another when it is determined that they possess the right of way (e.g. to 'cut someone off' in traffic). The term 'apologize', therefore, should **not** be used interchangeably across these examples, to both indicate that one is regretful of their (socially) perceived rudeness, and to express regret and/or assume responsibility for states of (material) immorality.

11. Determining specific states of morality

11. The determination of specific degrees of morality within any material state can occur through a process known as *differentiation*.

11.1. Differentiation

11.1. Differentiation is used by materials to determine which more-immediate outcomes (i.e. means) should be realized to rationally (i.e. probably most efficiently) realize their respective (ultimate) purpose of peace. In other words, differentiation is used to determine which structure and/or (re)actions *will probably most efficiently maximize the realization of intent*. There are two types of differentiations:

- a. *logical differentiation*, used to determine which (penultimate) endstate(s)/purpose(s), that is, which *known* intent, should be prioritized for realization; and,
- b. *rational differentiation*, used to examine the ability, or probable efficiency, of various considered methods/means (immediate outcomes) which may be used to realize such material's prioritized penultimate purposes. Unlike logical differentiation, which solely examines the nature of intent known to such material, rational differentiation includes consideration of the material's position in time and space in relation to intent whose endstates have been prioritized for realization.

11.2. Importantly (as discussed in part B), intent is logically differentiated (i.e. prioritized) on the basis of how defined it is across time and space, that is, the degree by which it is *defined*, *desired* and *deliberate*. Notably, a (sub-)material may not be required to conduct its own *logical* differentiation if its own process of *rational* differentiation has determined that it is rational to strive towards a penultimate purpose which has been directed by, and thus serves as the means of, a higher (i.e. a more-rational) material (where such material, of greater ability, has conducted its own *logical* differentiation).

11.3. The processes of logical and rational differentiation, and the subsequent process of determination of morality for specific material states, are presented in this appendix A.

12. Conclusion of Purist morality

12.1. Purism categorizes entities on the basis of their purpose: any purpose is either *intended* or *material* in nature. Morality is exclusively equivalent to the degree of consistency, or purity, within (the structural design and subsequent (re)actions of) any material. Purism views all forms of intent as sacred and beyond moral judgment. Any ideology that exists as intent (i.e. art/form) exists amorally up until the moment that a material adopts such ideology as its purpose. Upon this time, ideology which has a purpose (i.e. strives towards an endstate) other than peace and/or employs other-than-rational means to such purpose, exists as an *impurism*

(e.g. 'humanism', 'nationalism', 'racism', 'sexism') and such material possesses a degree of immorality.

12.2. This part has introduced the processes of (logical and rational) differentiation and moral determination – the methods by which the morality of any specific state, real or ideal, can be determined.

12.3. In general terms, all intent, viewed as sacred and amoral, possesses the right to peace and possesses nil responsibility. In an ideal world, where all material is consistently of absolute morality, all intent would be automatically recognized and peacefully realized (i.e. formed to the fullest extent that enables peace) by such material. Practically, however, form can only exist with the support of material structure(s) and contemporary conditions are abundant with material impurities (i.e. bodies/objects/infrastructure of varying purposes and abilities). Such impurities, passively or deliberately, abstractly limit and/or vary, all or selective, forms of intent. Purism therefore concludes that all materials possess a moral responsibility to actively and rationally work towards peace: the state where the realization of intent is maximized. Implicit with the definition of peace is the requirement for material progression; intent can only be maximized through its existence amidst states of ever-improving material conditions.

12.4. To Purists, the conceptualization of morality is relatively straightforward; rationally improving the consistency of the materials within our contemporary condition is our challenge.

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Appendix A – Part A: Differentiation and moral determination

A.0. This appendix (expanded from paragraph 11.1. of the previous discussion) details the processes of logical and rational differentiation, used as the basis for the determination of morality within any state of material. This appendix also details how the morality of a material state can be determined subsequent to such differentiation.

A.1. Logical differentiation

A.1.1. Logical differentiation is the material process for determining which (pen)ultimate outcome(s) should be prioritized, on the basis of contemporary considered conditions. For materials of moral (i.e. peaceful) purpose pursuing a penultimate purpose, this process is necessary when there are multiple, concurrently existing intentions (e.g. the intent of being A and the intent of being B), or multiple aspects to any intention (e.g. the 'roundness', the 'bounciness' and the 'color' of a beach ball). In these instances, on the basis that every complex-material possesses a finite capacity for service at any moment (the material of space, wholly rational, is the only material with infinite capacity), such material must logically distinguish which intent it prioritizes in order to realize its moral ultimate purpose, the *maximal realization of intent*.

A.1.2. The following differentiations reflect the Purist perspective of morality which states that the prioritization of all material resource must go to serve the greater intent, that is, the more defined statement across time and space: that existence which is to the greater degree *desired, defined and deliberate*. The prioritization of resource towards endstates which are to a greater degree intended is argued to be a logical, and thus moral, requirement (as demonstrated in part B).

A.1.3. Foremost, obvious differences between degrees of intent can be solved using the elementary logical differentiation. As previously exemplified (paragraph 7.3.), if A wants C, B does not want C, and C cannot, by its design, want anything, but is able to be allocated to perform (i.e. satisfy) the want of A, such an outcome is logical. It would be illogical to allocate C to B, or not allocate C at all.

A.1.4. As further example, if A and B want C and D, respectively, and C and D cannot themselves, by their design, want anything, but each is able to be allocated to either A or B, such respective outcomes are logical. It is illogical to allocate C to B, and/or D to A, or both C and D to either A or B, or to not allocate C and D at all.

A.1.5. Finally, if A considers its current form to be its ideal self, and C has the ability to either change or maintain the state of A, it would be illogical for C to vary (i.e. partially or completely change) A.

A.1.6. Further and more-complex logical differentiation may be required to determine the greater intent for resource prioritization. This can occur through comparison of each of the following aspects, which are characteristics of every intention:

A.1.6.1. Strength of desire

Strength of desire measures the *intensity* and *duration* by which the realization of an endstate of arbitrary or nil purpose (i.e. form) is sought. For example, if A and B both want C, yet B wants C more than A, that is, with greater strength (i.e. intensity multiplied by intended duration) of desire, it is logical that C is allocated to B.

The strength of any desire is not limited to calculation on the basis of its *current* or 'face value' strength. Strength can also be *projected* (forward or back) in time, especially when measured via relatively advanced materials. Projected strength of desire occurs as a calculation of the probable enhancement, depreciation or non-variation of desire that would occur in response to projected state(s) of forms (i.e. realized intention), and changes thereof (i.e. probable variation and/or limitation of these forms across time). More specifically, the strength of any desire can include measures of *projected* strength in instances where such intent is possessed by a mind, that is, a structure capable of ('true') action or inaction, not merely (conditionally) reaction, in response to changes of state(s) of forms, and where such (in)action includes the (prob)ability for change of strength of desire in response to such changes of form. For example, if A and B both want C with equal degrees of (*current*) strength of desire, and yet B has possessed C up until this point, and it is calculated (i.e. *projected*) that the transfer of C from B to A without B's intent would probably result in B creating and possessing additional desire for the repatriation of C (thereby possessing a greater total strength of desire for C than A), it is logical that C remains allocated to B.

A.1.6.2. Intricacy of desire

Intricacy of desire measures the complexity of a desired endstate and is directly proportional to the quantity of deliberately desired symbols by which such form is comprised. All other factors being equal, a more-intricate desire is a greater statement across space and time. For

example, if A specifically wants the symbols C, U, R, E, in the sequence presented (equating to five symbols: each of the four alphanumeric characters and their deliberate arrangement, spelling 'cure'), whilst B wants only the (four) symbols, U, R, C, E (in any sequence), it is logical that C is allocated to A.

A.1.6.3. Capacity of a desiring mind

The *capacity of a desiring mind* measures a mind's ability to (perceive and/or conceive and) desire a range of varying form(s). Such ability ranges from a capacity to potentially desire infinite (i.e. unlimited) variations of form (whereby any specific desire(s), sought from potentially infinite possibilities would be rendered as relatively more-sacred) to an ability which is limited by a capacity to desire only a single form – the form that such mind currently desires (rendering such desire as relatively less-sacred). For example, if A and B both want C to equal degrees, and yet A has the ability to perceive and/or conceive (and thus desire) the entire alphabet and yet specifically only wants C, whereas B (only) possesses the structures to perceive and/or conceive (and is thus limited to desire) all symbols as 'C', it is logical that C is allocated to A.

A.1.6.4. Consideration of desire

Consideration of desire measures the depth (i.e. 'quality') and frequency (i.e. quantity) of rational investigation (i.e. critical thought, involving the processes of *knowing* and *determination*) that has been applied to determine if a considered desire is actually desired (as considered). This aspect measures the degree (i.e. probability) that intent is *known* to exist, from both the perspective of the desiring mind and from the perspective of materials attempting to *know* and realize such intent. This aspect recognizes that all intent, as per any *known* definition, exists as a probability (including instances where no specific intent is *known* and yet the probability of intent becoming known in future moments must be considered). Greater degrees (i.e. depth multiplied by frequency) of consideration towards any considered desire indicates that such desire is probably of greater definition across time and space.

For example, if A and B both want C to equal degrees, yet B has considered (critically evaluated) their desire for C more than A, that is, with greater frequency and depth of consideration, it is logical that C is allocated to B.

Furthermore, if A and B both appear to want C to equal degrees, and appear to have considered (critically evaluated) their desires with equal frequency and depth of consideration,

yet material X, (the material charged with providing C to either being) considers that the existence of A and B's desire exists with respective probabilities of 0.70 and 0.90 of being true, it is logical that C is allocated to B.

A.1.6.5. Specificity of desiring mind

Specificity of desire measures the degree by which a desired state has been discriminated from other (especially similar) possibilities, by its desiring mind. All other factors being equal, a more selectively-preferenced desire is a greater statement across time and space. For example, if A wants (only) C, while B wants either C or D, it is logical that C is allocated to A.

Note that the differential aspects of *specificity of desiring mind* and *intricacy of desire* are very similar; the former relates to comparison between equally complex structures, differentiating on the basis that one being has a less-precise desire for such structures (e.g. A wants a 'blue' 'marble' while B wants any color marble: both marbles are of the same intricacy of design – yet each mind varies in specificity). *Intricacy of desire*, rather, relates to conditions where each competing desire is for a specified form, yet one form is defined to a greater complexity of design than the other (e.g. A wants a marble which lights up in a range of 11 different shades of blue, depending on how 'cold' it is, while B simply wants a blue (e.g. 'glass') marble).

A.1.6.6. Fidelity of specificity

Fidelity of specificity of desire measures the degree by which form is sought on the basis of its own merits (i.e. potentially as a 'stand-alone' form). Desire of greater fidelity is proportionally less replaceable, that is, if its realized form were to be replaced with similar or alternate form, such replacement would reduce the strength by which such (newly realized) form is desired. By contrast, form desired with lesser fidelity is desired for the merits it non-exclusively possesses whilst realized, either as part of a collective (e.g. for the broader role it currently plays amongst other forms of intention) or temporarily (i.e. as a 'stand-in') until a more adequate form can be realized. Greater fidelity of specificity indicates a greater statement of desire across time and space. For example, if A specifically wants 'C', while B wants 'the third letter of the alphabet, whatever such is', irrespective of the fact that 'C' (con)temporarily happens to be the third letter of the alphabet, it is logical that C is allocated to A.

A.1.6.7. Logical clarity of desire

Logical clarity measures the logicity of form should it be realized in space. Such logicity, specifically, describes the morality of such form (i.e. whether it *should* be realized, with consideration of the constraints of peace) and/or the possibility of such form (i.e. whether it *can* be realized, with consideration of the constraints of space). All other factors being equal, it is more logical to realize form of greater logical clarity.

For example, if A intends for C to change, B intends for C to remain in its current form, and the ownership of C cannot be determined by the governing material, whereas B intends for D to change, and B's ownership of D is determined as uncontested, it is logical that C remains unchanged pending further advancement of material (to allow for differentiation of its rightful owner) and that D is changed as per B's intent.

Furthermore, if A wants both C and D, either concurrently, in their (different) respective spaces, or consecutively, in the same space at different times, whilst B (impossibly) wants both C and D in the same (moment of) space and time, it is logical, for reason that A's intent is logical and B's intent is illogical, that C is allocated to A.

A.1.6.8. Freedom from conditional pressure (forcing desire)

Freedom from conditional pressure measures the degree by which desire is sought deliberately by its respective mind, thereby existing relatively free from conditional pressure(s). Greater degrees of freedom from conditional pressure indicates that such desire exists with proportionally greater unconditionality across time. All other factors being equal, a desire existing with greater conditional freedom is a greater statement of intent across time and space. For example, if A and B both want C to equal degrees, yet A wants C solely for its art (for example, its 'taste') and B partially wants and partially needs C (e.g. for both its taste and its 'nutrients'), where it is calculated as probable that B will not want C to the same degree once the pressure (resulting from the need to gain nutrients) from other material structures is alleviated, it is logical that C is allocated to A. It is less logical for any material to serve a forced, that is, less-deliberate 'desire', compared to a more-deliberate and more-unconditionally intended desire, existing on the basis of relatively free will and therefore, which may potentially exist forever. The latter, it is argued, is a greater statement across time and space (as demonstrated in part B).

A.1.7. Purists view that intent, as per any *known definition*, ultimately reduces to quantities of symbols existing across space and time (as discussed in part B). Each of the above differential aspects can be assigned a numerical value based of the degree that they contribute to the

definition or greatness of any intention. The first two differential aspects listed above (i.e. the *strength* and *intricacy* of any desire) are *quantitative aspects* ['Q'] of intent. They represent quantities of 'raw intent' and exist as numbers greater than zero. There is no limit to either the *intricacy* of any intention, or the *strength of desire* for such an endstate. The values of each *quantitative aspect* for any quantity of intent are multiplied together to determine a preliminary score for such quantity of intent.

A.1.8. The latter six differential aspects listed above (i.e. *capacity, consideration, clarity, freedom, fidelity* and *specificity of desire*) are *factoral aspects* ['f'], which mediate or 'refine' (and ultimately justify or reduce) the degree of greatness by which quantities of raw intent exist. *Factoral aspects* range in value between '0' and '1' and are applied to (i.e. multiplied with) *quantitative aspects* to produce a true quantification of intent ['I'], post-consideration of conditional factors. A factor [f] of '1' indicates that any quantity [Q] of raw intent is a true reflection of such intent's greatness (and ultimately, its definition across time and space). A quantity of intent which has a factoral score of '1' across all six *factoral aspects*, therefore, is wholly logical in space (i.e. uncontested by possibility) and morally unambiguous (e.g. uncontested by other beings); is considered, for all intents and purposes, to truly exist, with all properties exactly as considered; exists freely from conditional pressure and born from a mind that has the ability to desire infinite (i.e. unlimited) (other) variations of form; is sought as an irreplaceable outcome whereby there are no satiable alternatives; and is desired wholly in isolation (rather than as a peripheral desire in support of other desire).

A.1.9. The basis upon which aspects are selected, and the degree (i.e. depth and quantity) by which such aspects are considered, during any logical differentiation must be determined subsequent to processes of rational differentiation (as described from paragraph A.2. of this appendix). Aspects which cannot be considered (ultimately because, due to rational limitations, it is not rationally viable for a material to consider such aspects) are excluded from differentiation.

A.1.10. Quantities of raw intent which have been factorally refined can be summed and expressed as an overall ['I'] value, whereby greater values for 'I' indicate greater definition across time and space:

$$I = \sum fQ$$

A.1.11. For example, a being, 'C', intends to gift (i.e. permanently donate) their beach ball to one of two other citizens, beings, 'A' and 'B', during a visit to the beach. Readers will note that the gifting of a beach ball is an arbitrary outcome, with no logical answer as to whom the ball should go to (on the condition that such outcome is intended by C, the ball's owner). In other words, C, who has uncontested moral authority (i.e. ownership) over their own form, can intend to give a portion of their form (e.g. their beach ball) to whomever they want, with moral impunity. In this case, however, C themselves possesses no (arbitrary) preference as to which being their beach ball is donated, on the condition that their donation realizes peace. C, therefore, is essentially generically gifting their ball to charity, to go to the 'neediest' cause – that cause which will probably most efficiently serve peace – and the allocation of the beach ball becomes a material responsibility. 'X', a peaceful material, serving as the (human) body of C, is attempting to foremost differentiate whom has the greater intent ['I'] between A and B. From a Purist perspective, as per any other allocation of material (i.e. resource), there is a logical (i.e. moral) outcome that can be derived and delivered. Therefore, whilst the gifting of a beach ball may seem insignificant to some readers, this scenario could be extended to include any material (e.g. government) attempting to morally prioritize its service (i.e. resource) to competing intention (e.g. citizens).

A.1.12. It should also be noted that in an ideal world, all the materials involved in this condition – the sand, water, wind, and the human bodies of A, B, C – would be composed of a relatively-singular, reactive material, capable of rational reaction (i.e. *knowing*, *determining*, and *converting* their environment) towards a peaceful endstate. In the contemporary environment conditions, however, all materials are passively involved except for the (reactive) human bodies of beings A, B, and C: materials 'Y', 'Z', 'X', respectively. It is solely upon the materials of Y, Z, X, therefore, to both determine which outcome and which means will probably most efficiently result in peace, and enact these means. It should also be noted that contemporary human bodies appear neither to be specifically designed, and therefore nor are they ideally expected, to calculate complex differentiations. Unlike the bodies of A, B and C, it is the Purist view that future materials will be purposely designed for logical and rational differentiation. In instances where material is relatively advanced, such calculation would occur automatically, relatively instantly, discretely (i.e. beyond the awareness of beings) and subsequent to consideration of each specific aspect of differentiation. In the absence of advanced Purist material, a crude Purist (such as X, the (human) body of C) can conduct a crude differentiation.

A.1.13. Material X proceeds to consider the intent of A and B to a degree which is determined (by X) to be rationally permissible (as detailed in paragraph A.2. of this appendix). It is determined that it would probably be worth the resource of X asking each A and B if they 'want

a free beach ball' and, if so, enquiring as to the degree to which they 'want' it. It was determined that it would probably not be worth the resource involved if X were to establish a 'polygraph' test to determine the greater intent between A and B. After receiving a positive response from both beings, X asks each being to report their *strength of desire* for a beach ball using a scale of '0 to 11', where '11' indicates that being gifted the ball is 'desired to a greater degree than any other considered outcome', and where '0' indicates 'neutrality of desire (i.e. neither desire for association with, nor desire for disassociation from, such outcome)'. It should be noted that, more-ideally, a being's *strength of desire* for any outcome would be measured from, and expressed as, an actual quantity (e.g. the quantity of neural structures associating relevant symbols within one's 'brain'), rather than being represented using a 'self-reported' scale. X observes claims from both A and B that they each want to possess a beach ball "more than anything", each scoring themselves an '11'. X, lacking the ability to (rationally) view the structures supporting each of the being's minds, is unable to further verify these claims and so accepts their claims at 'face' value.

A.1.14. Because X is unable to (logically) differentiate the beings' intent at this point, X decides to ask each of the beings to specifically detail their ideal beach ball. Continuing to conceal the beach ball behind C's back (so as not to influence A or B), X asks A and B to list the aspects of their ideal beach ball, and to rate their (strength of) desire for each aspect (using the same '0 to 11' scale as above). Assume both beings define their respective ideals in accordance with a typical beach ball (and the ball that C possesses): a 'spherical shape', which is approximately 'of equal elasticity of surface', 'a thousand times lighter' and 'five times smaller in size', relative to themselves. Both beings rate scores of '11' for each of these aspects.

A.1.15. X identifies a point of difference between the beings' intent, however, on the basis that A specifies that they want either a blue, white and red, or a green, white and red beach ball (their two favorite color combinations), whilst B does not specify any preferred color. A's intent, therefore, has greater *intricacy of design* than B, consisting of seven symbols – the four symbols which define both A and B's general requirement of a 'beach ball', combined with the three colors (of either of the color schemes) desired by A. Being B's intent, by contrast, consists of only four symbols. A rates their strength of desire for each color as a '3', stating that such rating applies equally to both color schemes (i.e. blue, white and red and green white and red). Consequentially, by multiplying the *strength* (i.e. 3) by the *intricacy* (i.e. 3) of the color portion of A's desire, X calculates that intent for 'color' accounts for a quantity of '9' portions of raw desire. Material X determines that A possesses greater raw intent than B, with 'Q' values of '53' (i.e. '11 x 4 + 3 x 3') and '44' (i.e. '11 x 4'), respectively.

A.1.16. In terms of *factoral aspects*, X determines that it is rationally unviable to differentiate the *fidelity* and *capacity* by which A and B desire their respective intentions, and so these aspects are excluded from X's process of differentiation. In terms of *clarity of desire*, X, having purchased the ball six months prior to this occasion (on behalf of C's intent), believes with effective certainty that C's beach ball is morally uncontested by any other being (e.g. it is C's and thus now X's to give; C did not misappropriate it from A or B, in which case A or B would possess a right to contest its reallocation). Furthermore, the desire of either being appears to be logically clear to X; neither A nor B are requesting conflicting symbols in the same space (e.g. a beach ball that is also a beach umbrella). X allocates a *clarity of desire* factor of '1' to the intent of both beings. In terms of the *freedom of each desiring mind*, X notes that neither A nor B appear pressured by their conditions (e.g. neither appear to be obtaining the beach ball to later sell for financial gain). X allocates a *freedom of desire* factor of '1' to the intent of both beings. Furthermore, whilst X is limited in its ability to determine which desire exists despite the greater degree of *consideration* from their respective beings, X notes that each being has considered their intent at least once (when initially asked if they want a beach ball), albeit of unknown depth (i.e. quality) of consideration. In addition, X has *considered* that both being's intent exists with equal probability of being truly represented as considered and so allocates both beings a *consideration of desire* factor of '1' (this may have been different, for example, if X's only evidence of A or B's desire was gained through being told by 'being D', a friend of A or B, speaking in their absence).

A.1.17. Notably, X determines that a portion of A's intent possesses lesser *specificity of desire* than B. This difference occurs on the basis that A has a divided preference for either 'blue' or 'green' to represent one of the symbols of its ideal ball. It should be noted that non-specification of preference for any symbol is different from specifically stating preferences for 'any' symbol. That is, whilst B has no preference for the color of their ideal beach ball, the non-preference of B does not affect the *specificity* of any of B's intent on the basis that color (or indifference thereof) does not constitute a portion of B's intent (as it does in the instance of A). X is diligent to note, however, that A's (equally) divided preference (for blue or green) exists only in relation to one third of A's ideal ball color and neither in relation to the entire color scheme, nor in relation to A's entire intention (as it would, for example, if A's intent were wholly divided between 'a blue beach ball' or a 'green sand shovel').

A.1.18. On this basis, X must apply the *specificity of desire* factor to the specific quantitative aspect by which 'blue or green' contributes to A's overall intent. X notes that, as previously calculated (as per paragraph A.1.15. of this appendix), color accounts for '9' portions of A's intent. In other words, whilst color constitutes a moderate portion (i.e. $3/7 = 0.429$) of A's

intricacy of desire, it only constitutes a relatively small portion (i.e. $9/53 = 0.170$) of A's total raw intent. X then calculates that the portion of color which is divided between the two competing color schemes is $1/3$ (i.e. 'blue' is one third of 'blue, white and red', as is 'green' in relation to 'green, white and red'). X calculates $1/3$ of 9, resulting in a portion of 3. X then calculates a *specificity of desire* factor of '0.5', which represents that the most specific desire possible, desire for '1' symbol, is equally divided between desire for two ('2') competing symbols in this instance – desire for either 'blue' or 'green' in the same space. This factor (0.5) is then applied (i.e. multiplied) to the portion of the overall intent which encompasses desire for blue or green color (i.e. '3') to produce a quantity of '1.5'. A's 'Q' value is then adjusted accordingly such that their Q value of '53' becomes an I value of '51.5' (i.e. $53 - 1.5$), whilst A's intent for 'color' is now adjusted to represent 7.5 (i.e. $9 - 1.5$) portions of this I value. X concludes that the true I values for A and B, therefore, are '**51.5**' and '**44**', respectively, and that A, for the purposes of contemporary conditions, possesses greater intent than B.

A.1.19. It would be premature for X to donate the beach ball to A at this point, however. Rather, X must subsequently conduct rational differentiation to determine the degree to which the available resource of contemporary conditions affects the outcome of A or B as the rational choice for peace. Whilst logical differentiation determines specific intention that *should ideally* be prioritized for realization, rational differentiation subsequently determines which intent *can* realistically, and, therefore, *should* actually, be prioritized. The actual color of C's beach ball, for example, has been irrelevant up until this point, yet if it is blue, red, green or white, its form unwittingly favors (i.e. has greater ability to realize) the intent of A.

A.2. Rational differentiation

A.2.1. Rational differentiation considers the reality of limited and varying resource in any condition to logically differentiate and determine which means/methods (i.e. structure, action, association – otherwise known as immediate purpose(s)/states) will probably most realize a material's (ultimate) purpose. To prevent unnecessary continual 'qualification' throughout this discussion, it is implied, unless otherwise specified, that all means, purposes and their associated resource, exist as a *probability*, and as a *realistic* (i.e. actual, realized, rather than idealistic) property of the *primarily considered* state. A *primarily considered* material is simply the state whose rationality is the subject of determination (often in the context of peripherally considered means and purposes). In addition, all instances of consideration herein (whether primary or peripheral) assume that the basis upon which such states are selected, and the degree (i.e. depth and quantity) by which such states are considered, is determined subsequent to processes of rational differentiation (i.e. the process described herein). Finally,

the determination of rationality can occur in relation to both possible future states and currently existing states, and therefore future tenses (e.g. 'will be') and current tenses (e.g. 'is') should be substituted with each other where applicable.

A.2.2. As defined previously (paragraph 8.3.0.2.), a rational material *will probably most efficiently realize its purpose*. It is viewed that any state that is logically possible (i.e. permissible by the consistency of space) can be realized if sufficient resource is logically applied (whereby the application of resource required to reach and/or maintain any state can be determined as a probability at any moment). The application of resource required to realize any state (i.e. purpose) is categorized depending on whether it is residual, that is, incidental to the outcome (indicating material inconsistency, expressed as inefficiency during its operation), or essential, that is, inclusive of the outcome itself. Resource that is expended as a means of achieving any state is considered as residual resource expenditure because such resource is not directly reflected in the purpose and is therefore unnecessary in ideal (i.e. wholly logical/consistent) material conditions. Ideally, materials do not possess a cost associated with the operation of their means, that is, they do not expend resource realizing their purpose, and rather, all quantities of resource exist as realized purpose itself. Finally, and having equal bearing on a material's rationality, is the degree that the realized outcome (produced by a material's means) is congruent with (the ideal state of) its purpose. In ideal conditions, served by wholly rational materials, there is no discrepancy between the realized outcome of a material and its ideal outcome for its respective purpose. Although an ideal state can never truly (i.e. objectively and with independence from condition) be realized (for reasons discussed in part B), the state of any material may be considered to be ideal by an observer, thus satisfying the definition of *ideal* herein.

A.2.3. On this basis, the rationality ['R'] of any material state can be represented as the portion, measured in resource ('r'), by which its means and their outcome are considered non-ideal for the realization of their purpose ('r_{portion by which realization is non-ideal}'), as a proportion of the sum of both this portion (r_{portion by which realization is non-ideal}) and the portion by which its means and their outcome are considered ideal for the realization of their purpose ('r_{portion by which realization is ideal}'). This proportion ('r_{portion by which realization is non-ideal} / [r_{portion by which realization is non-ideal} + r_{portion by which realization is ideal}']) is then subtracted from '1' to reflect that rationality is inversely proportional to the quantity of residual resource expended in the process of realizing any outcome and the degree by which such outcome is non-ideal in relation to the considered material's respective purpose. R values approaching 1 represent greater proportions of rationality (whereby 1 is the default value of R in the absence of complex materials, representing the omnipresence and absolute rationality of the Material of space):

$$R = 1 - \frac{\text{r}_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}}}{(\text{r}_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}} + \text{r}_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}})}$$

A.2.4. A wholly rational material (i.e. space, possessing a value of $R = 1$) wholly realizes its purpose using nil residual (means-associated) resource; a semi-rational material (i.e. $R = 0.5$) would realize half of its purpose with nil residual wastage or would wholly realize its purpose whilst utilizing half of all associated resource as a means to realize this state (whereby the overall quantity of expended resource is divided equally between its means and purpose); a wholly irrational material (i.e. $R = 0$) expends all considered resource during the operation of its means whilst not realizing any of its purpose.

A.2.5. Values for resource (r) can be compared across all ranges of contemporary measures of resource whilst they exist in similar material states (e.g. 'dollars' can be compared with 'dollars', 'kilograms' can be compared with 'kilograms'). However, r , and, therefore, R , will be more-useful to materials of sufficient advancement to be able to consider (i.e. reduce) all varying measures of resource as a single quantity (r).

A.2.6. As a minimum, the resource (r) cost associated with the portion of a material which is non-ideal for its purpose ($\text{r}_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}}$) is the sum of the residual resource that would be expended realizing its outcome (' $\text{r}_{\text{means to realize outcome}}$ ') and the discrepancy, measured in resource, between its realized outcome and its ideal outcome for its respective purpose (' $\text{r}_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}}$ '). In instances where the cost and necessity to convert a less-than-ideal (realized) outcome into the (ideal) state of its purpose has been determined, this cost (' $\text{r}_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}}$ ') would also be included as a contribution to the overall portion by which a material is non-ideal for its purpose ($\text{r}_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}}$):

$$\text{r}_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}} = \text{r}_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + \text{r}_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + \text{r}_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}}$$

A.2.7. The residual resource (r) expended (as means) during the realization of any purpose ($\text{r}_{\text{means to realize outcome}}$) can be determined by summing:

the sum product of the probability ['p'], and the probable resource [r] cost, of the optimal ['optimal'] outcome for any considered method used for the realization of the considered material state;

with:

the sum product of the probability [p], and the probable resource [r] cost, of all considered non-optimal ['non-optimal'] outcomes associated with each considered method used for the realization of the considered material state.

The optimal outcome for any method (used for the realization of the considered material state) is the outcome by which any considered means realizes at least some portion of its respective material's purpose (i.e. a state possessing a value for $r_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}$). Non-optimal outcomes are residual outcomes associated within any considered means, which prevent, prolong or pervert the realization of a material's purpose, including the degree by which its optimal outcome is ideal, that is, the degree by which its realized outcome ($r_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}$) possesses a value approaching or equal to its ideal outcome for its respective purpose (' $r_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}}$ ')

$$r_{\text{means to realize outcome}} = \sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\}$$

A.2.8. The resource that would be required to convert a (realistic) less-than-ideal outcome into its ideal outcome of purpose ($r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}}$) is measured as per the method for the calculation of the resource costs expended realizing any purpose ($r_{\text{means to realize outcome}}$):

$$r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} = \sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\}$$

A.2.9. The discrepancy between the portion of resource (r) associated with the ideal realization of a material's purpose and the portion of resource (r) associated with its respective realizable outcome ($r_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}}$) is determined by subtracting the latter ($r_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}$) from the former ($r_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}}$):

$\Gamma_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}} = \Gamma_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}} - \Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}$

A.2.10. The resource associated with any material outcome (ideal or real) is measured as the sum of the probable (p) resource per ('r_{per q}') quantity ('q') of outcome, whether such quantity is of intentional (i.e. an 'I' value) or material purpose:

$$\Gamma_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}} = \sum\{p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}}\}$$

$$\Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}} = \sum\{p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}}\}$$

This compartmentalization allows for the possibility that varying quantities within any outcome may possess differing probabilities and resource values associated with their existence. The total resource associated with the ideal outcome of any material purpose exists as values ($\Gamma_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}}$) greater than '0'. The resource associated within a portion of ideally realized outcome exists as values ($\Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}$) ranging from 0 up to, and including, the value of the total resource associated with its respective ideal outcome of purpose ($\Gamma_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}}$). Note that the portion by which the realization of a purpose is considered ideal ($\Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}$) includes nil allowances for consideration of resource expended as means, representing that it is never ideal to expend residual resource during the realization of a purpose.

A.2.11. R, therefore, can be expanded:

$$\begin{aligned} R &= 1 - \Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}} / (\Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}} + \Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}) \\ &= 1 - (\Gamma_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + \Gamma_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + \Gamma_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}}) / (\Gamma_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + \Gamma_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + \Gamma_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}} + \Gamma_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}}) \\ &= 1 - (\sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}}\} - \sum\{p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}}\}) / (\sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& * r_{\text{optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}} \} \\
& + \sum \{ p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}} \} - \sum \{ p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}} \}
\end{aligned}$$

and simplified (through removal of ‘ $-\sum \{ p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}} \}$ ’ from the end of R’s equation):

$$\begin{aligned}
= 1 - & (\sum \{ p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{non-}} \\
& \text{optimal} * r_{\text{non-optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}} \} - \sum \{ p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}} \}) / (\sum \{ p_{\text{optimal}} \\
& * r_{\text{optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}} \} + \sum \{ p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}} \} \\
& + \sum \{ p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}} \})
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
= 1 - & (r_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + r_{\text{discrepancy between}} \\
& \text{ideal and realized outcome}) / (r_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + \\
& r_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}})
\end{aligned}$$

A.2.12. Rational differentiation between various states (structure or action, real or ideal) can occur through comparison of their respective R values. The greater R value within any differentiation indicates the state of greater rationality.

A.2.13. For example, assume that citizen, ‘X’, acting in an official government capacity (and therefore serving, as a material), is comparing two different methods, (couriers) ‘A’ and ‘B’, for the delivery of a parcel to a destination, ‘Y’, representing X’s purpose. Whilst there is no urgency for the parcel to reach its destination, the delivery of the parcel is determined (with effective certainty) to be worth \$400.00 for the receiving organization. X is cognizant of their moral responsibility to save taxpayer money during the method of delivery. ‘Money’ is therefore the measure of resource (r), and thus, *efficiency*, in this example. There is a price difference between couriers A and B, costing \$2.50 and \$3.10, respectively, but there is also a difference in service; records indicate that 99.7% of courier A’s parcels reach their destination (when there is a valid address and such address is written legibly on the parcel – such probability excludes customer/sender error); 0.2% are accidentally returned to sender, while 0.1% are permanently lost. In this example, it is irrelevant how many of courier B’s parcels reach their destination because, unlike courier A, their services are completely insured; return-to-sender parcels are re-sent at no extra cost whilst the cost of any lost or damaged parcels are

reimbursed and re-sent at no extra cost. Citizen X's parcel (as per any material) is replaceable, where the cost of such replacement (not including resending) is valued at \$500.00.

A.2.14. To determine which is the most rational method of delivery, that is, which method *will probably most efficiently realize its purpose*, citizen X would consider:

p_{optimal} : the probability of the optimal outcome using courier A: that courier A will realize its purpose (i.e. 0.997),

multiplied by:

r_{optimal} : the probable expenditure of resource for the optimal outcome using courier A (i.e. 2.50);

plus:

$p_{\text{non-optimal1}}$: the probability of 'non-optimal outcome 1' occurring: that courier A will not realize X's purpose because the parcel is lost (i.e. 0.001),

multiplied by:

$r_{\text{non-optimal1}}$: the probable total expenditure of resource if 'non-optimal outcome 1' occurs: the cost to replace material parcel (i.e. 500.00) plus the cost to resend using courier A (i.e. 2.50). Note it may be rationally determined that a third option should be calculated, in addition to exclusively using either courier A or B, by determining the cost of initially using courier A and then changing to courier B if the parcel is lost or returned;

plus:

$p_{\text{non-optimal2}}$: the probability of 'non-optimal outcome 2' occurring: that courier A will not realize X's purpose because the parcel is accidentally returned to sender (i.e. 0.002),

multiplied by:

$r_{\text{non-optimal}2}$: the probable total expenditure of resource if 'non-optimal outcome 2' occurs: the cost to re-send using courier A (i.e. 2.50).

In this example, it is considered that the full quantity of resource associated with the ideal purpose (i.e. \$400.00) will be realized (i.e. $r_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}} = 0$) in each considered outcome of each method, and therefore the cost to rectify non-ideal outcomes is considered to be nil (i.e. $r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} = 0$). That is, due to the protective packaging and the 'sturdiness' of the item itself, it is considered with effective certainty in this example that if the item does reach its destination, it will reach its destination in its ideal state (i.e. undamaged and valued at \$400.00). The calculation of rationality of a realized outcome which is less-than-ideal will be subsequently exemplified in paragraph A.2.16. of this appendix.

A.2.15. Citizen X would total the above (i.e. $[0.997 \times 2.5 = 2.4925] + [0.001 \times 502.5 = 0.5025] + [0.002 \times 2.5 = 0.005] = \mathbf{\$3.00}$) and compare this total to the cost for using courier B ($\mathbf{\$3.10}$). The lowest number indicates which courier provides the lowest aggregated cost of achieving X's purpose. In this example, X is not directly serving intent and therefore there exists no requirement for X to logically differentiate their service (such differentiation between competing intention is occurring at a higher level, by a more-rational material, X's government, and X has previously determined that they will rationally serve their ultimate purpose of peace by achieving their purpose, which has been directed by such government). In other instances, the aggregated costs for using courier A and B can further be expressed as 'R' values, where greater values equal greater rationality:

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_X \text{ using courier A} &= 1 - \frac{(r_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + r_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}})}{(r_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + r_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}})} \\
 &= 1 - \frac{(\sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}}\} - \sum\{p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}}\})}{(\sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}}\})} \\
 &= 1 - \frac{(0.997 \times 2.5 + 0.001 \times 502.5 + 0.002 \times 2.5 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 1 \times 400 - 1 \times 1 \times 400)}{(0.997 \times 2.5 + 0.001 \times 502.5 + 0.002 \times 2.5 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 1 \times 400)} = 1 - \frac{3}{3 + 400} = \mathbf{0.99256};
 \end{aligned}$$

$$R_{X \text{ using courier B}} = \frac{r_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}}}{(r_{\text{portion by which realization is non-ideal}} + r_{\text{portion by which realization is ideal}})} = 1 - \frac{3.1}{(3.1 + 400)} = \mathbf{0.99231}.$$

In this example, courier A is the more rational choice. Incidentally, if X's item was valued at a cost of \$750 to replace, rather than \$500, courier A's aggregated cost becomes \$3.25 ($R_{X \text{ using courier A}} = 1 - \frac{3.25}{(3.25 + 400)} = \mathbf{0.99194}$), and thus using courier B becomes the rational action for X.

A.2.16. The above example demonstrates rational differentiation of (the probable costs associated with a material's) means during the realization of its purpose. Differentiation, however, may also occur on the basis by which the realization of a material's purpose is less-than-ideal.

A.2.17. In the example of paragraph A.1.11., material 'X' (the human body of being 'C') is determining whether to donate C's beach ball to being 'A' or 'B'. Due to the considerable difference between the intent of both beings – A wants either a blue, white and red, or a green, white and red ball, whilst B does not specify color – the resource associated with the state (i.e. purpose) of C's ball itself affects the degree to which it ideally realizes intent. Whilst, receiving C's ball would be an ideal outcome for A considering the realistically available resource, if C's ball were colored 'purple' it would, at the same time, be less-than-ideal for A. In this example, due to the inadequacy of X as a material, combined with the relative simplicity by which X's purpose can be realized, comparison of the degree by which the resource ('r') associated with the state of the ball itself would realize X's ideal immediate purpose is the only method by which the gifting of C's beach ball to either A or B can be rationally differentiated (the immediate purpose of X is to wholly satisfy the intent of either being with the gift of the ball, thus satisfying X's ultimate purpose of peace: the maximal realization of intent). More specifically, due to A and B being in close proximity to C, X is effectively certain that the resource cost (e.g. time, attention and energy), and the difference in resource cost for the optimal outcome of either method (i.e. the gifting of the beach ball to either A or B), is negligible and beyond the scope of rational consideration required of X (probable differences in costs between the optimal outcome of each method, however, could be considered if either A or B were situated on an island further away from the beach where C is located). Additionally, with A, B and C located together in such close proximity, the probable cost of non-optimal outcomes for each method (i.e. outcomes which occur prior to, and prevent or prolong, the gifting of C's ball) would also be assessed as negligible and would also be excluded as a basis for differentiation (if either of the beings were located on an island, however, and X was

required to swim to gift C's ball, costs associated with non-optimal outcomes of means, such as X drowning or C's ball being washed away, may be considered). For these reasons, it is assumed by X in this example that the (product of the) probable (p) resource cost (r) for all considered means is nil (i.e. 'p = 1', in the instance of the optimal outcome, and 'p = 0', for instances on non-optimal outcomes, multiplied by r = 0).

A.2.18. In this example, therefore, X is attempting to determine the efficacy by which C's beach ball can ideally realize its purpose (i.e. to wholly satisfy the intent of either being with the gift of C's ball) using the associated resource of its current state, without having to utilize further means of resource (e.g. to alter the beach ball or purchase or create a new version). X determines this by calculating the quantity by which C's beach ball exists ideally realized (represented by the value of 'q_{real}', a subcomponent of the value 'r_{portion by which realization is ideal}') as a proportion of the quantity associated with the realization of X's ideal purpose (represented by the value of 'q_{ideal}', a subcomponent of the value 'r_{total associated with ideal outcome}'). In this instance, differentiation occurs solely upon the basis of these quantities (or, more specifically, the arbitrary values assigned to these quantities by beings A and B). It is beyond the rational necessity of X in this example to determine the values of resource that would be associated with the realization of specific quantities of its purpose. Consequentially, the associated resource values per quantity of intent ('r_{per q}') are each designated as '1'. In other examples, it may be necessary for X to consider the resource associated with the state of the beach ball, for example, its current retail value as a cost to replace; its cost to manufacture; the probable value recuperated from its potential sale or hire; its costs of ongoing maintenance to continue realization of its form, such as the cost to hire the ball from another or the cost to fill it with helium, if applicable (noting that these purpose-associated valuations only apply to resource values which would arise post-completion of X's purpose, that is, after the gifting has occurred; costs of means, associated with the process of gifting itself, would be considered separately). Each of these example costs could be determined for the entire state of the beach ball, or in relation to its specific sub-materials, whereby various portions of X's purpose would possess 'r_{per q}' values other than 1, representing the specific quantities of resource (e.g. monetary value) associated with the realization of specific quantities of such purpose.

A.2.19. More specifically, and assuming that C's ball is actually colored 'white', a white beach ball would wholly satisfy the criteria of B's intent on the basis that B intends for a beach ball and did not specify a preference for color. Material X, in relation to B, would therefore possess an associated quantity ('q') value of '44' for both its realistic ('q_{real}') and its idealistic ('q_{ideal}') purpose (i.e. r_{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome} = 44 - 44 = 0). This value reflects that no quantity of resource is required to amend C's realized version of a beach ball towards B's ideal

version of a beach ball (i.e. $r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} = 0$). In the instance of A, two thirds of A's ideal color scheme would not be realized by donation of a white beach ball (i.e. the color white would be realized, yet with neither the blue and red, nor the green and red that A also intends). As previously determined (in paragraph A.1.18.), A's color scheme contributes to '7.5/51.5^{ths}' of A's overall intent for a beach ball. Calculating two thirds ('2/3 = 0.66667') of '7.5', X determines that '5/51.5' of A's color scheme would remain unrealized after the gifting of the white beach ball, and therefore that '46.5/51.5^{ths}' of A's purpose (i.e. '51.5 – 5 = 46.5') would be realized by donation of a white beach ball. Material X, in relation to A, would therefore possess associated quantity values of '46.5' and '51.5' for its realistic ('q_{real}') and its idealistic ('q_{ideal}') purposes, respectively. In other words, '5' quantities of the white ball would not satisfy A's intent (i.e. $r_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}} = 51.5 - 46.5 = 5$) and would require a further (undetermined) quantity of resource to amend this realized version towards A's ideal version. Because X has determined that it is not rational to utilize means to rectify this discrepancy (e.g. painting of the white ball in the image of A's intent or the purchase or manufacture of another ball of the colors of A's intent), the cost to rectify the non-ideal portion of this outcome is nil (i.e. $r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} = 0$).

A.2.20. On the basis of the above, the determination of the immediate rationality of X gifting C's (white) beach ball to either A or B is as follows:

$$R_{X \text{ gifting to A}} = 1 - \frac{(r_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + r_{\text{discrepancy between ideal and realized outcome}})}{(r_{\text{means to realize outcome}} + r_{\text{means to convert realized outcome into ideal outcome}} + r_{\text{total associated with ideal outcome}})}$$

$$= 1 - \frac{(\sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}}\} - \sum\{p_{\text{real}} * q_{\text{real}} * r_{\text{per q real}}\})}{(\sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{optimal}} * r_{\text{optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{non-optimal}} * r_{\text{non-optimal}}\} + \sum\{p_{\text{ideal}} * q_{\text{ideal}} * r_{\text{per q ideal}}\})}$$

$$= 1 - \frac{(1 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 51.5 \times 1 - 1 \times 46.5 \times 1)}{(1 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 51.5 \times 1)} = 1 - \frac{5}{51.5} = \mathbf{0.90291};$$

$$R_{X \text{ gifting to B}} = 1 - \frac{(1 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 44 \times 1 - 1 \times 44 \times 1)}{(1 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 0 \times 0 + 1 \times 44 \times 1)} = 1 - \frac{0}{44} = \mathbf{1}.$$

A.2.21. It is determined that it is more immediately rational for X to donate the white ball to B, given the contemporary considered conditions. That is, with sole consideration of the degree

by which immediate outcomes *could* be realized, and prior to the determination of which less-immediate (moral) outcomes *should* be realized, X is more-able to serve B. It is emphasized that greater R values indicate greater material ability to realize a considered purpose (whether immediate or ultimate); R values do not consider whether the realization of these purposes is moral (i.e. consistent with the realization of an ultimate purpose of peace).

A.3. Determining morality

A.3.1. Combining the definitions of a moral/consistent (i.e. peaceful) purpose (as defined in paragraph 8.2.2.) with moral/consistent (i.e. rational) means (as defined in paragraph 8.3.0.2.) produces an expanded definition of morality: the *state (i.e. structure, (re)action, and/or association, whether conceptual or real) whereby a material will probably most efficiently maximize the realization of intent.*

A.3.2. The morality, consistency, or *purity* ['P'], of any considered material state (action or structure, ideal or real), therefore, is the proportion of all intent that either would be *realized* (represented by a positive value for such proportion) or *arbitrarily varied* and/or *limited* (as represented by a negative value for such proportion), if such considered state were to be realized, multiplied by the rationality ['R'] of the means used to realize such state. More specifically, this proportion is calculated by subtracting:

the sum quantity of intent whose realization would be *arbitrarily varied* and/or *limited* if the considered material state were to be realized ['S'];

from:

the sum quantity of intent that would be *realized* if the considered state were to be realized ['I'];

and dividing this result by the sum of all considered quantities of intent ['M'].

A.3.3. Note that to 'qualify' as a value for 'S', the *variation* and/or *limitation* which results from a considered material state must be *arbitrary*, and not of a *logical* consequence (as previously explained in paragraph 7.5.). Greater positive and negative values for 'P' indicate greater morality and immorality of material state, respectively:

$$P = R[(I - S)/M]$$

A.3.4. The morality of various material states, therefore, can be differentiated by comparison of their respective 'P' values, allowing for determination of states of peace. For descriptive purposes, and recognizing that active materials will never be wholly rational, the most moral state in any condition (i.e. the state with the greatest P value in any differentiation, and thus the state which should be assumed) can be referred to as *conditional* or *provisional* morality (or simply just *morality*). This can be differentiated from *absolute* or *perfect* morality (as indicated by $P = 1$, where the R value of 1 is actually 1 (rather than being assumed to be 1, due to the negligible impact that rationality is determined to have on moral determination in such condition); the material of space).

A.3.5. Continuing the example of paragraph A.1.11., the P values for the gifting a white beach ball to either being A or B are: $P_{X \text{ gifting to A}} = R[(I - S)/M] = 0.90291[(51.5 - 0)/(51.5 + 44)] = \mathbf{0.48691}$; and $P_{X \text{ gifting to B}} = R[(I - S)/M] = 1[(44 - 0)/(44 + 51.5)] = \mathbf{0.46073}$. It is therefore a moral outcome that the beach ball is donated to being A in these respective conditions. It can be noted that in this example, values for S are zero because the realization of intent held by the other being in each respective instance is limited for rational reason: C has only one ball to donate and so X is rationally unable to satisfy the intent of both beings in contemporary conditions. Similarly, if C had two beach balls to donate and yet only one of the beings intended for a beach ball, the value of S would remain as zero because the realization of intent, in this instance, is being limited (by X) for logical reason (it is illogical to force a 'gift' upon someone who doesn't desire for such).

A.3.6. Alternatively, following C's donation to A, C changes their mind and intends to destroy the beach ball (which now belongs to A). More specifically, C desires to reduce the form of A's ball from five symbols so that it is replaced by only one symbol, 'nothing'. This desire is crudely determined by 'Y', the peaceful (material) body of being A (now in possession of the ball), to possess an 'I' value of '11', reflecting the considered intricacy (i.e. '1' symbol) multiplied by the strength (i.e. intensity, '11', multiplied by duration, '1') of C's desire. More-obvious intricacy and/or more capable analysis of C's desire may have revealed greater quantities of symbols contributing to their intent, including various symbols describing the specific associations of symbols (e.g. 'deflated', 'ripped') during the process of 'destruction'. If C had pre-meditated such destruction over a period of days or weeks (or a period obviously discernible from the period by which A has desired to possess their beach ball) leading up to the current moment, the strength of C's desire would be increased (i.e. multiplied) by this duration. In this example,

however, based on the consideration that C offered their ball for donation moments earlier, Y determines that the duration of intent is effectively equal (i.e. indistinguishable) between both beings. That is, it is determined that being A and C's respective intentions began moments earlier and extend indefinitely into the future (as intent for continued possession of the beach ball and memory of its destruction, respectively).

A.3.7. Body Y, although acting as a crude means for differentiation, is diligent to note that the intent of A and C is possessed by the respective mind of each being (in other conditions, the intent of a being may exist without a mind, statically recorded using a medium whereby the intent will not change across time). The implication of this is that a mind may alter (i.e. abstractly limit and/or vary) its intent over time. Whilst either of the beings may, at a future point in time, possess decreased beach-ball-associated desire, they are also capable of increasing their strength of desire and/or creating additional intention relating to such beach ball. This may include enhanced desire (as a true action, not a material reaction) in response to changes of form. That is, subsequent to having their intent for possession of a beach ball realized, A has the potential to increase their desire for (repatriation of) such realization if it were suddenly altered (e.g. destroyed by Y). Therefore, the determination of the morality of the destruction of A's beach ball in accordance with C's intent must also consider the projected desire for repatriation, that is, the desire for re-continuation of a discontinued realization of form, that A would create and possess (in addition to their current intent) as a response to the occasion that their beach ball is suddenly removed and destroyed. In the previous example (of paragraph A.1.11.), C was intending to donate their beach ball to either A or B, and therefore the calculation of projected intent was unnecessary (rather, it was simplistic to compare the intent of A and B in this example because both outcomes simultaneously realized the intent of C). On the basis that C has recently donated their ball and that A has only just assumed ownership of the ball (which A didn't expect to possess moments earlier), Y determines that both the desires of A and C will be calculated on 'face value' (i.e. without projection) in this example.

A.3.8. Therefore, assuming that Y possesses an ability to effectively wholly, relatively instantly, and without undue cost, complete C's intent with relative certainty (i.e. $R = 1$), the (im)morality of Y's action would be: $P_{Y \text{ realizing intent of C}} = R[(I - S)/M] = 1[(11 - 51.5 \times 0.90291)/(11 + 51.5)] = -0.56700$. In this instance, S is calculated by multiplying the R value for the realization of A's intent (reflecting X's ability to rationally continue realization of A's intent) by the quantity of A's intent (i.e. A's 'I' value). This result determines what portion of A's intent could be rationally, that is morally, realized by their body, X and, thus, would be arbitrarily limited if C's intent were realized. Finally, it can be noted that if material Y were to destroy the beach ball of A without

the intent of C (or A), such act would be of even greater immorality: P_Y varying the form of $A = R[(I - S)/M] = 1[(0 - 51.5 \times 0.90291)/(0 + 51.5)] = -0.90291$.

A.3.9. It is noteworthy that greater states of immorality (i.e. higher negative 'P' values) require proportionately greater rationality (i.e. morality of means – higher R values), where such R values represent morality within the structures supporting immoral actions and structures. Immoral states, therefore, are not only inconsistent in purpose; they are inconsistent by their failure to possess inconsistency within both their purpose and means.

A.4. Moral determination in less-idealistic conditions

A.4.1. Moral differentiation between states (i.e. *righteous* and *evil* purpose and *irrational* and *rational* methods) is most readily determinable in idealistic conditions, where the considering material is relatively progressed and the material being considered possesses relatively-static and readily distinguishable purposes and methods (e.g. governments/organizations/institutions which possess 'mission statements' and operate using standardized procedures/protocols/rules/'laws'/doctrine). Differentiation, however, must also be determined by crude materials as a means to solve 'small scale' moral disputes, in instances where purposes and means/methods may change rapidly and/or are relatively indistinguishable (e.g. human beings interacting on a daily basis).

A.4.2. For example, two beings are each intending to (privately) make use of a public park. One is walking and the other is standing and both are on a collision course, that is, they are each seeking to concurrently use the same (indivisible) resource: space. As they make visual contact with each other they both assess that it would be of approximately equal effort (in terms of resource expended via material work) for either being to step-aside to allow for the travelling being to pass by the standing being without contact (this assessment would be different, for example, if either of the beings had their leg in a plaster cast and were on crutches). It is (rapidly) determined by both beings that, to avoid contact (and the immoral occasion of 'assault'), the only rational outcomes are that either one of the beings changes their position/course (e.g. one compromises their intent via taking a full step to one side) or that both beings change their position/course (e.g. both compromise their intent via each taking a half-step to one side). Because it is assessed that there is no difference between the rationality of either outcome (i.e. approximately the same quantity of resource would be expended, and approximately the same quantity of intent would be altered, in either outcome), the (bodies of each of the) beings determine that this is a situation requiring logical

differentiation. That is, it must be determined which being's intent – to stand or walk – is the greater intent/statement across time and space.

A.4.3. In absence of advanced Purist material, the body of these contemporary human beings can conduct a (rapid) crude differentiation based on (empirically) apparent realization of each other's intent. Whilst the aspects of intent which are internalized within the mind of each being (such as *intensity* of desire) are beyond calculation and would therefore be discounted or considered equal, the aspect of *duration* can be empirically viewed to exist within any realized form (where, as per paragraph A.1.6.1. of this appendix, *intensity* multiplied by *duration* is the measure of *strength of desire*). In other words, all other factors being equal, the being who has appeared to maintain their intent for the longest duration must be granted priority to maintain such intent, whilst the intent which has apparently been realized for a lesser duration must compromise their form. In this instance, it is not rationally possible for either being to determine the length of time that each other has spent walking and standing (i.e. both beings first noticed each other once they were already in their current states and they each realize that they would both suffer alteration to their intent if they were to stop and investigate this aspect further). Consequentially, the duration of intent is measured on the basis of the rate of change of observed pattern(s) of intent. The being with the slowest rate of change of its observed pattern(s) of intent at any impact would have changed their pattern(s) last/least and thus realized (i.e. possessed) such intent (to occupy the contended points of space) for the longest duration. That is, all other differentiations considered equal, the slowest moving being at any impact (i.e. the being standing still in this instance) has the moral right of way to continue such realization of intent without arbitrary variance from interfering material.

A.4.4. To further highlight this conclusion, assume a car, 'A', travelling at a relatively consistent speed of 100 km/h, as per its driver's intent, is approached from behind by another car, 'B', travelling at a relatively consistent speed of 111 km/h and on a collision course with car A. Should impact occur, B would be traveling at 11km/h relative to A (which would be stationary relative to B). A would be occupying whichever points of space the impact occurs at, whilst concurrently realizing their intent to remain stationary within such points, whereas B would be intending to occupy such points at a rate of 11 km/h. Because A would possess intent which has been consistently realized for a greater *duration* at impact than B, all other aspects being equal, B has a responsibility to overtake A or slow down (to avoid the immoral occasion of a collision with A, or the need for A to move aside or increase speed).

PART B

The logical basis of Purism – the Purist argument

This argument presents the logical basis to the Purist perspective of morality, as discussed in part A. Purism views that 'consistency within material' is both 'morality' and the basis of all logic; a consistent/moral material strives towards a logical endstate using logical means, where logic/consistency is defined as the outcome for any given condition which is void of arbitrary variance and/or limitation. The wholly logical endstate for any material is peace: the state where material (pre)serves the maximum quantity of intent, void of abstract limitation or variance of service. This part argues that material's responsibility to logically strive towards peace is logical because intent, the only endstate which can be defined across space and time, is the only endstate which can be consistently strived towards. It is concluded that the only logical/consistent state for any material is to be consistently (pre)serving intent, and that such state is exclusively the concept known as morality.

0. The logical basis of Purism

0.1. This part argues for a logical basis to the Purist perspective on morality, detailed in part A.

0.1.1. Summary of the Purist perspective. Prior to preceding I provide a brief summary of the Purist perspective. Readers seeking to skip this summary should proceed to paragraph 0.2. The Purist perspective views morality as *purity (within material)*, where *purity* is a synonym for both *consistency* and *logicality* – a state which is void of arbitrary variance and/or limitation. The term *material* describes the vast majority of entities within any environment, from sub-atomic structures to atoms and their higher structures: molecules, organs, and bodies (for example, human, animal, government), building materials (for example, steel, wood, plastic), debris, waste and natural landscape. Whilst materials are not regarded by Purism as sacred/precious, certain materials are useful, and thus important, to the degree that they serve as the structural foundations for *forms*, the sacred, or precious, aspects of existence. Purists use a further term, *intent*, to encapsulate form in either of its two states: *desire* (for form) and/or *form(ed desire)*. For example, the desire to ‘own and play with a beach ball’, where such desire is not actually being realized (i.e. the desired ball is neither owned, nor being played with), exists as intent – specifically, it exists as a state of desire (for form). A beach ball which is actually realized (e.g. ‘owned’ and/or ‘being played with’) also exists as intent – specifically, it exists as a state of form(ed desire). All intention is reliant on the literal support and continued service of materials for its realization. The inclusion of desire as a form of intent recognizes the legitimacy of forms that are conceived and sought, yet which are currently unrealized due to resource limitation and/or variation. That is, Purism views that the only reason that such desires are not fully realized forms is due to the inconsistency, that is, the impurity or immorality, of their contemporary material conditions – in ideal conditions any desire would be instantly and perfectly formed.

0.1.2. Importantly, intent is distinguished from material on the basis that the former is *defined* and *deliberately desired*, where a *desired* entity is sought for either nil or abstract purpose. Intentions, therefore, are entities (i.e. associations, actions or structures/objects) of ‘want’ (not ‘need’). Intent, whether existing as form or desire (for form), is considered to encompass all that is sacred and is viewed as amoral (i.e. beyond moral judgement). Purism furthermore views that intent possesses nil responsibility and the right to peace.

0.1.3. Materials, encompassing all entities which are not intended, are viewed to possess a moral responsibility to logically strive towards the only logical/moral/consistent purpose,

peace. Peace is defined as the state possessing the *maximal (material) realization of intent*. Peace is thus a state void of *arbitrary limitation* or *variance* with respect to material's service (i.e. its means and purpose must be void of arbitrariness). A material which arbitrarily (i.e. without a logical reason) does not support (i.e. limits or varies) specific forms of intent is considered less-peaceful in purpose than a material that will serve (i.e. strive to realize) unlimited variations of intent. Such arbitrary limitation and/or variation may occur in relation to a material's own (non-)willingness to serve all or specific forms of intent, and/or it may occur in relation to a material's willingness to arbitrarily limit and/or vary existing forms of intent itself (whereby such form is being served by other, more-peaceful materials). For example, a less-than-peaceful material (be it an atom, a human body or a human government) may strive to only realize (i.e. support the structure of) blue colored beach balls, thus serving specific forms whilst limiting the existence of other forms of color. Such a material may also or alternatively strive to actively destroy (i.e. vary the form of, through varying the material serving) all red beach balls currently being realized by other material.

0.1.4. Finally, Purism views that the only logical/moral/consistent means to peace is through actions and structures which are rational, where rationality is defined as the state (i.e. structure and/or action) of a material that *will probably most efficiently realize its purpose*. Rational means, therefore, as per a consistent purpose, are void of abstract limitation or variance. Arbitrary/illogical structure or action would constitute an inappropriate use of resource on the basis that it would *probably not most efficiently* realize such material's purpose.

0.2.1. The logic of Purism. The Purist perspective – stating the equivalency between the notions of consistency/logic/ morality and the responsibility for material to rationally strive towards peace – is a logical conclusion.

0.2.1.1. I employ three arguments to argue that the morality of Purism is an objective, logical conclusion: the *if A is wanted, and X is needed, then X should...* argument, the *ends are precious, means are important* argument, and the *metaphysical definition* argument. If these arguments are logically complete then conclusions of alternative versions of morality would be inconceivable to logical observers who consider these arguments (Primus, 2019).

0.2.1.2. Prior to using these arguments to participants unfamiliar with Purist definitions, the following abbreviated definitions can be deployed:

0.2.1.3. Abbreviated Definitions:

0.2.1.4. A **desire**, also known as a (state of) being, a *want* or an *end* is defined as a state which is *sought to exist for arbitrary or nil purpose*. The striving to own a beach ball is a ready and simple example of a desire, whether it's the continuation of an already realized desire – a ball that one already owns and one desires to keep into the future – or whether it's the striving for a future realization of desire, such as the conceptualization of a beach ball that one does not yet own yet one plans to own in the future.

0.2.1.2. A **material**, also known as *resource* or a *means*, is defined as *a state which is not desired*. For example, the plastic and the air molecules from which the beach ball is composed is a material (without these materials, the desire could not be realized).

0.2.1.3. Logical observers will note that these definitions are exhaustive (i.e. there is no entity which definitionally falls outside these two categories) and mutually exclusive (i.e. a purpose for which any entity is sought must definitionally fall into one of these two categories, but not both, noting that an entity can be sought for multiples purposes at the same moment but each purpose will either be materialistic or desired).

0.2.1.4. A state is defined as *a structure or action, real or imagined*.

0.2.2. If A is wanted, and X is needed ((by A) but not wanted), then X should...

0.2.2.1. This argument states that:

- a) Because the states of beings (let's collectively call them, 'A') appear to exist and are, by definition, unconditionally sought (i.e. they are sought without contingency on the existence of other states – that is, they are desired (wanted) to exist by the mind of a being for the sake of being desired, and they are, by definition, not needed) (e.g. the beach ball is sought for fun but it is not needed for anything); and,
- b) Because each state of being appears to necessarily require material support (resource) for their continued or eventual realization (let's collectively call materials 'X') (e.g. the beach ball needs the plastic and air molecules to exist – this is a resource that it needs and other entities might need); and,
- c) Because materials (X) appear to exist and are, by definition, only conditionally sought – needed – as a means to achieving the aforementioned unconditionally sought states

(desires) (e.g. the molecules of air and plastic are needed but, by definition, they are not themselves desired – otherwise they would be wanted); and

- d) Assuming that the above empirical claims (appearances) are hypothetically true (e.g. assume that the beach ball really is desired and that it really does require molecules of plastic and air as we believe they do); then,
- e) Materials (X) should (i.e. it is consistent (logical) that they) wholly serve A (e.g. the materials in the beach ball should maintain their structural integrity and not be reallocated or stolen for another purpose); and,
- f) Where wholly serving A is not possible (e.g. if there are two children who desire a beach ball and only enough resource (money) for a family to buy one beach ball)

– noting that a spectrum of desire could exist towards various states and that it is considered logical for X to realize A if A is desired to an infinite degree (e.g. all other things being equal, it is logical to allocate a beach ball to someone who wants it irrespective of how much they want it) and illogical for X to realize A if A is undesired (e.g. it is illogical to give a beach ball to someone who doesn't want one, especially when there are others that do) –

materials (X) should maximize the realization of states of beings, prioritizing states sought with the greatest desire

(e.g. all factors being equal, excluding, for example, where allocation of a toy might be used as an incentive to modify material behavior, a child who wanted a beach ball more than their sibling should be given the ball); and,

- g) Materials (X) should, wherever it will probably enhance their achievement of (f), render themselves to be increasingly willing and able to do so (e.g. technological advancement throughout society and its materials, so that resource is more plentiful to maximize the realization of beings' desires).

0.2.2.2. That is:

- a) If A is sought to exist for arbitrary or nil purpose (desired, not needed); and

- b) A requires (needs) X to exist; and
- c) X exists, and is, by definition, only conditionally sought due to X's requirement (usefulness) in the realization of A (X is not sought for any other reason: needed, not desired); then,
- d) X should serve, and wholly realize, A; or (noting conditional resource restraints or contradictory desires),
- e) X should maximize the realization of A, prioritizing the aspects of A which are sought with the greater strength (intensity multiplied by duration) of desire where prioritization is necessary.

0.2.3. Ends and means argument

0.2.3.1. This argument states that:

- a) Entities which are sought solely as an end – a true end – are conceivably the most precious states that we can consider; we cannot conceive of a state which holds greater value than a state that is (unconditionally) sought as an end in itself (a desire);
- b) Beings, by their definition, are necessarily considered true ends and are conceivably the only type of true end. That is, a state which is sought for arbitrary or nil purpose is the only conceivable type of end; we cannot conceive of how any state could be more 'end-like'.
- c) Entities which are sought solely as a means to an end are not directly themselves sought (valued); they are indirectly valued for the usefulness they provide towards the realization of said sought ends, and are necessarily considered less valuable than said ends (e.g. if one wants to have a beach ball then one should value the molecules of air and plastic from which it is composed to a lesser degree than one values the form of the ball itself; the air and plastic could be replaced with improved materials, which do a better job of sustaining the form of the beach ball, and could conceivably not be missed by the one who desires the beach ball);
- d) Entities described in (c), sought to serve as a means – let's call these entities 'materials' – are sought to exhibit specific properties which would appear to probably

most efficiently serve the ends which are sought (lest these means be less-than-optimal for achieving their ends);

- e) Ends which are sought to a greater degree than other ends (across time and space) are (or should be) considered more precious than ends which are sought to a lesser degree (e.g. excluding all other variables, if someone wants their beach ball more than they want their sand bucket – noting that both are sought as an end (wanted) – then the beach ball would be considered more precious than the beach ball, both from the perspective of that mind and from the perspective of other logical observers);
- f) Accordingly: those entities which are sought only as a means (materials) should strive to maximize the realization of those states which are sought as an end in themselves (desires), with prioritization of realization afforded to states sought with greater desire (when there is an inability to concurrently realize all desires).

0.2.4. Metaphysical definition argument

0.2.4.1. This argument states that logical observers recognize, at least implicitly, that states which have greater metaphysical definition across time and space – more specifically, those states which are sought with a greater degree of desire (in space), over a greater duration (in time) – should be prioritized (i.e. be provided resource and the opportunity to be preserved) beyond states of lesser definition: states which are temporarily sought as a means to more-defined states (ends), or ends which are sought to a lesser degree than other ends. The universe automatically makes this prioritization amidst interactions between inanimate materials and we observe this as the ‘laws’ of physics; logical observers expect this continuity (i.e. they believe it is logical and consistent) that said prioritization continues amidst interactions between the states of complex, autonomous materials (e.g. humans, animals, governments) and beings (the states of their desires/wants).

0.2.4.2. Those who seek to nullify this argument (or paragraph 0.2.3.1.b.) should attempt to conceive of a state which is more-defined across space and time than a state of being (desire), and/or present evidence that the universe does not naturally prioritize states of greater definition amongst interactions of inanimate materials (e.g. all things being equal, an object of greater mass is prioritized for resource – e.g. granted the space to move through as a right of way – during interactions with an object of lesser mass). Some commentators might argue that perhaps in the future we could conceive of a more ‘end-like’ state; this does not invalidate

the argument that at this moment, beings are the only conceivable state which is sought solely as an end.

0.2.5. **Expansion of arguments.** In expanding the above arguments for the logical basis to Purism, I make the following points in this part:

1. Logic is *consistency* within any condition – that state void of arbitrary variation or limitation. Such definition applies to consistency within conditions of conceived ideals (e.g. a mathematical equation, where ‘1’ consistently equals ‘1’) as well as (actual) realized conditions (where and when consistency appears empirically – ‘one’ broadly continues to appear as ‘oneself’ in various mirrors). It is necessary that the intersection between ideal and real versions of consistency/logic occurs at, and is due to, the consistent nature of space.
2. Materials are omnipresent and each possesses at least one, and potentially infinite, endstate(s) (also known as purpose(s)). Any material’s endstate may range from its contemporary realized state to an idealized future state towards which it is striving to realize. Whether ideal or real, any purpose relies on material(s) consistently striving towards its (end)state as its only possible means of realization.
3. Intentions are considered truly defined. Being *symbolically defined*, they exist objectively defined across space. Intentions, yet, are further defined through being *desired* and *deliberate*; they exist objectively, with varying degrees of independence from material conditions, across time.
4. In contrast to the true definition of intent, material is relatively ambiguous; whilst it may be symbolically defined (and therefore objectively definable in space) it lacks true (i.e. objective and independent) definition across time.
5. With consideration of the above points, any of the three arguments for the logicity of Purism can be made. The most complex of these – the ‘If A is wanted, and X is needed, then X should...’ argument – states that it is logical that entities which can strive towards provision of, are needed for, and are not themselves existing or striving to exist as, realization of a more-defined endstate, do strive towards realization of a more-defined endstate. In other words, it is more logical/consistent for any entity to strive, and prioritize their purpose, towards the realization of a state that is more defined (across space and time), and it is less logical for an entity to strive, and prioritize their

purpose, towards the realization of a state that is less defined. Furthermore, it is logical that striving entities possess logical means (i.e. take logical actions and assume logical structures) in order to realize their endstate(s).

I conclude that:

6. The only consistent/logical endstate for any material is for it to be consistently/logically (pre)serving intentions – those entities/endstates which are truly defined across time and space. Furthermore, prioritization of service must logically go towards that intent which is *most* defined across both time and space.

1. Logic is consistency within any condition; such consistency is derived from space

1.1. I offer (Primus, 2019) that all logic is definitionally equivalent to, and physically derived from, the consistency within and throughout space: the Material which ultimately supports all existence.

1.2. I define logic as *the single consistent/uniform outcome/(end)state for any given condition: that outcome/(end)state which is void of abstract/arbitrary limitation or variance.*

1.3. In the equation ' $1 + 1 = x$ ', for example, the only logical/consistent answer, in this condition, is that $x = 2$. Logic is the sole reasoning upon which one can deduce that ' $1 + 1 = 2$ ', that is, because '1' always equals '1'. The integer '1' is consistent everywhere; one being's notion of '1' is always equal to, that is, consistent with, any another being's notion of '1'.

1.4. Conceptual consistency (such as that used to solve the above equation) and occasions of (actual) realized consistency (observed empirically), are both possible due to the intrinsic property of space: consistency. We are forced to conceive that space – and only space – is absolutely consistent when we consider the nature of space itself (Primus, 2019). That is, the reason why '1' must always equal '1' in theory is due to an actual consistency in physical space, where one point of space exactly and always equals any other point of space. Any observed consistencies in conditions are both possible and necessary because the materials used to exist in any condition use, and rely on, the consistency of space as their sub-material. Therefore, it is argued that while, empirically, aspects of all the structures that one experiences appear to be changing constantly, logically, there must be an absolutely consistent Material at the very basis of all structures/material, serving as the Material for all other materials. Due to its singular and irreducible nature, space can be viewed as an ultimate Material. Note that the

term *Material* is capitalized in reference to the singularity and irreducibility of space; in instances where capitalization is insufficient to differentiate between Material and material(s) (e.g. due to the convention of capitalization at the beginning of every sentence) the prefixes *simple* and *complex* can be used, respectively.

1.5. To conceptualize the impossibility of other than (a singularity of) indifference/consistency at every point of space, readers should note that conceptual magnification of, or 'zooming-in' to, the 'surface' of an object is possible until the point of indifference between it and the environment. Such point of indifference is a point of the singular, consistent, and ultimate Material, space. Superficially, one might consider, for example, that any object, A, and the space that surrounds it, B, are different from each other and are therefore two separate materials. If one more-deeply considers object A and the space that surrounds it, B, however, it is impossible, with conceptual magnification, to imagine a point where both remain as separate entities (whereby both entities could, arguably, if they existed, subsequently be forced into a single point). That is, if one imagines two separate entities (i.e. materials) 'meeting' or 'touching', they can conceptually 'zoom-in' further to imagine the point(s) between such entities. This can continue until one reaches a (i.e. *the*) point of indifference between A and B. If one conceptually 'zooms-in' and continues to imagine object A as separate from space B (and thus one still considers them as two separate materials) this indicates that the reader is actually imagining two points, not one point; this author asks the reader to conceive *the* (singular) point where A meets the surrounding 'nothing' of B – it must be a single (1) point. Readers will find it impossible to imagine two (2) materials (object A and the nothing of space, B) at a single (1) point. If readers could imagine two materials at a single point, then '2' would equal '1'. For readers who doubt the true (i.e. objective and unconditional) nature of this (or any) impossibility (e.g. through belief that more-advanced beings may one-day be able to realize that one point of space can possibly accommodate the difference of two or more materials), the gravity of impossibility can be demonstrated through extending this impossibility to an example encountered in daily reality; readers can attempt to consider how other than 'anything' could be beyond any door, whereby *anything* is defined as *something (other than difference at a point of space) or nothing* (note that the term 'door' can be substituted with the more-general term 'appearance' – perceived difference). Fortunately, '1' equals '1' at all points of space and at all times, and anything is necessary and therefore certainly behind every door, on the basis that the Material of space is consistent. Such consistency provides the basis for everything that exists upon it (including intent).

1.6. The Purist definition of logic encompasses logic in its many contemporary expressions, be it deductive, or 'syllogistic' (Aristotle, -350; Johnson, 1994; Hamlyn, 1990; Lear, 1980),

propositional (Ferreirós, 2001; Walicki, 2011; Rautenberg, 2010; Barwise, 1989; Jech, 2003), mathematical (Bocheński, 1961; Boole, 1847, 1854; Carroll, 1958; Copi, 1974; De Morgan, 1847; Haack, 1996; Prior, 1990; Post, 1921), modal (van Benthem, 2010; Blackburn, van Benthem, Wolter, 2007; Carnielli, Pizzi, 2008; Corsi, 2002), or computational (Boolos, Burgess, Jeffrey, 2002; Winograd, 1972; Hayes, 1973; Kowalski, 1973; Baral, Gelfond, 1994). In other words, it is argued that all expressions of the concept known as *logic* can be reduced to a single factor which serves as the definition of Purist logic itself: *consistency* – the absence of arbitrary variation or limitation within any condition.

1.7. Purist logic, therefore, rejects skepticism of its universality of truth and presence in reality (Leibniz, 1704; Mill, 1843; Whately, 1826; Watts, 1724), for example, refuting the notion that “logic...rests on assumptions that do not correspond to anything in the real world” (Nietzsche, 1878, p.19) and that “logical laws only hold within the limits of our thinking” (Erdmann, 1892, p.96). Rather, the Purist definition of logic reconciles the empiricist (Hume, 1740; Locke, 1690; Hume, 1748; Alston, 1989; BonJour, 1985; Dancy & Sosa, 1992; Goldman, 1986; Kornblith, 1994; Longino, 2002; van Fraassen, 2002; Woolhouse, 1988) and the rationalist (Descartes, 1628, 1641, 1644; Leibniz, 1704; Plato, -380; Casullo, 2003, 2012; Alexander, Weinberg, 2007; Bealer, 1999; Day, 1994; Bealer, Strawson, 1992; Boyle, 2009; BonJour, 1998) perspectives on epistemology, through demonstration that (Kant’s, 1787) *synthetic a-priori* knowledge is derived from the consistency of space. It is this ‘pure reason’ that is the source of all ‘intuition’ regarding *synthetic a-priori* truths.

1.8. More accurately, Purists view that the consistency within space is the basis for all knowledge. In one sense, it serves the conceptual basis for all (‘rational’) reasoning. Such reasoning may exist as ‘purely’ conceptual ideals of objective truth, for example, the notion that difference is impossible at any point of space, that one point of space equals any other, that space is unlimited, and all *synthesized* truths beyond, yet based on, these truths). Such certainty (based on the consistency of space) may also be imperfectly extended and applied to reasoning which incorporates empirical realizations (of various states of space), for example, an assertion that one ‘snowberry’ equals another, across space or time. In another sense, the consistency of space serves as the literal basis for all knowledge, through its presence within all structures which enable both (rational) reasoning and (empirical) experience (i.e. observable conditions and observer).

1.9. Whilst we can only conceive that space must be consistent at every point (Primus, 2019), difference (i.e. variation and/or limitation) does apparently exist. Such difference is empirically evident by the apparent definition of objects, viewed as being distinct from their environment,

and by their apparent change/variation. We are further forced to conceive (as per paragraph 1.5. of this part) that such difference/definition exists as (degrees of) change *of* the state of space, thus allowing for existence of (multiple) materials, rather than change *within* the (consistent) nature of space itself. That is, change occurs *across* (multiple points of), but never *within* or *throughout* (a single point of), space. To enable the difference (i.e. forms and materials) we perceive and/or conceive, space must, logically, be able to be 'moved'/'initiated'/'forced' into (reducible) states, known as *materials*, which exist solely on the basis of such motion (i.e. space possessing direction and velocity). Objects (such as A) in space (B) are neither separate from space, nor absolute in their existence. Rather, objects must therefore only exist as movement of points of space, that is, movement of points of the ultimate/irreducible Material. I argue that such movement of space wholly encompasses the notion of 'time' (Primus, 2019).

1.11. It is notable that the above theory applies what can be described as an *endospective* or 'inside-out' approach to physics (i.e. beginning from the inside of material, and working outwards). The Purist approach uses the force of inconceivability to make logical deductions regarding the nature of the simplest materials, beginning with the nature of simplest material – space – as the basis for all subsequent assertions about more complex materials, composed from space. This approach is consistent, that is, compatible, with prominent theories of physics, for example, classical mechanics (Newton, 1726; Kibble, Berkshire, 2011; Sussman, Wisdom, Mayer, 2001), thermodynamics (Clapeyron, Clausius, Mendoza, 2005; Gibbs, 1902; Einstein, 1905; Pickover, 2008), electromagnetism (Ohm, 1891; Faraday, 1839–1855; Maxwell, 1861, 1865; Jackson, 1998; Griffiths, 2013), and, less obviously, the theories of relativity (Einstein, 1920; Eddington, 1923; Katti, 2013) and quantum mechanics (Greene, 2000; Planck, 1901; Heisenberg, 1925; Dirac, 1930; von Neumann, 1932; Feynman, 1942; Griffiths, 2004; Becker, Becker, Schwarz, 2007; Witten, 1989, 1995, 2012; Woit, 2006; Yau, Nadis, 2010). In contrast to the Purist approach, these theories could be described as incorporating *exospective* or 'outside-in' approaches. They use logic to derive theoretical assertions describing, and which are ultimately linked to empirical observations of, the nature of realized materials (which are empirically/apparently evident). From this point, such theorists work 'inwards', using the same process to attempt to describe the nature of the many sub-materials which comprise each material, with the ultimate goal of deriving parsimonious 'laws' which describe the nature of both materials and their sub-materials.

2. Materials are omnipresent; each possesses at least one, and potentially infinite, purpose(s), ranging from their contemporary and actual state to an idealized future

state; every purpose continually relies on material striving towards its state as its only means of realization

2.1. Materials are omnipresent

2.1.1. By virtue that materials are defined as *entities (i.e. structures/objects, actions, associations) possessing purpose which is not intended (i.e. such structures, actions, associations do not 'qualify' as intent)*, contemporary society is abundant with (complex) materials. That is, for all intents and purposes, material encompasses everything other than the forms of beings themselves and their sentimental belongings. The vast majority of the environment is considered to be material(s). This includes both objects sought for their logical purpose, such as bodies (e.g. government, human, animal), tools, infrastructures, sub-atomic particles, terrain, and unsought objects, existing for arbitrary (non-useful) purpose, such as waste, debris, particles, and natural landscape.

2.1.2. It is a logical requirement (as per paragraph 1.5) that, even in the absence of complex materials, the Material of space is omnipresent. Space in a state of relatively less motion (i.e. possessing relatively less definition) is required as a resource for all materials to exist (i.e. 'move' throughout). In terms of certainty of non-limitation of Material across space and time, Material's omnipresence is an intrinsic characteristic of the consistency of space. Anything less than three, unlimited, perpendicular, spatial dimensions (i.e. length, width, height) is impossible. By the same logic (paragraph 1.5.) that not more than a single entity (i.e. indifference) can exist at any point of space, two reasons mandate that at least (i.e. no less than) a single entity must exist at any point of space. Firstly, one can only attempt to imagine the 'void-which-is-other-than-nothing-or-something' which is required if one or more of the dimensions of space (e.g. length) were arbitrarily limited. That is, there is nothing that can replace the 'nothingness' of space which would not also count as dimensional continuation (e.g. of length) of space – there is nothing 'more-nothing' than nothing – the reason that one can be certain that 'something' or 'nothing' is beyond any door. Secondly, any limitation of space would require a difference at the point where space ends and the 'other-than-space' begins – a previously stated (paragraph 1.5.) impossibility.

2.2. All materials must possess at least one purpose/endstate at any moment, which may be realized and/or idealized in nature

2.2.1. As previously mentioned (paragraph 5.1. of part A), all material(s), logically, must possess at least a single purpose/(end)state at any moment. Paragraph 5.1.3. of part A

defines *purpose* as *a(n end)state/outcome of any entity, whether ideal(ized) (i.e. conceived as a future state, anywhere up unto a final state which assumes perfect conditions) or real(istically describing an actual and contemporary portion of conditions) in nature.*

2.2.2. As mentioned (paragraph 5.1.4. of part A), an entity's *purpose* can be viewed as the state that such material would achieve and maintain in ideal, that is, perfect, conditions for the realization of such material's purpose (void of resource limitation or variance due to interference by other materials). More specifically, the final state towards which an entity strives (or serves, in the instance of space) can be regarded as its *ultimate purpose* (or a *penultimate purpose* if such state incorporates realized states – states which are reactively defined, based on reality's condition). The term *(pen)ultimate purpose* can be abbreviated simply as *purpose*, unless its use is required to differentiate an entity's overall or final direction from its peripheral purposes (if any).

2.2.3. Purism argues that all purposes consist of two components:

1. a target portion of space/Material condition (detailing the limits of the state); and,
2. a state for such target portion, ranging from its current and actual (realized) state to conceived future (idealized) states.

2.2.4. At least one (default) purpose is intrinsic to all entities, by their nature of being, however any number of additional purposes can be conceived and bestowed upon entities (by beings, for example).

2.2.5. More specifically, depending on whether a material is:

- A. a *(re)active* entity (capable of active change towards a future purpose); or,
- B. a *passive* entity,

the purpose of an entity will respectively either be:

- A. a (future), *idealized* endstate towards which such entity continually strives (the term 'strive' is used irrespective of whether or not such means/methods of striving are rational); or,

B. its current and actual *realized* state (which inherently realizes its purpose).

2.2.6. *(Re)active* entities, are defined, for the purposes of this part, as *material possessing structures designed and used to*:

1. Know (i.e. conceive and/or perceive): symbolically measure (e.g. where such structures are designed to be ‘triggered’ by) changes in environment (including changes within the (re)active structure itself),

2. Determine: compare such changes against a pre-recorded/programmed ideal purpose, and,

3. Convert: subsequently trigger operation of motor-structures designed to render/realize the environmental condition (including the structure itself) in the image of such structure’s purpose.

2.2.7. An *ideal*, more specifically (in relation to the definition provided in paragraph 5.1.4. of part A) is a state whose (*known*) symbology has been (actively) created (i.e. *converted*) subsequent to (rational) *determination* by a *(re)active* entity (and therefore such state relates to such entity’s (internally) recorded purpose – not necessarily external conditions). A *realized* state, if *known* (i.e. symbolized) by a *(re)active* entity, exists as symbology which has been wholly (reactively) created through the measuring of change(s) within the environment (and therefore such state exists with the absence of, including prior to, *determination* by a *(re)active* entity).

2.2.8. Three examples of purpose are expressed as three target quantities:

A. a point in space;

B. a tennis ball; and,

C. the living body (e.g. human) of a being;

paired with respective examples of states for each of the above target quantities:

A. consistency (– the only state possible for a(ny) point of space);

B. traveling in a direction, x , at a rate of movement, y , or remaining stationary at points of space, z , as per the sum of forces upon the ball. Such purpose describes its (actual, reactively created) *realized* state and, along with a myriad of other possible empirical-based definitions/descriptions, may dually apply to any other body (e.g. from a rock to a human body). An example of an additional, *ideal* purpose bestowed upon a tennis ball (broadly, during the (active) creation of such ball, and more-specifically, during a game of tennis), could be to serve as a 'spherical' object of consistent 'size', 'color', 'weight' and 'elasticity', which exhibits certain parameters of 'bounciness' off certain surfaces (e.g. tennis courts), thus being suitable for tennis;

and,

C. existing and *progressing* forevermore to, respectively, serve and better-serve the intend of its respective mind (an *ideal* purpose for the body of any being).

2.2.9. A point of space, because it is *passive*, can be said to possess a current and actual (*realized*) state that is also its *purpose/endstate*. It lacks the structures to strive for an ideal other than itself.

2.2.10. A tennis ball is considered *passive* because it cannot (*re*)act independently towards an ideal future (end)state/purpose; its *purpose*, because it is passive, is also its current state and is, to a greater degree than (*re*)active materials, determined by external forces. A tennis ball drifting through space (with a direction and a rate of velocity) has a purpose to drift through space in such state until another purpose is bestowed upon it, for example, if such ball were to be hit in another direction and velocity or halted by friction.

2.2.11. A living human body is an example of an entity which is (*re*)active in its operation. The advantage of reactivity is that (*re*)active materials/structures, such as the bodies of beings, may be programmed to strive towards *ideal* endstates (i.e. *purposes*) which are different to their (current) realized states. These endstates may be vastly different from its current state (as opposed to a passive material, whereby its current state is its purpose). Included with the ability to pursue different (i.e. ideal) states, is the ability to strive to impose such state upon an unlimited target quantity. Beyond the ability of a tennis ball, for example, (which ideally retains its proportions, direction and velocity until used for another purpose), a human body can strive to affect a target portion of space beyond the scope of itself. In other words, a human body, in addition to its potential to possess a purpose for the preservation or change within its own self,

may possess purpose(s) for the preservation or change of unlimited other materials (e.g. bodies, infrastructure) in the immediate or extended environment.

2.3. Every purpose continually relies on material striving towards its state as its only means/method of realization

2.3.1. As per paragraph 5.1.2. of part A, *means/methods* are defined as *the structure(s), (re)action(s) and/or association(s) by which a material realizes (i.e. achieves and maintains) or pursues realization of its purpose(s).*

2.3.2. As previously detailed (in paragraph 1.10. of this part), no material structure can exist outright as a separate or absolute entity itself. Rather, all existence must exist through, and as, motion (i.e. change, of direction and velocity) of the singular Material, space. On this basis, all complex material possesses at least one means/method which is continually striving, or working, to obtain and/or maintain its purpose, whether such purpose is its current state (in the case of a passive entity) or an ideal state (in the case of (re)active entities). Specifically, every purpose needs at least one, and, depending on its complexity, potentially infinite, materials possessing endstates which are logically/consistently striving towards the realization of such purpose.

2.3.3. Consequently, depending on whether an entity is:

A. a *simple* material; or,

B. a *complex* material,

the purpose of such entity will respectively either:

A. intrinsically serve also as its means; or,

B. require use of means to realize its purpose, where such means may include either transformation towards a future (i.e. different) endstate or maintenance of an entity at its current state (depending on whether it is a *(re)active* or *passive* entity, respectively).

2.3.4. It is argued that the only entity which could be considered a *simple* material is the Material of space (specifically, every point of space), because it cannot be reduced/removed

or improved. Rather, its *means*, its *purpose*, and its future state(s) are each equivalent to its current and actual state. All materials other than space, therefore, are classified as *complex*.

2.3.5. *Complex* materials, unlike space, can be reduced (i.e. varied or limited). They inherit (i.e. conditionally possess) their state(s) of existence through the properties (e.g. relative velocity and direction) of their various levels of sub-materials, known as *means* (which may themselves consist of sub-materials). The means of complex materials can be considered to be the sum of the purposes of their respective sub-materials.

2.3.6. It is consistent that complex materials, relying on sub-structures for their existence, possess a finite means at any moment, that is, there is a finite quantity of sub-materials, or structures, which are available and willing to serve a material at any point in time. Furthermore, it is consistent that, generally, the more complex the purpose, the greater number of individual methods (i.e. structures either passively or (re)actively serving a higher purpose) must be employed as a means to realize (i.e. achieve and maintain) such purpose. *More-progressed* materials (as discussed in part A), however, are more-refined in structure and may be able to realize relatively complex purposes using fewer quantities of structures and actions. *Progressed (complex)* structure allows intent to be realized more efficiently, and with greater stability, requiring fewer sub-materials (i.e. less working-parts) to perform the same functions. *Progressed* material also possesses less potential for malfunction (i.e. less possibility for variation from purpose by sub-materials), allowing for greater stability and efficiency (i.e. less resource for operation of working-parts). Therefore, although the material needs of structures which support intent are important to satisfy, it is rational that they should be removed or improved where and when rationally possible.

2.3.7. To demonstrate means by expanding upon the previously (paragraph 2.2.8. of this part) presented examples of purpose:

A. target entity: a point in space; ideal state: consistency;

B. target entity: a tennis ball; ideal state: traveling in a direction, x , at a rate of movement, y , or remaining stationary at points of space, z , as per the sum of forces upon the ball; and,

C. target entity: the body of a living being; ideal state: existing and *progressing* forevermore to, respectively, serve and better-serve the intend of its respective mind;

respective examples of means to such states are provided:

A. consistency;

B. molecules, atoms, subatomic structures, consistency (of Material); and,

C. organs, cells, molecules, atoms, subatomic structures, consistency (of Material), eating, sleeping, working, exercising, resting, submitting 'tax returns' – any action or structure which is conducted, created, or associated with, out of need to progress one's available resource is a means to one's purpose(s).

2.3.8. The realization of the purpose of each of these means serves as the means of realizing any higher, (pen)ultimate purposes which rely on them. For example, the purpose of human organs serves as the means for the body of a being to exist, whereas such human body may serve as the means to realizing a higher purpose, such as that of a government body. Notably, **a government is not necessarily the highest purpose towards which to strive, nor the most powerful, nor the most moral entity within any condition. A government is an entity** (of any degree of power – it needn't have, or claim to have, a monopoly on force) **that is constitutionally dedicated to material service** (this could be any type of service, and it may be predominantly enshrined through its physical constitution, in the instance of endo-government, or through its legal constitution, in the instance of contemporary exo-governments – those with written constitutions); **in moral conditions** (i.e. in a healthy and highly functioning society) **government is the highest known purpose towards which to strive, the most powerful known entity** (or entities, as some might call them, noting the eventual decentralisation and proliferation of government into the cells of an endo-government) **and the most moral** (logical/rational) **known entity** – it/(they) will rationally strive to serve the states of all beings without arbitrary variation or limitation of service.

2.3.9. A point of space, is considered *simple* (i.e. constructed of a single Material, rather than multiple materials) because its current state is also its *means* of maintaining such state. It cannot be reduced to anything less than itself and, as such, it intrinsically 'is' by its own automatic method. Thus, for the state of any point of space, both its purpose and its means, and both its current state and its future state, is, intrinsically, its consistency.

2.3.10. A tennis ball is an example of a *complex* entity. It is considered (relatively) *complex* because it relies on sub-materials (e.g. molecules, atoms, subatomic structures, etc.) as a *means* of realizing its current state/purpose. That is, a tennis ball's current state is the result of the concerted effort of its means achieving and maintaining such state.

2.3.11. A living human body is an example of an entity which is both *(re)active* and *complex* in construction. Human bodies, as per all complex materials, must employ various means to maintain their current state(s). In addition, and unlike passive materials (such as a tennis ball), human bodies require additional means to transform/convert their current state(s) towards the realization of their purpose/endstate (assuming their current state differs from their ideals).

3. Intentions exist objectively defined, with varying degrees of independence from material conditions, across space and time

3.0.1. The purpose/(end)state of any entity (i.e. structures/object, action, association) can be categorized dichotomously, as being either of *intended* or *material* nature, based on the degree of definition by which such states exist. Definition is defined as *a state of relative indifference (i.e. consistency/pattern/non-change) across (a portion of) time within a state of relative difference (i.e. change) across (a portion of) space, which distinguishes/differentiates such state (i.e. allows such state to exist) from its (immediate) environment (intended society and/or material conditions)*.

3.0.2. Definition in fewer words, is essentially a *pattern of difference across time and space*. A definition, therefore, could exist as a conceptual ideal (e.g. the word 'vehicle' within a dictionary), whose un-changing definition across time (i.e. for the duration that such dictionary entry exists) distinguishes such state from other symbols (e.g. the remainder of the dictionary). It could also exist as a perceptual state, such as the symbolization which occurs whilst experiencing a 'vehicle' as being separate from its environment, thus allowing one to 'witness' such vehicle (and potentially conceive it as an ideal) across time. Finally, and irrespective of

whether the above definitions exist, definition exists as states of space itself – patterns of relative difference across time which enable symbols to be perceived and/or conceived. The differences which allow for the experience of a symbolized ‘vehicle’, whether perceived or conceived, must be based upon actual difference(s) occurring within reality across time.

3.0.3. It is a logical requirement (as discussed within paragraph 1.10. of this part) that all definition, or difference, exclusively encompasses all existence itself. That is, all states exist through their differentiation from other states. The terms *definition*, *difference* and *existence* are ultimately synonyms. On this basis, it is viewed that all entities exist as degrees of definition which, as previously demonstrated (part A), can ultimately be quantified based on the degree by which such entities exist (as a relative pattern) across time and space.

3.0.4. It is argued that, upon close examination, intent is the only endstate that exists truly defined, where *truly* is defined as *objectively, and with some degree of independence beyond material conditions, across time and space.*

3.0.5. Intent, reduced to its essence (from its expanded definition in part A), is a state which is *symbolically defined* across space and *deliberately desired* across time. It exists as desire for symbolism which may or may not, to various degrees, also exist as states of realization (as *form*), depending on the consistency of material conditions (as defined by the Purist perspective of part A) and the nature of the intent itself. More specifically, on the basis that every intention exists symbolically, intent is objectivity *defined*, and exists with (varying degrees of) independence from material conditions, across space. Uniquely, however, intentions are the only truly defined states on the basis that they are unconditionally defined across time; each exists as such, with (varying degrees of) independence from material conditions, through their nature of being (to some degree) *desired* and *deliberate*.

3.1. Defined (across space)

3.1.0. All intent is objectively *defined* across space by virtue of existing symbolically. More accurately, it is argued that all symbolism, whether of material or intended purpose, is objectively defined across space. On the basis that categorization of a symbol’s purpose provides no inherent difference to its objectivity across space, the objectivity of symbolism is largely inconsequential to the Purist argument (and discussion of the objectivity of symbolism has been relegated to this appendix A). However, that symbols exist with equal objectivity across space is not to say that all symbols exist with equal definition across space. It is evident, rather, that not all known (i.e. symbolic) states are equally defined across space (e.g. one

vehicle will be symbolized, that is, defined, differently from any another vehicle, by any other observer, on the basis of their differences across space). Logically (as per paragraph 1.10. of this part), symbolic states exist with (and as) degrees of definition across space on the basis that absolutely defined states are an impossibility – they must be realized from space.

3.1.1. With consideration that for an entity to be defined across space it must be *distinguishable/differentiable from its environment through means of its relative pattern of difference* (as defined in paragraph 3.0.1. of this part), the degree of spatial definition of any entity is determined via two factors. Greater definition of a symbol across space occurs through greater logical *clarity*, in terms of such symbol's possibility across space, and through greater differentiation from its immediate conditions, achieved through greater *intricacy* of design and greater *consideration* by observing materials.

3.1.2. Firstly, symbology which possess definition across space possesses logical *clarity*, or specifically, *clarity of possibility*. Such symbology is symbolically consistent and does not contradict itself through representing difference (i.e. variation and/or limitation) at any point of its space. So, whilst each symbol is finite, occupies finite (i.e. limited) points of space, and may differ (i.e. vary) across time or from any other point across space, a possible symbol does not symbolize difference (e.g. both black and white, or the limit/absence of three-dimensional space: length, width, height) at any point of its space. States of non-*clarity of possibility*, by contrast, consist of conflicting or incomplete symbolization in relation to specific points of their space (e.g. where both a 'sphere' and 'cube' are sought to exist in the same space at the same time without contacting each other, and/or where all faces of such cube represent length). On this basis, states which possess lesser degrees of *clarity of possibility* are, to lesser degrees, clearly *distinguishable/differentiable as relative patterns of difference* across space. Note that the *clarity* of any symbolization, specifically the *clarity of its peace*, also contributes to the degree that a symbol is defined across time (as subsequently detailed in paragraph 3.2.3.).

3.1.3. Secondly, for any symbolism to possess greater spatial definition (i.e. be differentiated from immediate conditions) it must both possess greater *intricacy of design*, compared to the ambiguity and lack of symbolic definition associated with non-existence. It must also exist with such intricacy despite greater *consideration* (i.e. confirmation of existence) from the perspective of observing materials.

3.1.4. The greater the quantity of symbols by which an endstate is composed, including where arrangements of more-basic symbols are used to create more *intricate* symbolisms, the more-intricate an entity is, and the greater definition it possesses beyond its immediate

environmental conditions across space. Quite simply, a(ny) single symbol across space is more defined (i.e. exists beyond, that is, to a greater degree) than the absence of a symbol across space. On this basis, the definition of more-intricate structures can be deduced. An 'octahedron', for example, possessing eight faces (symbols), is more symbolically intricate and is thus more-defined across space, than a cube, possessing six faces. Desire for eleven cubes arranged in a specific layout which is of symbolic value to their owner (thus creating a twelfth symbol) is a greater definition across space than eleven cubes (symbols) desired in isolation.

3.1.5. Finally, on the logical basis that all symbols exist solely via perception and/or conception (as per paragraph A.5. of this appendix A), it is recognized that the degree by which any symbol is *known* is proportionate to the degree by which such symbol exists. Although any symbol exists objectively in space at any moment, and did exist wholly known at some point(s) in time from the perspective of its respective creator (e.g. the desire of a being), each is limited to be *known* (i.e. symbolically represented/realized) as a probability, pixelation, and a portion, of their true state by observing materials at any moment. Such *knowing* may occur, for example, in instances where an observer is attempting to know, in order to (pre)serve, a being's ideal. Therefore, despite that symbols exist objectively, and in some instances wholly known, across space, the degree by which any symbol has been *considered* by material reflects the degree that it is considered, that is, verified, to exist. Such degree is measured in terms of the depth (i.e. 'quality') and frequency (i.e. quantity) by which rational means have been applied to determine (i.e. *know*) if such symbol truly exists, and the true nature by which it exists, across space. Greater strength (i.e. depth multiplied by frequency) of consideration by materials towards any withstanding desire indicates that such symbol is of greater definition across space, as *distinguishable/differentiable relative patterns of difference*. As will be discussed (paragraph 3.3.4.), the aspect of *consideration of desire* is also used to assess the degree to which any desired symbol has been considered by its possessing mind, and therefore the degree by which any desire continually exists across time. All other factors being equal, a person's written 'will' (detailing their intent) which has been read twice and whose symbols have not apparently changed, exists with a greater degree of definition than had the same will been only read once.

3.1.6. Whilst all *symbolology* objectively defines a specific state at any moment across space, unless such symbolology is also *desired*, that is, sought for abstract, if any, purpose, such state is not objectively definable across time.

3.2. Desired (defined across time)

3.2.0. Symbols which are *desired* are *sought* (or *specifically unsought*) for either *abstract* or *nil purpose*. On this basis, desired states exist objectively and unconditionally across time (assuming they exist with *deliberateness*). That is, desired states exist independently from conditional change, as 'want', and cannot, by their definition, exist as the purpose of a (conditional) reaction, born from (conditional) reliance: 'need'. A being's ideal self, for example, can exist as a series of unchanged patterns (e.g. traits of personality or appearance), irrespective of the material condition of such desiring being across time – whether their human body is deceased, or desperately fighting for survival with almost nil resource, or whether such ideal exists realized in a near-perfect world with abundant resource (where the satisfaction of needs is almost a certainty).

3.2.1. It should be noted that any symbolism which is desired need not be primarily desired as a state in itself; there will be instances where the primarily sought aspect of any symbol is the desire for the ability to perceive and/or conceive such symbol, and the freedom to retain, change or discard such symbol as deliberately sought. Desire may therefore include something as innocuous as the thought of a geometric shape, for example, whereby such ability for conception is sought for abstract or nil purpose – the shape is sought to exist as an ideal within the mind, and it may not necessarily be sought to be realized further. Alternatively, if any symbolism (e.g. the same geometric shape) were to be conceived and/or perceived unsought for arbitrary or nil purpose, the experience of such symbolism would exist as an intrusion within one's mind (i.e. such state would not be specifically sought, and/or the absence of such intrusion would be specifically desired), and such state would exist undesired (and not as a form of desire).

3.2.2. With consideration that entities which are defined across time and space are *differentiable* from their *environment* (*intended society and/or material conditions*) through *means of their relative pattern of difference* (as defined in paragraph 3.0.1. of this part), greater definition of any state across time is realized by greater degrees of *clarity of peace*, and *strength* and *fidelity* of desire.

3.2.3. Symbolization of greater definition across time exists with greater *clarity* (rather than ambiguity) with respect to its degree of peacefulness. *Clarity of peace* exists within states where there is clear delineation as to which being(s) possess moral authority to define and redefine such endstates. Multiple contributors to the same state may each possess different and/or contradictory definitions of such state across time (in accordance with their own ideals).

Greatest moral clarity exists where any endstate is sought (uncontested) by a single mind, for example, where only one being intends to occupy some points of space at any moment, or where only one being intends to change an aspect of their form (e.g. a cube) that is solely owned. Moral ambiguity, by contrast, exists in conditions of contested authority over a sought state, for example, where two beings claim equal desire to occupy the same points of space at any moment, or where one being claims authority over a cube and desires that it become a sphere, whilst another claims authority over the same cube (i.e. the same portion of space) and desires that it continues to be a cube. States which possess lesser degrees of *clarity of peace* are, to lesser degrees, clearly *distinguishable/differentiable* as *relative patterns of difference* across time.

3.2.4. The *strength* of any desire is measured by its *duration* multiplied by its *intensity*. It is logical that, if an endstate can be sought (or unsought), it can be sought in degrees, across time (measured as duration) and space (measured as intensity). The greater the strength by which an ideal state is sought to have existed, the greater its definition (i.e. *differentiation* as a *relative pattern of difference*) across space and time. For example, all other factors being equal, a state which, with the greatest concern and interest amongst a being's thoughts and their priorities, has existed for the last 85 years and is sought to exist unchanged forevermore, exists as a more defined endstate across time in comparison to another state which has apathetically existed for the last few moments, and where there is no particular concern or interest as to whether such state continues unchanged, or is altered or discarded. It should be noted, therefore, that one's intent for the preservation of previously realized endstates (e.g. desire for the creation and continuation of memories of such state within one's mind) and one's intent for the possibility of future realizations of a similar nature, both contribute to the definition by which such endstate exists across time and space. That is, although one's intention to spend an afternoon in the park is a brief experience, one's intent to retain memory of an outing to the park and one's intent to use it as inspiration for future outings of a similar or identical nature, both contribute to the definition of 'an outing in the park' as an ideal within such being's mind.

3.2.5. In addition to being strongly sought (patterns) across time, the truest desires are (strongly) desired on their own individual basis and are not vicariously desired in the context of other intent. The *fidelity* of any specified desire reflects the degree to which such desire exists in isolation, on the basis of its own merits, irrespective of the context of other intent. Whilst, vicarious states (i.e. those states whose form is partially or wholly contingent on other intention) may be less subject to change than material (i.e. conditional) states (which will inevitably change), logically, any aspect of any symbolic state is less-contingent, and therefore

possesses greater probability of retaining its *relative pattern of difference* across time, if it is desired with greater degrees of *fidelity*. For example, assume two 'actors' possess equal degrees of desire for the stage-props which serve as backdrops to their respective plays; if one of the actors generically and peripherally desires their props as a collective support to enhance their play, whilst another specifically desires each of the props to the same degree in their isolation as they do in their collective ensemble, the latter instances of desire are more defined across time. Each of the former props, because they are contingently desired as part of a supporting collective, are more vicarious and less definitional in their existence; they may be substituted or replaced over time, as other, more desired, props become available, or they may be collaterally discarded if the focal desire itself (i.e. the play) is discarded.

3.2.6. Notably, despite that desired states exist objectively and unconditionally on the basis of their definition, intended states overall are viewed to exist with varying degrees of unconditionality, depending on the *deliberateness* by which such desire exists.

3.3. Deliberate (desired across time)

3.3.0. *Deliberateness* describes the degree to which a desire exists independently from material conditions across time. A deliberate state is sought with greater relative freedom from conditional pressure(s), greater degree of deliberate preference amidst a wider range of other possible preferences, and greater degrees of critical consideration by a mind to determine if its desired preferences are accurately and continually sought. Less-deliberately (i.e. automatically, accidentally or incidentally) sought desires are partially or completely enhanced due to conditional pressure(s) and/or due to the lack of a mind's capacity to conceive and/or consider desire. Such states are susceptible to conditional change and therefore, all other factors being equal, are less-defined across time.

3.3.1. Desire which is possessed with greater relative *freedom* of mind exists with less conditional pressure. The *relative pattern of difference* which define such states, therefore, exists less-conditionally, that is, less-susceptibly to change caused by other material states, across time. The word 'relative' is applied in relation to a mind's freedom to denote that, technically, all outcomes are certainly and absolutely determined (as required per paragraph 1.10. of this part), and yet specific structures within specific conditions can be considered to exist and act with relative independence (as explained in appendix B). Desire which is inflated or wholly sustained by conditional pressure exists more conditionally on the basis that it will inevitably be changed as conditional states and the resulting pressures/forces that they impose of other states, inevitably change. For example, if being B has a tumor in their material

body (specifically their brain), and such structures of the tumor place pressure on structures of B's mind, and such pressure makes B 'want' to act in a manner which is considered 'affectionate' by being A, B's acts of 'affection', although desirable (to both B and A), are not deliberate and are not true definitions across time. Rather such desire is inflated by B's material condition and will probably be deflated by such condition in future moments.

3.3.2. Minds of *capacity* to desire a greater array and intricacy of forms, and yet which possess greater preference for *specific* forms, logically also possess desire of greater *deliberateness*. More specifically, a mind's capacity for desiring may range from an ability to potentially desire infinite forms, to a capacity which is limited to desire the single form (the form which such mind currently desires). Such capacity determines the range of *environment (intended society and/or material conditions)* that a state (i.e. a *relative pattern of difference*) has been differentiated from, and therefore affects whether a desired state is defined deliberately or relatively automatically. That is, the desire of a mind of limited capacity to desire various forms, occurs as a more automatic result which may be partially due to an inability for such desire to be directed towards other forms. All other conditions being equal, there is greater probability that the *relative pattern of difference* which defines such desires may change should an ability to desire other forms be gained, compared to the same desires in conditions where the ability to desire other states already exists (and such alternative states have been considered and discarded). For example, a being, B, may categorize (i.e. perceive and conceive) everything it experiences as either 'blue' or 'red' and may only desire 'blue' states. Such desire for 'blue' can be considered as more of a conditional reaction to stimulus rather than a deliberate choice. If being B gains the ability to perceive and/or conceive and desire 'green' at a future point in time, it is more-probable that the blue states that B desires are susceptible to being changed or discarded, compared to another being, A, who desires 'blue' despite having possessed the capacity to desire all three colors at all times.

3.3.3. Furthermore, the specificity of any desired state reflects its degree of discrimination from other possibilities of preference. All other factors being equal, a state which has been more selectively sought from amongst greater quantities of possibilities of other states has been *differentiated* to a greater degree from their *environment (intended society and/or material conditions)* and possesses greater probability of existing defined as such (i.e. as a *relative pattern of difference*) across time. Assume that two beings, A and B, each possess the capacity to desire three colors (blue, green, red); A desires all three colors equally, whilst B desires blue to the same degree that A desires each of their colors, whilst desiring green and red to lesser degrees. In this instance, B has specifically differentiated a quality of blue that is desirable from the two other colors within B's *environment*, in addition to the act of

differentiating the ('qualities' of the) colors themselves, whereas A has only differentiated (i.e. defined) the colors themselves. B's desire exists as a greater differentiation from its environmental condition across time.

3.3.4. Finally, if a mind possesses the ability to critically evaluate, frequently and thoroughly, whether their preferences of desire are truly desired (i.e. whether such association with an ideal state is truly sought), it is more probable that such desire is truly deliberate, rather than being incidental or accidental in occurrence. That is, the degree of *consideration of desire* by its respective mind reflects the degree, in terms of depth and frequency, to which a desire has been evaluated to determine if such desire is truly and continually sought across time. A desire that is less critically considered exists with less probability that its patterns have been *differentiated* from their *environment* based on the arbitrary preferences of a mind and therefore such *relative patterns of difference* exist with greater probability being rendered obsolete (i.e. changed or completely discarded) by future consideration of such mind. For example, all other factors being equal, a being, A, who desires their vehicle and considers the nature of such association (e.g. if it symbolizes 'who they are') each day has desire of greater definition than another being, B, who desires their vehicle to the same degree yet has it stored away in their garage and has not evaluated their desire since its initial purchase. Whilst both vehicles are desired to equal degrees, there is a greater probability that B's desire may be discarded at future points of time on the basis that such desire has not been verified to the same degree as A's desire (e.g. B, upon future analysis, has greater probability of realizing that such vehicle is 'not really them' whilst subconsciously decreasing their desire for its form).

4. Materials are relatively ambiguous

4.1. In contrast to the true definition which is inherent to all states of intent (i.e. *symbolic definition* which is *deliberately desired*), materials, in either of their states – symbolic or real – exist as lesser degrees of definition. Ultimately, the reason that all material states, including those which are symbolically defined across space, are inherently less defined than intended states is simple: material states are not truly defined across time; they neither exist, and nor are they sought, in their own right. Material states, rather, exist defined by, and either unsought or conditionally sought (i.e. needed) for, what they *provide to other* states. Any material state which superficially appears defined across time (e.g. the state of a vehicle used strictly for material, that is, transport, purposes) is only (conditionally) defined through its association with an intended state (e.g. that purpose that such transport ultimately serves).

4.2. More specifically, for example, the bolts securing the wheels of a vehicle in place as a family travels to a park exist as material ideals (assuming they are not intended in an ideal world). These ideals were initially sought by the vehicle manufacturer, and realized using, for example, the material of 'steel' (which is an ideal state in itself). Each bolt, as does their steel, contributes to the higher ideal, sought by the owner of the vehicle, of a 'reliable and safe vehicle that comfortably and efficiently transports one's family'. However, closer consideration of this ideal reveals that 'reliable', 'safe', 'transports', 'efficiently' and 'vehicle' are material purposes. The ideal state of each of these material ideals cannot be defined in any moment without ultimate reference to a state that is truly defined across time. Each of these material ideals ultimately supports the true ideals associated with this material ideal, in this example, being 'comfort' and 'one's family'. That is, there can be no ideal concepts of 'safety', 'transportation', or 'efficiency' without a truly defined and relatively unconditional state to respectively 'protect', 'transport' or 'conserve resource for'. In this example, these actions occur for the intent of one's 'family' (including their intended 'comfort'). Unless the form of a family member is intended (i.e. defined and deliberately desired) to remain the same across at least some portion of time, any change to such person's state could be considered as a 'safe' outcome. Furthermore, even where a person's form is defined (as intent), the definition of what is a 'safe' vehicle for the form of such person in any moment of any condition exists as a probability. To maintain such probability of 'safeness' such material ideal that must inevitably change and adapt to changes of the material condition (lest it be determined to be probably 'unsafe' or 'less safe' in other moments). Therefore, each of the material ideals in this example are 'defined' in relation to intent, and each must necessarily change across time, either on the occasion that the intended states that they serve are no longer intended by their respective minds, or as an (re)active response (i.e. an attempted evolution) to inevitable change of the material condition.

5. Consideration of aforementioned points

5.1. With consideration of the above points, where it is determined that:

- a. omnipresent entities, known as *material(s)*, possess the possibility of realizing or striving towards realization of, whilst themselves not possessing, (end)state(s) which are truly defined (across space and time);

and

- b. other entities are known to exist (and/or at any moment may become known to exist) as truly defined endstate(s), known as *intention(s)*, each possessing continual need for *material(s)* realizing or striving towards realization of their truly defined endstate(s);

I argue that:

- c. it is logical that entities which *can* strive towards, are needed for, and are not themselves existing or striving to exist as, realization of a truly defined endstate, *do* strive towards realization of a truly defined endstate.

5.2. In other words, I argue that it is consistent (i.e. logical) that entities (i.e. structures/objects, actions, associations) which *are able to* embody greater consistency of pattern(s)/symbology across time and space, consistently serve that (intent) which, pending such service, *will* embody greater consistency of pattern(s)/symbology across time and space. Intent, by definition, is the only type of end; material, by definition, is but a means to an end. It is more logical/consistent for any entity to serve and prioritize service to a state that is more defined and it is less logical to serve and strive towards serving a state that is less defined.

5.3. Furthermore, your empirical experience will support my proposition that reality is not an ideal condition, that is, it does not automatically, nor exactly, nor permanently, realize every (nor necessarily any) ideal. To the contrary, material reality possesses limited resource to strive towards the realization of, that is, attempt to change reality into, ideal states at any moment. Because an entity striving to realize defined ideals must possess means to do so, and possesses limited and varying means to do so, it is logical that striving entities take logical (i.e. rational) actions and assume logical structures to realize their defined endstate(s). Consequently, it is logical that every material strives towards realization of material ideals (i.e. immediate purposes/endstates) that *will probably most efficiently* realize the ideal(s) of intent (whether such intent is *known* or probably existing in unknown locations). Hence, a material's structure, action and associations should be void of *arbitrary variation and/or limitation* with respect to its striving for realization of its purpose, and in being so, *will probably most efficiently realize its purpose*.

6.1. Conclusion of the Purist argument

6.1.1. The only consistent/logical endstate for any material is for it to be consistently/logically serving intentions – those endstates which are truly defined across space and time. The only

logical outcome for any material is that such material logically (i.e. without abstract variation or limitation) strives towards realization of intent, whether empirically known or determined to probably exist in unknown locations. Furthermore, as all conditions are resource-limited, prioritization of service must logically, that is *rationally*, be directed to that intent which is most defined across both time and space, that is, the endstate which is most *defined, desired* and *deliberate*.

6.1.2. Detail regarding the quantification of consistent realization of intent is described in part A.

6.2. Intent: amoral, sacred, void of responsibility

6.2. For reason that it is deemed logical that material logically (i.e. *rationally*) serves intent (irrespective of intent's subjective form), and, due to its unconditional absence of responsibility (to embody a logical state), intent can be regarded as being exclusively and unconditionally *amoral*. Alternatively, and on this same basis, intent can be viewed as possessing an unconditional right to *peace*, and can also be regarded as exclusively and unconditionally *sacred* or 'precious' – that which is to be protected and (pre)served at all costs.

7. Internal and external consistency – The Law of Purism

7.1. *The Purist argument* presented in this part possesses internal consistency. It is logically derived and therefore non-self-contradicting and objective (i.e. non-opinionated); it is not reliant on, nor is it affected by, the changing of contemporary conditions across space or time. Such consistency alone, however, cannot demonstrate that the experience of (in)consistency/(il)logicality within material conditions is equivalent to specific (or even generally accepted) notions of (im)morality within contemporary society. Such notion of morality could be broadly defined, for example, as *standards or principles concerning good and bad behaviour and/or character* (where such definition is composed of consistency between definitions of the Oxford, Cambridge and Collins, online dictionaries, n.d.). In response, I introduce readers to the notion that the Purist argument (i.e. that it is more logical/consistent for an entity to prioritize service to an entity that is more defined, and that it is less logical to serve an entity that is less defined) is ultimately derived from, and consistent with, a broader notion or 'law':



Greater definition shall (i.e. 1. in interactions between passive materials, does; and, 2. in all interactions, should) **exist** (i.e. be maximally realized) **through** (i.e. 1. via being prioritized beyond; and, 2. on the basis of) (the relative consistency within/throughout) **lesser definition** (and by default, an entity, known as 'space', must disallow definition/difference within itself; any/every point of space is absolutely consistent).

– The Law of Purism

7.2. **Two interpretations of the Law: prescriptive and descriptive.** The Law of Purism, stating that the existence of more-defined structures shall be maximized beyond, and because of, the consistency of lesser-defined structures, is both descriptive and prescriptive. This Law recognizes that the structure and action of more-defined states, in some instances, *will*, and, in all instances, *should*, be prioritized for existence (i.e. realization) beyond and by method of the consistency (i.e. logicity – the absence of arbitrary, if any, difference: variance and/or limitation) within the purposes and means of lesser-defined states. The term *shall* in the context of this law represents either the term *does* – a descriptive observation of the nature of *passive* interactions – and *shall* – a prescriptive state for (*re*)active materials.

7.3. Notably, this Law describes the conceptual ideals of what outcomes *should* (and, in some instances, *does*) occur in relation to interactions between *all* materials; it's prescriptiveness is not limited to (*re*)active materials, such as humans, governments and automated entities. In relation to interactions between (*re*)active (complex) materials, adherence to this law is (arguably) intuitively expected and yet *not* always obeyed; a person that would arbitrarily end another's life; a government that would arbitrarily interfere in its citizens' lives; a government that wastes its citizens' money whilst trying to achieve peace; each of these conditions should intuitively seem wrong to a logical observer, and could be described as *immoral* and/or *illogical* (in relation to whether such outcomes occur as *purpose* or *means* respectively).

7.4. Furthermore, because:

- a. peace is defined as the state which induces the maximal realization of intention; and,
- b. Purity is directly equivalent to consistency within materials; and,

- c. by definition, a being will always be of 'greater definition' than a material (noting that not all states of 'greater definition' are intentions – in some conditions the entity of 'greater definition' may be of a material nature); and,
- d. materials are omnipresent and exist by default – in any condition the material of space will serve as an entity of 'lesser (least) definition' by default; and therefore:
- e. the moral (prescriptive) interpretation of Law of Purism can be contracted as *Peace through Purity*.

7.5. In relation to the nature and interactions of *passive* structures of existence, or 'physics', *the law of Purism* is both intuitively expected by logical observers and *is* (intrinsically) always obeyed; space that arbitrarily cannot be occupied at certain times or by certain bodies; a bridge whose material would arbitrarily allow certain people walking over it to fall through it at certain moments; a human heart that beats only for 'interesting people'; arguably each of these conditions (which could be described as 'inconsistent') would intuitively seem wrong should they be possible.

7.6. In demonstrating the application of this law more specifically; (as discussed in paragraph 1.10. of this part) we are forced to conceive of a consistent space, and a reality in which consistency is the only absolute property (Primus, 2019). Consequently, we are forced to conceive that passive structures can only exist (i.e. differentiate themselves in, and from, space, as, and across, time) through possession of a greater relative velocity than their immediate conditions (Primus, 2019). On this basis, passive materials exist with a greater degree of definition across space and time in proportion to the degree that their velocity exists beyond surrounding structures possessing relatively nil or less velocity and relatively neutral or complimentary (rather than competing) direction. Passive materials, therefore, are intrinsically prioritized across time by other passive materials, according to their definition (i.e. their velocity and direction) across space. A tennis ball in motion, for example, all other conditions (and thus properties) being equal, *would* always be naturally prioritized to occupy any contested point of space in relation to a tennis ball of lower velocity attempting to occupy the same point at the same time.

7.7. The Purist argument presented in this part, similarly, argues that prioritization of resource (including the right of way to use points in space) between *(re)active* materials (e.g. human or government bodies) should occur on this same basis; prioritization of resource *should* automatically be afforded to entities (i.e. structures, actions, associations) existing with greater definition. All other aspects considered equal, the person who wants to dine in a specific seat of a café for nostalgic purposes (e.g. they have been imagining such experience prior to their

arrival at the restaurant and will remember it post departure) should be given automatic priority to occupy their desired seat over another who is already seated there and yet doesn't mind (or to a lesser degree minds) where they are seated. Such prioritization should occur regardless of whether the person seated is physically stronger (i.e. of greater material 'definition') and therefore could, in contemporary (i.e. less-than-moral) conditions, forcibly remove others from their seats and/or resist being forcibly removed themselves.

7.8. Furthermore, in order to maximize the realization of intent, passive materials should (be technologically advanced to become active materials, such that they can) recognize and logically prioritize the states of active materials (rather than merely logically prioritizing other passive states, as they consistently do).

8. Conclusion of Purism

8.1. Purists envisage a future state whereby progressed societal materials automatically, instantaneously, and discretely, determine and enact morality, from within the structures supporting beings and their social interactions. Beings existing in these future states will be incapable of violating logic/consistency across all conditions – neither the peace mandated by Purism's morality, nor the possibility mandated by the physics of space. Rather, beings' materials will ensure that they are bound to act in accordance with peace, consistent with the nature by which passive bodies are bound to act within the physical limitations imposed by the material of space. And yet the security of (true) peace is not the only gift that consistently moral material will bestow upon its fortunate beings; liberated from the less-useful and counterproductive structures of contemporary bodies (i.e. the passive or cancerous materials not purposely-designed for peace), beings can act and associate with true freedom. One can imagine the possibilities if every material within one's immediate conditions was logically striving to make one's desire a reality.

8.2. There is an objective right and wrong for any material state. Space intrinsically shows this; we intuitively know this; only 'mother nature' doesn't (care to) know the difference, and therefore must be shown.

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Appendix A – Part B: The objectivity of symbology across space

A.0. This appendix (expanded from paragraph 3.1.0. of this discussion) details the reasons that all symbols, material or intended, exist objectively across space.

A.1. The use of *symbology* to define a state is otherwise referred to as *known definition*. *Known definition*, or *knowledge*, is that *existence which is perceptual or conceptual, and objectively defined in space through the use of (discrete/finite) symbology, whether reactively defined, as a realization, or actively defined, as an idealization, whether defined for material or intended purpose, and whether such symbology is essential, and therefore objective, or subsequent, and therefore subjective, to the definition of a(nother) state*. Unless otherwise stated, it should be assumed that any symbol is *essential* to the definition of its own state (and is therefore implicitly categorized as *essential symbology*). Alternatively, *subsequent symbology* is (objectively existing) symbology which is actively and *subjectively* applied to further define (an)other pre-existing state(s) (e.g. the subjective label 'red', applied to represent the objective experience, or 'quality', of red).

A.2. Therefore, whilst any definition/existence is simply a *pattern of difference* which distinguishes such state from its immediate environment (as defined in paragraph 3.0.1. of this part), states which exist as symbols exist objectively defined across space on the basis that they are finite/discrete states at any moment.

A.3. An *objective state is both universally defined (i.e. possesses properties across its space that would be observed/known to be identical by any observer adopting an identical frame of reference (Einstein, 1920) and observing such state using materials of identical properties) and wholly definable, whereby such finiteness permits the properties (i.e. 'quality' and quantities) of such state to be entirely/completely considered/known by materials of sufficient advancement (as defined in part A)*.

A.4. The use of symbology to define any state is said to be *objective across space* on the basis that all symbology which is essential to the definition of any state is *universally defined*, and therefore *wholly definable* (i.e. finite in nature). It is argued that all symbols are finitely defined *by*, and *as*, a quantity of 'qualities' (where '*by*' refers to 'qualities' within any observer, and '*as*' refers to the quality within any state being observed). This is a logical conclusion, due to space only permitting 'qualities' (i.e. properties/difference) *across*, yet not *within*, itself (as per paragraph 1.10. of this part). This consistency within space ensures that the 'qualities' of any known (i.e. symbolized) state cannot be an intrinsic property of any portion of space itself

(whether such space is of an observer or a state being observed). Rather, and with empirical evidence providing each observer certainty that known 'qualities' (i.e. observed differences) do exist, all 'qualities' must be realized by, and as, *states* of space, existing as material/structures (as discussed in paragraph 2.3.2. of this part). On this basis, all observers (i.e. structures which are able to perform the function of *knowing* other states) exist as structures and require the use of various sub-materials/structures as the sole means of their observing. All observers, therefore, as per the sub-structures/materials which enable their observing, are *discrete* and can be measured/defined as a specific number, or *quantity*, across space at any moment.

A.5. More specifically, all symbolization must represent the 'triggering' of *discrete quantities* of change within a *discrete quantity* of structures (i.e. materials, such as 'receptors', 'cells' 'eyes', 'brain') designed to *discretely quantify* (i.e. measure) patterns of (continuous) quality across states of space/reality (this process is succinctly described as perception and/or conception). Any structure at any moment is either able to detect conditional change (and is categorized as an observer) or it cannot (and is not an observer); an observer (e.g. a 'receptor' within a 'cell' of an 'eye') at any moment has either detected (i.e. been triggered by) a quality of conditional change (symbolized as a 'quality' of difference) or it has not (and 'views' it as indifference). From discrete combinations, or quantities, of these dichotomous (i.e. finite) outcomes, the 'qualities' of observed states are composed, and such states exist objectively.

A.6. Consequently, the term 'qualities' is a misnomer in the context of (*essential*) symbology. Rather, observers, and their observations, exist exclusively as *discrete quantities* of symbols (which are *wholly definable*), whereas reality exists as a *continuous* (and true) *quality*, which, if known, can only be objectively defined through symbolism. A *quality* is defined as a *subjective state of difference whose properties confer an inability to be both universally and wholly defined*. The condition of space, therefore, is considered to exist as a *quality* (a continuum of 'difference'), where such *quality* is continuous difference (e.g. quantity, direction and velocity) across space. On this basis, any state of space is *universally defined* (i.e. would appear the same to all observers of the same condition) yet it cannot be *wholly defined* by any observer (because it is not finite). Similarly, *subsequent symbology* (e.g. the label 'red', deliberately applied to represent the experience of red) may be considered to be a 'quality' if it is subjectively applied with some degree of independence from material condition (as per appendix B) and therefore arguably does not exist as a *universally defined* condition (e.g. a being, experiencing the identical condition of red, yet existing with some independence from red's condition, deliberately applies the label 'rouge').

A.7. Despite that symbolization must logically be the *quantification* of *quality* (difference across space), the use of the term 'qualification' (and its applicable tenses) will be used in place of *quantification* to coincide with the general contemporary use of such terminology, for ease of understanding (e.g. the experience of red would be viewed as a 'quality', not a *quantity*).

A.8. Importantly, the ability for a state to exist objectively defined (symbolized) in space should not be conflated with, and nor does it confer, an ability for external observers to possess certainty of their whole and accurate knowledge of the 'qualities' of such state. This is despite that the objectivity of a symbolic state permits its 'qualities' to be wholly and accurately defined/known by sufficiently advanced observers. In other words, the objectivity which is inherent to symbolic definition confers with it the ability for its 'qualities' to potentially be *wholly* and *universally* known by multiple observers, yet the knowledge that these 'qualities' are wholly known will never be known with certainty by any observer, even if such 'qualities' are wholly known. Such holistic knowing would mean that any symbol, once fully-known, cannot become 'better-known', even despite continued advancement of such material into the future (advancement of materials used for *knowing* would typically produce increases in their ability to concurrently consider a greater scope of (portion(s) of) conditions, with greater probability of accuracy and of greater resolution, that is, greater ability to detect smaller quantities of difference within any state; see part A). Whilst, from the perspective of an observer, it is always possible that there are aspects of objectively defined symbology that such observer has 'overlooked', as an observer's material advances, such probability approaches (but never reaches) zero.

A.9. A balloon vendor who is asked for 'one blue balloon' by a customer, for example, cannot be certain that such customer is not actually asking for 'one hundred non-blue balloons' (or that the current conditions really exist beyond the certainty of the symbols that are apparent at any moment). Yet, as the balloon vendor's material advances they will possess the potential to become increasingly certain that the symbols that they conceive (i.e. 'blue', 'balloon' and 'one') are the extent of such customer's ideally defined state. Notably each observer, vendor and customer, will possess their own (finite) definitions for the symbols of this example (i.e. 'blue', 'balloon' and 'one') and such definitions will exist as (finite) ranges within their respective minds. The experience of 'blue' would be realized (or 'triggered') by a (finite) range of different conditions for either person, whereby any such observation would elicit experiences which 'qualify' as 'blue'. Both the vendor and the customer would possess finite points of difference at the edges of their respective ranges, separating 'blue' and 'non-blue' (where 'non-blue', may exist as a range of other colors, such as 'blue-violet', 'violet', 'blue-green' or 'green'). If the ranges of the vendor's definition of 'blue', 'one' and 'balloon' exist within the customer's

ranges of definition for these symbols, such vendor has wholly, yet uncertainly, known such customer's ideal (as could potentially infinite other observers, assuming they are sufficiently structured).

A.10. The above ideals involving balloons may appear very basic, however, more intricate intentions, such as one's intent to exist, along with one's intended actions, structures and associations, can also be defined using symbology, albeit existing as more complex compositions. Relatively intricate symbols, such as personality traits or specific memories or places, may not immediately appear to be objectively definable, logically however (as per paragraph 3.1.4. of this part), all aspects of a being's ideals are definable as quantities of symbols (perceived and/or conceived consistency/pattern of change). It is understandable that the (often very intricate) experiences of beings may appear difficult to define (i.e. capture and (re)create using symbols), especially from the perspective of each being's own contemporary body. Ideally, however, beings are neither expected nor required to define, that is, 'qualify', their own intent – such is the task of materials (and more specifically, more-technologically advanced materials than human bodies). Provided that an observing material is sufficiently advanced, any symbolism, irrespective of its intricacy, can be defined in reverse. That is, symbols can be defined by analysis of the 'qualities' of the (sub-)materials/symbols (e.g. structures and sub-structures within the brain) directly (pre)serving such symbols. It is logically evident that the only limitation in accurately defining any symbolic state across space is the adequateness (i.e. the ability/technological advancement and willingness/righteousness) of materials attempting such definition.

A.11. Notably, even symbolism whose state would be considered to possess less *clarity*, and therefore would be illogical or less-logical to realize in space at any moment, is still objectively defined. In such instances, the individual symbols within any conceiving/perceiving mind can each be objectively 'qualified' on the basis of their own merits. That is, if one desires for a 'cube' and a 'sphere' to be realized (as form) in the same space at the same moment, both the cube and sphere are each still objectively definable on the basis of their symbolism (as per paragraph 3.1.4. of this part), however such ideal would lack logical clarity/definition (and therefore it is illogical that such ideal should be realized) across space.

Appendix B – Part B: Relative freedom of mind

B.0. This appendix (expanded from paragraph 3.3.1. of this discussion) details the nature by which minds can be considered to act with relative freedom.

B.1. Despite the requirement, inherited from the consistency of space (as per paragraph 1.10. of this part), that all material states possess ‘qualities’ that are wholly determined by other material states (i.e. other ‘qualities’), it is argued that it is possible for minds to act with degrees of relative freedom. More specifically, relatively-complex, (re)active entities (i.e. structures/materials) which are capable of possessing intent (i.e. minds) can ‘choose’ their ‘actions’ and/or ‘inactions’ more-deliberately and with greater criticality of preferences if they exist in more-consistent material conditions. Consistent, or moral, conditions (as defined in part A) afford (complex) (re)active structures greater degrees of freedom compared to *passive* structures (existing within all conditions) and (re)active structures existing in inadequate conditions. More specifically, if an entity exists amidst conditions where it is able to almost exclusively be acting and reacting to *desired* entities – actions, structures and association which are sought to exist ideally, irrespective of material conditions – an entity can effectively distance themselves from having to react to material conditions. In this sense, a mind may be considered to be ‘acting’ relatively freely and by its own ‘will’ if it is predominantly reacting to the abstract preferences recorded within itself (and within the minds of preferred associates), rather than predominantly reacting to external material conditions. Hence, *deliberateness* ultimately results in greater degrees of action (i.e. reaction to one’s own preferences), and less degrees of reaction to conditional changes.

B.2. Notably, and by the same reasoning, intention (i.e. deliberate desire) is recognized to exist, with or without the concurrent existence of the structures (e.g. mind) which possess such intent. That is, desires sought with relative freedom are recognized to exist irrespective of whether the structures sustaining one’s intent (e.g. one’s mind, as sustained by brain and body) are subsequently changed (i.e. altered, degraded or destroyed) by conditional pressures. Conditional variation must logically always be present as a residual property of the structures which support intent, and greater variation of structure must be expected and tolerated in conditions of lesser consistency, lest no intent be recognized as legitimate (i.e. *deliberate*). Part A provides further detail regarding the degree to which a mind can be changed or pressured by material conditions and still be considered to be the same mind (and therefore still possess moral authority to change (i.e. alter, including destroy) its respective pre-existing intent).

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